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INTRODUCTION

Scholars who study the human mind are increasingly interested in
our capacity to imagine the future.1 Some think that capacity defines us.2
XWhat best distinguishes our species is an ability that scientists are just
beginning to appreciate: We contemplate the future. Our singular foresight
created civilization and sustains society.U3 In other words, because we can
conceptualize possible futures and take actions today that will bear fruit
tomorrow, we change the world by changing how we think.4
We need mental models and metaphors to simplify, grasp, and
express complex realities and ideas.5 Our understanding is imperfect and the
world changes; our thinking eventually becomes obsolete and our methods
stop working; thus, we should regularly challenge our mental models, reenvision our objectives, and revise our strategies.6 The Florida Bar
Foundation (the XFoundationU) recently did just this when it undertook a

1.
Scott Cole, A Timely Dose of Theory in Future Thinking Research, 70 Q.J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 347, 347 (2017) (reviewing SEEING THE FUTURE: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE-ORIENTED MENTAL TIME TRAVEL 1 (Kourken Michaelian et al. eds.,
2016)); see also Adam Bulley, The History and Future of Human Prospection,
EVOLUTIONARY STUD. IMAGINATIVE CULTURE, Spring 2018, at 75, 76 (reviewing SEEING THE
FUTURE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE-ORIENTED MENTAL TIME TRAVEL supra;
MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN ET AL., HOMO PROSPECTUS (2016)). Cognitive scientists use a variety
of terms to refer to this ability, including prospection and, delightfully, X[f]uture-oriented
[m]ental [t]ime travel.U Cole, supra, at 347.
2.
Martin E. P. Seligman & John Tierney, We Aren’t Built to Live in the
Moment,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
19,
2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/opinion/sunday/why-the-future-is-always-on-yourmind.html.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
See OLLE TORGNY, KUNGL TEKNISKA HÖGSKOLAN, ROYAL INST. TECH.,
METAPHOR - A WORKING CONCEPT 3 (1997); S.V. Kiseleva & N.A. Trofimova, Metaphor as a
Device for Understanding Cognitive Concepts, 23 REVISTA DE LENGUAS PARA FINES
ESPECÍFICOS 226, 227 (2017); Steve Rathje, Metaphors Can Change Our Opinions in Ways
We Don’t Realize, QUARTZ (Mar. 31, 2018), http://qz.com/1241030/metaphors-can-changeour-opinions-in-ways-we-dont-even-realize/; P.N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models and
Cognitive Change, 25 J. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 131, 131 (2013); James Clear, Mental Models:
Learn How to Think Better and Gain a Mental Edge, JAMES CLEAR,
http://www.jamesclear.com/mental-models (last visited Dec. 21, 2019); James Clear, Mental
Models: How to Train Your Brain to Think in New Ways, JAMES CLEAR,
http://www.jamesclear.com/feynman-mental-models (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
6.
Kate Gerasimova, How to Challenge Your Mental Models and Think
Differently,
GOTHAM
CULTURE
(Mar.
23,
2017),
http://www.gothamculture.com/2017/03/23/challenge-mental-models-think-differently/.

2019]

STRATEGIC RESET

3

Strategic Reset.7 In this Article, the Author explains the Foundation’s
Strategic Reset and places it in context by discussing the circumstances that
compelled it and the key ideas that shaped it.8
The Foundation is a 501(c)(3) charity with the mission of providing
greater access to justice in Florida.9 The Foundation’s principal source of
revenue is the State’s Interest on Trust Accounts (XIOTAU) program, the
nation’s first.10 Lamentably, Florida is one of only three states11 that
currently do not provide legislative funding for civil legal aid.12 In the past,
7.
STRATEGIC RESET COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRS. OF THE FLA. BAR FOUND.,
THE FLORIDA BAR FOUNDATION STRATEGIC RESET 2, 6 (2017), http://fbfcdnlwncgfpygomdk2qxtd0e.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Strategic-Reset-andExecutive-Summary.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIC RESET REPORT]. The term reset is apt
because it is a metaphor that comes from 21st century digital technology. See Reset,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/reset (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
People reset things before the turn of the 21st century[e.g., bones, watches, clocks,
odometers, passwords[but in the context of the Foundation’s Strategic Reset, the analogy is
to resetting an electronic device: Clearing errors, restoring, refreshing, making a system work
correctly again. See STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra, at 23.
8.
See id. at 6; discussion infra Part V.
9.
See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018); Leadership and Funding for Justice in
Florida, FLA. B. FOUND.: ABOUT, http://thefloridabarfoundation.org/about/overview/ (last
visited
Dec.
21,
2019);
Mission,
FLA.
B.
FOUND.:
ABOUT,
http://thefloridabarfoundation.org/about/mission/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
10.
Leadership and Funding for Justice in Florida, supra note 9.
11.
James J. Sandman, The Role of the Legal Services Corporation in
Improving Access to Justice, DAEDALUS, Winter 2019, at 113, 113; State Legislative Funding
for
Civil
Legal
Aid,
A.B.A,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/A
TJReports/ls_sclaid_atj_legislative_funding.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2019). The other two
states are Alabama and Idaho. State Legislative Funding for Civil Legal Aid, supra; see also
Phillip Ensler, Civil Legal Aid Funding Is Not an Expense, It’s an Investment, ALA.
APPLESEED
CTR.
FOR
L.
&
JUST.
(June
22,
2018),
http://www.alabamaappleseed.org/author/ensler/civil-legal-aid-funding-is-not-an-expense-itsan-investment/; State Funding Initiative, IDAHO LEGAL AID SERVICES, INC.,
http://www.idaholegalaid.org/node/1064/state-funding-initiative (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
12.
Sandman, supra note 11, at 113; State Legislative Funding for Civil Legal
Aid, supra note 11. XCivil legal aid is a combination of services and resources that helps
Americans of all backgrounds[including those who face the toughest legal challenges:
Children, veterans, seniors, ill or disabled people, and victims of domestic violence[to
effectively navigate the justice system.U What Is Civil Legal Aid?, VOICES FOR CIV. JUST.,
http://www.voicesforciviljustice.org/for-journalists/civil-legal-aid-faq-media/ (last visited
Dec. 21, 2019). The terms legal services or civil legal assistance are sometimes used
interchangeably with civil legal aid. See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 65 n.1 (4th ed. 2018). In this Article, the Author uses the term civil legal aid to refer
broadly to all forms of free legal assistance. See discussion infra Part IIX. On the history of
civil legal aid in the United States, see HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra, at 12, 22; FELICE BATLAN,
WOMEN AND JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A HISTORY OF LEGAL AID, 18631945, 39, 17 (2015); 2
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the Foundation had the resources to fund a significant portion[up to a
third[of the budgets of Florida’s civil legal aid providers.13 Ten years of
interest rate cuts in the wake of the Great Recession, however, decimated
IOTA revenues and greatly reduced the Foundation’s ability to financially
support the State’s civil legal aid organizations.14
There is a widening justice gap15 in the United States: The need for
civil legal aid greatly exceeds the supply.16 The traditional legal aid delivery
model has consisted primarily of representation by lawyers employed by
legal aid organizations or private lawyers providing their services pro bono.17
Most people receive no help for their urgent and pressing legal problems. 18
It is estimated that eighty percent or more of the civil legal needs of poor and
low-income people go unmet, and that forty to sixty percent of the middle
class now cannot afford to hire lawyers.19 In other words, the civil justice
system[our system for lawfully and peacefully adjudicating disputes and

EARL JOHNSON JR., TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL LEGAL
AID IN THE UNITED STATES 58789 (2013).
13.
John A. Noland, The Florida Bar Foundation Celebrates the 30-Year
Anniversary of IOTA, FLA. B.J., JulyAug. 2011, at 24, 26.
14.
See STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 34.
15.
Sandman, supra note 11, at 114. Justice gap is a metaphor that describes
the Xshortfall between legal needs and available legal servicesU in civil matters. Id. Legal
Services Corporation (XLSCU), the country’s single largest funder of civil legal aid, has
measured the unmet need for civil legal aid in the United States in four Justice Gap reports
published in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2017. See LSC, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 3 (2005)
[hereinafter JUSTICE GAP REPORT 2005]; LSC, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:
THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 4 (2d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter JUSTICE GAP REPORT 2007]; LSC, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:
THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 12 (2009)
[hereinafter JUSTICE GAP REPORT 2009]; LSC, THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET
CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017) [hereinafter JUSTICE GAP REPORT
2017].
16.
Robert H. Frank, How Rising Inequality Widens the Justice Gap, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2018, at BU3. The Federal Constitution does not provide an automatic right to
counsel in civil cases. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 438 (2011); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
17.
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 8.
18.
JUSTICE GAP REPORT 2017, supra note 15, at 6; Frank, supra note 16.
19.
JUSTICE GAP REPORT 2017, supra note 15, at 6; Leonard Wills, Access to
Justice:
Mitigating
the
Justice
Gap,
A.B.A.
(Dec.
3,
2017),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/minority-triallawyer/practice/2017/access-to-justice-mitigating-justice-gap/.

2019]

STRATEGIC RESET

5

establishing legal rights[is mostly inaccessible to ordinary citizens.20 This
undermines the rule of law.21
The depletion of the Foundation’s financial resources, the widening
justice gap, and the emergence of a nationwide shift in thinking about how
the aspirational goal of full access to the civil justice system might be
achieved led the Foundation’s leadership to conclude that the traditional
legal aid model was not working[that there will never be enough lawyers or
enough money to meet Floridians’ unmet civil legal needs[and that
innovative solutions and dramatic changes in the State’s civil justice and
legal aid systems would be required to fulfill the Foundation’s mission of
providing greater access to justice.22 So, therefore, on June 16, 2016, by
unanimous vote, the Foundation’s Board of Directors passed the following
resolution (XStrategic Reset ResolutionU):
RESOLVED, The Florida Bar Foundation should execute a
strategic reset and establish itself as not only a source of funds and
expertise, but as a strategic leader and catalyst in the cause of
increased access to justice for all. Its primary goal in the
immediate future should be to serve as an agent of rapid, effective
and high impact change.23

The Strategic Reset is a work in progress that will guide the
Foundation’s investments of time, energy, and funds for five years (from
fiscal years 20182019 through 20222023).24 The Foundation’s mission of
providing greater access to justice in Florida has not changed, and its goals
and strategies remain consistent with the three purposes for which the
Supreme Court of Florida originally authorized the use of IOTA funds (civil
legal aid, improvements in the administration of justice, and law student
programs).25
20.
See Frank, supra note 16.
21.
See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 20172018 11 (2018);
Access to Justice, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/access-tojustice-and-rule-of-law-instutions/access-to-justice/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
22.
See STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 6. The Strategic Reset
Report was written by the Board’s Strategic Reset Committee and adopted by the
Foundation’s Board on June 22, 2017. Id.; Strategic Reset for the Florida Bar Foundation,
FLA. BAR FOUND.,
http://www.floridabar.org/news/strategic-reset-for-the-florida-barfoundation (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
23.
STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
24.
Id. at 2.
25.
See In re Interest on Tr. Accounts (IOTA II), 372 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla.
1979); In re Interest on Tr. Accounts (IOTA I), 356 So. 2d 799, 805 (Fla. 1978); STRATEGIC
RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; Leadership and Funding for Justice in Florida, supra note
9; Mission, supra note 9.
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A shift in thinking about how to increase access to justice in the
United States is well underway.26 In this Article, the Author refers to and
touches on some of the emerging new ideas, but she does not attempt a
thorough treatment of the entire subject[that would be too big of an
undertaking.27 The Author does aim to persuade readers to consider whether
prevailing views of and approaches to civil legal aid have become obsolete
and to open their minds to new ideas.28 Florida is on the leading edge when
it comes to creating a better future for access to justice and the rule of law in
the State, but it trails behind when it comes to state funding for legal aid.29
The Author also will argue that the State of Florida and the State’s business
community should contribute substantial funding for civil legal aid.30
There is a growing consensus that access to justice is essential to a
society governed by the rule of law and that civil legal aid benefits everyone,
not just the poor.31 Civil legal aid generates economic and social benefits far
in excess of its cost.32 All citizens, including corporate citizens, benefit from
a well-functioning, fair, and accessible legal system.33 As Nathan L. Hecht,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, recently wrote: XLegal aid, like
pro bono legal services, is not an entitlement. It’s not welfare. It’s simply
good government. This is an American idea, not a liberal one or a
conservative one.U34

26.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.ncforaj.org (last visited Dec. 21, 2019). Information on recent developments in
access to justice is available in many places. See id.; STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7,
at 1521; Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/resource_center_for_acces
s_to_justice/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019); What Is Legal Aid, LSC, http://www.lsc.gov/whatlegal-aid (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
27.
See discussion infra Part IV.
28.
See discussion infra Parts IVVII.
29.
See FLA. STAT. § 68.095 (2019); State Legislative Funding for Civil Legal
Aid, supra note 11.
30.
See THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CIVIL LEGAL AID
ORGANIZATIONS IN FLORIDA 12 (2016); Nancy Kinnally, Summit Focuses on Legal Aid
Solutions, FLA. B.: NEWS, Jan. 1, 2016, at 21; discussion infra Part VIII.
31.
See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 60.
32.
See
Economic
Impact
Study,
FLA.
B.
FOUND.,
http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/impact/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019). This study found
that every $100,000 invested in civil legal aid in Florida creates an estimated $719,000 in
economic impacts. Id.
33.
See id.
34.
Nathan L. Hecht, The Twilight Zone, DAEDALUS, Winter 2019, at 190,
191; see also Alysia Santo, How Conservatives Learned to Love Free Lawyers for the Poor,
POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/24/howconservatives-learned-to-love-free-lawyers-for-the-poor-215635.
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Part II of this Article describes the role of the Foundation and
Florida’s IOTA program in funding legal aid organizations and
improvements in the administration of justice in Florida.35
Part III explains how the Great Recession affected the Foundation’s
finances between 2008 and the present.36
In Part IV, the Author discusses the key metaphors and mental
models needed to understand the Xrapid, effective and high-impact changeU
for which the Foundation seeks to be a strategic leader and catalyst.37
In Part V, the Author explains that the Strategic Reset is still very
much a work in progress and outlines the new strategic directions that are
beginning to take shape.38
Part VI contains a brief history of legislative funding for civil legal
aid in Florida.39
In Part VII, the Author explains how access to justice relates to the
rule of law and how it benefits every sector of society and supports social
stability.40
In Part VIII, the Author argues that the State of Florida and Florida’s
business community should begin funding civil legal aid in meaningful
ways.41
The Foundation’s leadership is committed to doing today what will
expand access to the State’s civil justice system in the future.42 As
Foundation Board member Hon. Edwin A. Scales III of Florida’s Third
District Court of Appeal put it in his keynote speech at the Foundation’s
2017 annual dinner: XIt is my sincere hope that when we then [i.e., in the
future] reflect on our Foundation’s inventive, dynamic, bold experiment[
the Strategic Reset Initiative[it will be bearing fruit, providing far more
access to civil justice than merely divvying out depleting IOTA funds.U43

35.
See discussion infra Part II.
36.
See discussion infra Part III.
37.
See STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 6; discussion infra Part IV.
38.
See discussion infra Part V.
39.
See discussion infra Part VI.
40.
See discussion infra Part VII.
41.
See Karen A. Lash, Executive Branch Support for Civil Legal Aid,
DAEDALUS, Winter 2019, at 160, 16061; Economic Impact Study, supra note 32; discussion
infra Part VIII.
42.
See Florida Bar Foundation Continues to Play a Vital Role in Florida
Commission on Access to Civil Justice, FLA. B. FOUND. (Oct. 13, 2016),
http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/florida-bar-foundation-continues-play-vital-roleflorida-commission-access-civil-justice/.
43.
Foundation Poised for a Strategic Reset, FLA. B. NEWS, Aug. 1, 2017, at
1.
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THE FLORIDA BAR FOUNDATION AND FLORIDA’S INTEREST ON
TRUST ACCOUNTS (IOTA) PROGRAM

IOTA (or XIOLTA,U as it is more widely known, for Interest on
Lawyers’ Trust Accounts) is a method of using the interest generated by
pooled client funds in lawyers’ trust accounts to raise money for law-related
charitable purposes, primarily to fund civil legal aid for the poor.44 Florida’s
IOTA program was the first in the United States.45 It was established in
1981 after a decade of study and effort by forward-thinking Florida lawyers
and judges.46 The Supreme Court of Florida designated the Foundation, an
existing nonprofit organization founded in 1956, to receive and administer
the funds generated by the program.47 This made the Foundation a major
player in civil legal aid in Florida.48 The Foundation became influential not
44.
Talbot D’Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access,
FLA.
B.J.,
Apr.
1999,
at
12,
16;
What
Is
IOLTA?,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/interest_lawyers_trust_accounts/overview/ (last visited
Dec. 21, 2019).
45.
See In re Interest on Tr. Accounts (IOTA I), 356 So. 2d 799, 80405 (Fla.
1978).
46.
See id. at 807 (establishing the program); In re Interest on Tr. Accounts
(IOTA III), 402 So. 2d 389, 393 (Fla. 1981) (adopting the program); In re Interest on Tr.
Accounts (IOTA II), 372 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 1979) (amending the program); L. David Shear,
The Interest on Trust Accounts Program: The Quest Now Is Implementation, 56 FLA. B.J. 104,
105 (1982); Leadership and Funding for Justice in Florida, supra note 9. The Honorable
Arthur J. England, Jr. (19322013), who served as a Supreme Court of Florida justice from
19751981 and played a pivotal role in this effort, wrote: XWe intended at the outset to create
an IOTA model for other states, as well as to become the first in the country to adopt an IOTA
program.U The Honorable Arthur J. England, Jr. to Receive the 16th Annual Russell E.
Carlisle Advocacy Award Presented by Legal Aid Service of Broward County, BROWARD
COUNTY B. ASS’N BARRISTER, Sept. 2013, at 11. All fifty states and the District of Columbia
now have IOLTA programs.
Directory of IOLTA Programs, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/interest_lawyers_trust_accounts/resources/directory_of_i
olta_programs/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019); What Is IOLTA?, supra note 44. For the history
of IOTA/IOLTA. See IOTA I, 356 So. 2d at 80002; Talbot XSandyU D’Alemberte,
Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 631, 63637 (1998);
Arthur J. England & Russell E. Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 56
FLA. B.J. 101, 10103 (1982); Gregory A. Hearing, Comment, Funding Legal Services for the
Poor: Florida’s IOTA Program — Now Is the Time to Make It Mandatory, 16 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 337, 34449 (1988); JOHNSON JR., supra note 12, at 58689; NAT’L ASS’N OF IOLTA
PROGRAMS, History of IOLTA in North America, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1KKHOXhDsOk.
47.
IOTA I, 356 So. 2d at 807; Herman J. Russomanno, The Florida Bar
Foundation: How Lawyers Help the Poor, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2001, at 4, 4; Burton Young, The
Florida Bar Foundation: A History for a New Beginning, FLA. B.J., 108, 108 (1982); History,
FLA. B. FOUND.: ABOUT, http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/history (last visited Dec. 21,
2019).
48.
Young, supra note 47, at 108, 112.
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only because it distributed IOTA funds, but also because of the knowledge
and engagement of its leadership and staff.49 The Foundation, now a
501(c)(3) nonprofit, developed into Florida’s foremost source of information
and expertise on access to justice issues.50
There are three approved uses for IOTA funds: Civil Legal
Assistance for the poor (XLAPU), Improvements in the Administration of
Justice (XAOJU), and Law Student Assistance (XLSAU).51 In the program’s
first few years, when participation was optional, IOTA revenues hovered
around $3 million annually.52 After 1989, when participation became
mandatory, annual revenues of $10 million or more were typical.53 In 1990
1991, a year of unusually high revenue ($19 million), the Foundation created
49.
See id.
50.
Id. at 112; see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018); Leadership and Funding
for Justice in Florida, supra note 9. Jane Curran, the Foundation’s first Executive Director,
held that position for thirty-two years. Jane Elizabeth Curran Distinguished Service Award,
FLA. B. FOUND., http://thefloridabarfoundation.org/jane-curan-award-recipient (last visited
Dec. 21, 2019). She is said to have Xspearhead[ed] virtually every innovation utilized in the
IOTA/IOLTA movement throughout the United States until her retirement.U Id. The second
Executive Director, Bruce Blackwell, a former Foundation President and former member of
the Florida Bar’s Board of Governors, led the Foundation through the challenging years
described in Part II. Gary Blankenship, Florida Bar Foundation’s Blackwell Steps Down,
FLA. B. NEWS, May 15, 2018, at 8; see also discussion infra Part II. After a competitive
national search led by the Author, the Foundation’s Board selected Dominic XDonnyU
MacKenzie as its third Executive Director. Max Marbut, Donny MacKenzie to Lead the
Florida Bar Foundation, JACKSONVILLE DAILY REC. (July 2, 2018, 3:34 AM),
http://www.jaxdailyrecord.com/article/donny-mackenzie-to-lead-the-florida-bar-foundation.
An experienced litigator, MacKenzie, was Holland & Knight’s Jacksonville pro bono partner
and had served on the Foundation’s Board for eight years, including as the Foundation’s
20152016 President and as the first Chair of the Foundation’s Strategic Reset Committee.
Id. The Foundation’s current officers, directors, and staff are profiled on its website. Our
Leadership:
Board
of
Directors,
FLA.
B.
FOUND.:
ABOUT,
http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/about/board-of-directors (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
51.
IOTA II, 372 So. 2d at 69; IOTA I, 356 So. 2d at 807; Financial
Stewardship, FLA. B. FOUND., http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/about/finances/ (last
visited Dec. 21, 2019).
52.
See In re Interest on Tr. Accounts: A Petition to Amend Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar, 538 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1989). The Foundation’s financial information is
publicly available and published on the Foundation’s website. See Financial Stewardship,
supra note 51. The annual revenue information discussed in this Part is derived from a
spreadsheet prepared for an August 8, 2019 telephonic meeting of the Foundation’s Spending
and Reserve Committee. E-mail from Carlos Halley, Bd. Member, Fla. Bar Found., to Juliette
Lippman et al., President, Fla. Bar Found. (Aug. 5, 2019, 2:32 PM) (on file with author); see
also
Reports,
Policies
&
Manuals,
FLA.
B.
FOUND.,
http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/reports-policies-manuals/ (last visited Dec, 21, 2019);
discussion infra Part II.
53.
See In re Interest on Tr. Accounts: A Petition to Amend Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar, 538 So. 2d at 453; D’Alemberte, supra note 46, at 636.
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an endowment trust and began to set aside reserves.54 The Foundation also
developed other sources of revenue.55 During the golden years of the 1990s
and early 2000s, the Foundation provided approximately a third of the total
funding for Florida’s civil legal aid organizations.56
During this time, and through the inception of the Strategic Reset,
the Foundation operated as a traditional grantmaking organization.57 It
distributed most of its funds toward making general support grants to fund
the operations of the legal services organizations serving all parts of the
State, as well as specific populations (e.g., children, the elderly, the disabled,
and victims of domestic violence).58 General support grants were based on
the size of the eligible population.59 Other grant programs awarded funds for
specific purposes (e.g., special programs, extraordinary needs, disaster relief,
and the like).60
III.

THE GREAT RECESSION

Interest rate cuts in the wake of the Great Recession had a
profoundly negative effect on IOLTA revenue nationwide.61 The Federal
Reserve lowered interest rates to effectively zero in December 2008.62 Rates
remained at effectively zero through December 2015, reached two percent
54.
Jack Karp, A Blank Check for Legal Aid Gets Harder to Cash, LAW360
(Nov. 26, 2018), http://www.law360.com/articles/1102027/a-blank-check-for-legal-aid-getsharder-to-cash; see also The Florida Bar Foundation Endowment Trust, FLA. B. FOUND.,
http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/ways-to-give/endowment-trust/; Email from Carlos
Halley, supra note 52.
55.
Financial Stewardship, supra note 51. The Foundation now has multiple
revenue sources. Id.; Reports, Policies & Manuals, supra note 52.
56.
Noland, supra note 13, at 26.
57.
Strategic Reset for the Florida Bar Foundation, supra note 22.
58.
See id.; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE FOR THE POOR GRANT PROGRAM 2015, 14 (2015).
59.
See STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
60.
See
Grant
Programs,
FLA.
B.
FOUND.,
http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/what-we-do/grant-programs (last visited Dec. 21,
2019);
Past
Grants,
FLA.
B.
FOUND.:
PROJECTS,
http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/project/past-grants/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019). The
description of the general support grant program and information on grants from 2006 to 2020
are available in the grant information. Grant Programs, supra; Past Grants, supra.
61.
Robert J. Derocher, The IOLTA Crash: Fallout for Foundations, A.B.A.
(June
15,
2017),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/2012_13/september
_october/iolta_crash_fallout_foundations/.
62.
See Kimberly Amadeo, Fed Funds Rate History with Its Highs, Lows, and
Charts, BALANCE, http://www.thebalance.com/fed-funds-rate-history-highs-lows-3306135
(last updated Oct. 31, 2019).
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(the lowest rate considered normal) in mid-2018, and were lowered again in
October 2019, to less than two percent.63 Florida was in a better position
than other states because the XFoundation [had prudently] Rsaved for the
proverbial rainy day.’U64 By 2007, just before the recession hit, the
Foundation had $88 million in reserves.65
Figures 13 illustrate the effect of prolonged interest rate cuts on the
Foundation’s finances.66 Figure 1 shows a precipitous drop in annual IOTA
revenue.67 It also shows that annual IOTA revenue remained flat at around
five million dollars for about five years.68 Figures 23 show that the
Foundation dipped into its reserves to continue funding grants, initially at
pre-recession levels, then steeply cut back its grantmaking.69 Figure 3 shows
the depletion of the Foundation’s reserves.70

63.
Id.
64.
Karp, supra note 54.
65.
THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 201314, 3 (2014) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 201314]; Gary Blankenship, Foundation Strives to Make Its Grants Count,
FLA. B. NEWS (Jan. 15, 2017), at 12.
66.
THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 201718, 7 (2018) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 201718]; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 201617, 11 (2017)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 201617]; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 201516, 8
(2016) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 201516]; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT
201415, 14 (2015) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 201415]; ANNUAL REPORT 201314, supra
note 65, at 3; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 201213, 17 (2013) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 201213]; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 201112, 16 (2012)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 201112]; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 201011, 16
(2011) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 201011]; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT
200910, 18 (2010) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 200910]; THE FLA. BAR FOUND., ANNUAL
REPORT 200608, 810 (2008) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 200608]; see also Financial
Stewardship, supra note 51.
67.
ANNUAL REPORT 201718, supra note 66, at 7; ANNUAL REPORT 201617,
supra note 66, at 11; ANNUAL REPORT 201516, supra note 66, at 8; ANNUAL REPORT 2014
15, supra note 66, at 14; ANNUAL REPORT 201314, supra note 65, at 3; ANNUAL REPORT
201213, supra note 66, at 17; ANNUAL REPORT 201112, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL
REPORT 201011, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL REPORT 200910, supra note 66, at 18;
ANNUAL REPORT 200608, supra note 66, at 810.
68.
ANNUAL REPORT 201718, supra note 66, at 7; ANNUAL REPORT 201617,
supra note 66, at 11; ANNUAL REPORT 201516, supra note 66, at 8; ANNUAL REPORT 2014
15, supra note 66, at 15; ANNUAL REPORT 201314, supra note 65, at 3; ANNUAL REPORT
201213, supra note 66, at 17; ANNUAL REPORT 201112, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL
REPORT 201011, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL REPORT 200910, supra note 66, at 18;
ANNUAL REPORT 200608, supra note 66, at 810.
69.
ANNUAL REPORT 201718, supra note 66, at 7; ANNUAL REPORT 201617,
supra note 66, at 11; ANNUAL REPORT 201516, supra note 66, at 8; ANNUAL REPORT 2014
15, supra note 66, at 14; ANNUAL REPORT 201314, supra note 65, at 5; ANNUAL REPORT
201213, supra note 66, at 17; ANNUAL REPORT 201112, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL
REPORT 201011, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL REPORT 200910, supra note 66, at 18;
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Annual IOTA Income
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Figure 1. Florida Bar Foundation: Annual IOTA income, FY 2007
2008 through 20182019.71

ANNUAL REPORT 200608, supra note 66, at 810; see also Reports, Policies & Manuals,
supra note 52 (listing all annual reports from 200719).
70.
ANNUAL REPORT 201718, supra note 66, at 7; ANNUAL REPORT 201617,
supra note 66, at 11; ANNUAL REPORT 201516, supra note 66, at 8; ANNUAL REPORT 2014
15, supra note 66, at 14; ANNUAL REPORT 201314, supra note 65, at 3; ANNUAL REPORT
201213, supra note 66, at 17; ANNUAL REPORT 201112, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL
REPORT 201011, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL REPORT 200910, supra note 66, at 18;
ANNUAL REPORT 200608, supra note 66, at 810; Reports, Policies & Manuals, supra note
52 (listing all annual reports from 200719).
71.
Financial Stewardship, supra note 51.
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Figure 2. Florida Bar Foundation: Total grants awarded, FY 2007
2008 through 20182019.72
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Figure 3. Florida Bar Foundation: Grant reserve balance, FY 2007
2008 to 20182019.73
72.
Email from Carlos Halley, supra note 52.
73.
ANNUAL REPORT 201718, supra note 66, at 7; ANNUAL REPORT 201617,
supra note 66, at 11; ANNUAL REPORT 201516, supra note 66, at 8; ANNUAL REPORT 2014
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The Foundation’s leadership could not have foreseen the interest rate
cuts or predicted they would last so long.74 The Foundation went into
survival mode, using its reserves, then making cuts and seeking other
funding sources, hoping for a return to normal that never came.75 Grantee
organizations and their clients suffered.76
The 20142015 fiscal year marked a turning point.77 Income from
the IOTA program fell to a historic low of $5.3 million.78 The Foundation’s
$88 million reserve was depleted.79 The Foundation was kept afloat by a
loan from the Florida Bar and investment income from the Foundation’s
endowment.80 In 2015, the Foundation could fund only a sliver[eight
percent[of the budgets of Florida’s legal aid organizations.81 The need for
a change in strategy was apparent and urgent.82

15, supra note 66, at 14; ANNUAL REPORT 201314, supra note 65, at 6; ANNUAL REPORT
201213, supra note 66, at 17; ANNUAL REPORT 201112, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL
REPORT 201011, supra note 66, at 16; ANNUAL REPORT 200910, supra note 66, at 18;
ANNUAL REPORT 200608, supra note 66, at 810.
74.
See Mark D. Killian, Recession Takes a Heavy Toll on the Foundation’s
Finances, FLA. B. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2011, at 1.
75.
See id. In the 20112012 annual report, the Foundation’s President
reported that X[t]he Foundation’s staff has shrunk already from [twenty-two] to [sixteen], and
it’s anticipated that Florida will lose as many as 100 legal aid attorneys over the next few
years as the Foundation’s reserves dwindle.U ANNUAL REPORT 201112, supra note 66, at 2.
She expressed faith that things would return to normal, however: XEventually IOTA revenue
will go up, along with interest rates, but by the time it does, we will face a period of
rebuilding.U Id. That year, the Foundation suspended its LSA grant programs, with the hope
of reinstating them Xonce IOTA revenue has fully rebounded and legal aid funding has been
substantially restored to pre-recession levels.U Id. at 13. In the following year’s annual report,
the Foundation’s Executive Director, Jane Curran, also expressed a belief in an eventual return
to normal, stating that Xwe hope our generous donors will continue to help bridge the gap until
interest rates rise and IOTA revenue returns to a level that can better support Florida’s legal
aid organizations.U ANNUAL REPORT 201213, supra note 66, at 18.
76.
See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES: LOW-INCOME
CLIENTS HAVE NOWHERE TO TURN AMID THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 1 (2010) (outlining the effect
of the recession low-income clients with pressing civil needs); JOY MOSES, AND JUSTICE FOR
ALL: PRIORITIZING FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE DURING THE GREAT RECESSION 3 (2009); James
A. Kowalski, Jr., Foreword: A Public Emergency for Legal Aid Organizations on the Brink,
17 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 407, 409 (2016) (describing the effect of reduced funding on
Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc.).
77.
See ANNUAL REPORT 201415, supra note 66, at 3.
78.
Id. at 14.
79.
Id. at 3.
80.
Id.
81.
Blankenship, supra note 65. In 2015, Florida legal services organizations
received a total of $82.95 million in funding. THE FLA. BAR FOUND., supra note 58, at 2. Of
that, the Foundation supplied only 6.82 million, or 8.2%. Id. at 1; see also THE FLA. BAR
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PHILANTHROPY, LEGAL AID, AND RESOURCES:
MENTAL MODELS AND METAPHORS

Here, it is necessary to discuss the key concepts that undergird the
Strategic Reset.83
A.

Catalytic Philanthropy and Strategic Grantmaking

The Strategic Reset Resolution declares that the Foundation intends
to alter the status quo, to Xserve as an agent of rapid, effective and highimpact changeU and to become Xa strategic leader and catalyst in the cause of
increased access to justice for all.U84 This idea[a charitable foundation’s
becoming an agent, strategic leader, or catalyst for high impact change[
comes from the world of philanthropy.85
Catalytic philanthropy is a term first used and described in 2009 by
Mark Kramer, an influential thinker in the philanthropic world who focuses
on helping funding organizations maximize the impact they make on
complex social issues.86 Catalytic philanthropy is Xan approach practiced by
innovative funders to create transformative change beyond writing the
check.U87 Catalytic philanthropy shifts responsibility for setting the agenda
and accountability for results from the grantee to the grantor.88 It allows
charitable foundations to play much more important and impactful roles in
addressing complex social challenges.89 Organizations that practice catalytic
philanthropy take an active leadership role in developing solutions to the
issues they exist to address.90 Strategic grantmaking is a similar concept.91
FOUND., LEGAL AID FUNDING SOURCES FOR LSC-FUNDED ORGANIZATIONS IN FLORIDA IN 2015,
1 (2015).
82.
See STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.
83.
Id. at 1.
84.
Id. at 6.
85.
Mark R. Kramer, Catalytic Philanthropy, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.,
Fall 2009, at 30, 32; Mark R. Kramer, HARV. BUS. SCH.: FAC. & RES.,
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=937405 (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
86.
See Kramer, supra note 85, at 32; Mark Kramer, FSG: ABOUT,
http://www.fsg.org/people/mark-kramer (last visited Dec. 21, 2019); Mark R. Kramer, supra
note 85.
87.
What Is Catalytic Philanthropy?, FSG (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.fsg.org/blog/what-catalytic-philanthropy.
88.
See
Mark
Kramer,
Catalytic
Philanthropy,
FSG,
http://www.fsg.org/publications/catalytic-philanthropy (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
89.
See id.; Kramer, supra note 85, at 30, 32.
90.
Kramer, supra note 85, at 3233.
91.
See COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW: COMPARING
GRANTMAKING STRATEGIES 1 (2008).
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Strategic grantmakers have a defined impact that they seek to make; they
shape their grantmaking around the specific changes and outcomes they seek
to produce. 92
To reflect its transformation from traditional grantmaker to strategic
grantmaker and catalytic philanthropist, the Foundation’s website now
contains the following description:
The Florida Bar Foundation is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit
organization whose mission is to provide greater access to justice.
Through strategic grantmaking, the Foundation funds local and
statewide civil legal aid organizations and projects to improve the
administration of justice and increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of the legal aid delivery system. The Foundation
engages in catalytic philanthropy by investing in training,
technology, technical assistance, assessment and capacity-building
for legal aid and works to develop and expand innovative pro bono
initiatives.93

B.

Traditional and New Legal Aid Delivery Models

As previously noted,94 the traditional legal aid delivery model
primarily consists of providing poor people with a free lawyer, either a staff
attorney employed by legal aid organizations or a private attorney providing
legal services without charge (pro bono publico) as part of their professional
obligations.95 Under this model, the solution to the access to justice problem
appears to be comprised of more money and more lawyers,96 and perhaps to
expand the right to counsel from the criminal to the civil context.97
92.
Id.
93.
Leadership and Funding for Justice in Florida, supra note 9; see also 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
94.
See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 8; discussion supra Part I.
95.
D’Alemberte, supra note 46, at 63132; HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note
12, at 62 (referring to the access to justice movement’s Xrange of initiatives beyond the core
civil legal assistance system supplemented by pro bonoU); Russell G. Pearce, The Lawyer and
Public Service, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 171, 17576 (2001) (discussing lawyers’
professional obligation to provide free legal services to the poor); Legal Services Corporation,
Glenn Rawdon’s Speech at the White House forum on Increasing Access to Justice, VIMEO
(Apr. 21, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.vimeo.com/925/7868; LSC, Glenn Rawdon’s Speech,
Everyone, Anytime, Anywhere, on How Techonolgy Transforms Civil Legal Aid, LSC (Apr.
14,
2014),
http://www.lsc.gov/media-center/blog/2014104114/glenn-rawdons-speecheveryone-anytime-anywhere-how-technology.
96.
BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE: MORE
TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF THE LAW 11 (2017). In Rebooting
Justice: More Technology, Fewer Lawyers, and the Future of the Law, the authors, both law
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In the past two decades, a new legal aid delivery model has begun to
emerge out of a broad access to justice movement.98 In 2011, lawyer and
legal blogger Richard Zorza99 wrote:
In the media there is often a fatalistic[if dramatic[
attitude to the feasibility of solving the overall access to justice
problem. Appalling statistics on access are combined with
dramatic stories showing the dire consequences of lack of access
and with news of new budget crises to paint a picture of an
insoluble problem overwhelming heroic advocates. The story is all
about the urgent need for more money, and all too rarely about the
more comprehensive innovations that might transcend these
dynamics.
But the good, and not often recognized, news is that there
is now a broad emerging general operational consensus (used here
in the sense of a Rcommon basis for moving forward’) within the

professors, argue that Xgiving each person a full-service lawyer for freeU would not increase
justice and call it the Xmore lawyers, more justice fallacy.U Id.; see also D’Alemberte, supra
note 46, at 63536.
97.
BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 96, at 11. The movement to extend the right
to counsel to civil cases is sometimes called civil Gideon, after Gideon v. Wainwright, the
landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that states are required
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to provide attorneys to
defendants in criminal cases if they cannot afford one. 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963); see also
U.S. CONST. amend, VI. The term civil Gideon may be misleading because the movement
does not seek a free lawyer in every case for everyone who cannot afford one, as implied by
Barton & Bibas in Rebooting Justice: More Technology Fewer Lawyers, and the Future of the
Law, but rather, to advance the right to counsel for low-income people in civil cases involving
basic human needs, such as housing, health, domestic violence, and child custody, or the
potential for incarceration. See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 96, at 11; HOUSEMAN & PERLE,
supra note 12, at 46; Backdrop: The Access to Justice Crisis, NAT’L COALITION FOR CIV.
RIGHT TO COUNS., http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/about/history (last visited Dec. 21,
2019); Better Access to Legal Representation Is Crucial — Even in Civil Cases, L.A. TIMES:
OPINION (Apr. 20, 2019, 3:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-civilgideon-20190420-story.html.
98.
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 40.
99.
Richard Zorza, Access to Justice: The Emerging Consensus and Some
Questions and Implications, 94 JUDICATURE 156, 156 (2011). Zorza died April 13, 2019,
during the writing of this Article. See Bob Ambrogi, In Memoriam: Richard Zorza,
Impassioned Advocate and Blogger on A2J and Legal Tech, LAWSITES (Apr. 27, 2019),
http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2019/04/in-memoriam-richard-zorza-impassioned-advocateand-blogger-on-a2j-and-legal-tech.html. A Harvard Law School graduate, Zorza was a public
defender and legal services attorney early in his career and later was one of the founders and
leaders of the Self-Represented Litigation Network, an organization dedicated to reforming
the legal system to help meet the needs of self-represented litigants. Id.
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relevant legal community[courts, bar, and legal aid[about the
100
approaches needed for a comprehensive solution.

The new model involves a range of initiatives beyond the traditional
model.101 Participants in the movement include state supreme courts, access
to justice commissions, IOLTA funders such as the Foundation, other
funders, bar associations, law schools, and civil legal aid programs.102 XThe
aspirational goal of [the movement is one hundred] percent access to
effective assistance.U103 Achieving full access will require collaboration to
develop a comprehensive, integrated access-to-justice system in each state.104
[T]he manner in which the civil legal services system develops in
the future will no longer be determined solely by LSC and its
grantees. Instead, the future of civil legal assistance increasingly
will be in the hands of a much broader partnership of stakeholders
who operate within the justice system in each state.105

100.
Zorza, supra note 99, at 156.
101.
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 62. As noted in the Introduction,
supra Part I, it is not possible to discuss in any depth the plethora of innovative initiatives that
have come out of the access to justice movement in the past two decades. See id. at 40, 60;
Wills, supra note 19; discussion supra Part I. In general, these initiatives and experiments
involve both new technologies and new ideas. Zorza, supra note 99, at 15760. Some are
aimed at simplifying court operations and providing informational access services and other
tools to make the courts easier to use for self-represented litigants. Id. at 157. Some promote
the availability of more free and low-cost legal services, such as allowing lawyers to provide
unbundled services (also known as discrete task representation) or to provide services through
virtual online law practice (sometimes known as eLawyering), and making pro bono-friendly
changes, such as mandatory reporting, insurance for pro bono participation, and emeritus
practice. Id. at 157, 16061. Some focus on using technology to expand access. Technology
Initiative Grant Program, LSC: GRANTS & GRANTEE RESOURCES, http://www.lsc.gov/grantsgrantee-resources/our-grant-programs/tig (last visited Dec. 21, 2019). XSince 2000, when
Congress first appropriated special funds for [LSC’s] Technology Initiative Grant [(XTIGU)]
program, LSC has . . . awarded nearly [sixty-five] million [dollars] in grants for more than 700
projectsU that use a broad range of technologies to help make the delivery of civil legal aid
more efficient and effective. Id. These Xtechnologies includ[e] mobile [applications], cloud
computing, data analysis, and automated document assembly.U Id.
102.
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 56.
103.
Id. at 56 (quoting CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & CONFERENCE OF
STATE COURT ADM’RS, RESOLUTION 5: REAFFIRMING THE COMMITMENT TO MEANINGFUL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL 1 (2015)). At their joint meeting in July 2015, the Conference of
State Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators adopted a resolution
supporting Xthe aspirational goal of [one hundred] percent access to effective assistance for
essential civil legal needs.U Id.
104.
See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 5657.
105.
Id. at 43.
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Beginning in the mid-1990s, the concept of state Access to Justice
Commissions began spreading across the country.106 Supreme Court of
Florida Justice Jorge Labarga established the Florida Commission on Access
to Civil Justice in 2014.107 Its purpose is to study the Xunmet civil legal
needs of disadvantaged, low-income, and moderate-income FloridiansU from
the perspective of multiple constituencies and stakeholders, considering the
State’s legal assistance delivery system as a whole.108 The Commission’s
formation focused the Supreme Court of Florida and the Florida Bar on the
same mission as the Foundation: Expanding access to justice in the State.109
The Foundation’s leadership has played vital roles on the Commission.110
Like other state access to justice commissions, however, Florida’s
Commission does not fund or deliver civil legal aid.111
C.

A Widened and Updated View of Available Resources

The traditional and new models of access to justice engender
different views of what resources are available to achieve full access to
justice.112 In the traditional model, the resources are essentially thought to
106.
See NATHAN L. HECHT & THOMAS L. KILLBRIDE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE
COMMISSIONS: LESSONS FROM TWO STATES 43 (Flango et al. eds., 2014).
107.
In re Fla. Comm’n on Access to Civil Justice, No. AOSC14-65, 2014 Fla.
LEXIS 3901, at *3 (Fla. Nov. 24, 2014).
108.
Id.; In re Fla. Comm’n on Access to Civil Justice, No. AOSC16-17, 2016
Fla. LEXIS 2717, at *1 (Fla. Oct. 10, 2016).
109.
See In re Fla. Comm’n on Access to Civil Justice, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 3901,
at *3.
110.
Florida Bar Foundation Continues to Play a Vital Role in Florida
Commission on Access to Civil Justice, supra note 42. Several past presidents of the
Foundation serve or have served on the Commission. See id.; In re Fla. Comm’n on Access to
Civil Justice, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2717, at *3; In re Fla. Comm’n on Access to Civil Justice,
2014 Fla. LEXIS 3901, at *7; Commission Members, FLA. COMMISSION ON ACCESS TO CIV.
JUSTICE, http://atj.flcourts.org/commission-members/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019); Past
Presidents
1971–2019,
FLA.
B.
FOUND.:
ABOUT,
http://thefloridabarfoundation.org/about/board-of-directors/past-presidents (last visited Dec.
21, 2019). These include the Hon. William A. Van Nortwick, Kathleen Schin McLeroy, John
Patterson, Emerson R. Thompson, Jr., and Dominic MacKenzie, the Foundation’s Executive
Director. See In re Fla. Comm’n on Access to Civil Justice, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2717, at *3; In
re Fla. Comm’n on Access to Civil Justice, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 3901, at *7; Commission
Members, supra; Florida Bar Foundation Continues to Play a Vital Role in Florida
Commission on Access to Civil Justice, supra note 42; Past Presidents 1971–2019, supra.
111.
Definition of an Access to Justice Commission, ABA RESOURCE CTR. FOR
ACCESS
TO
JUST.
INITIATIVES
(June
2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls
_sclaid_atj_definition_commission.authcheckdam.pdf; Karp, supra note 54.
112.
See STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 6; Foundation Poised for a
Strategic Reset, supra note 43, at 17.

20

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

consist of money and lawyers.113 The new model has a much broader
conception of available resources.114 This Section discusses two metaphors
that illustrate the two models, one as old as the Old Testament and one as
new as the smartphone.115
1.

A Metaphor for the Traditional Model: D’Alemberte’s XTributariesU

Legendary Florida attorney Talbot XSandyU D’Alemberte116 created a
powerful image of access to justice two decades ago in his 1998 law review
article, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access (XTributariesU).117
D’Alemberte likened justice to a mighty river fed by multiple smaller rivers,
or tributaries.118 The image, he wrote, reminded him of a passage from the
Book of Amos: XBut let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like
an ever-flowing stream.U119
In D’Alemberte’s article, the mighty river was the justice system and
the tributaries were resource streams: XFull access to the civil justice system
can be achieved through free-flowing tributaries of resources that enable the
impoverished to secure legal representation,U he wrote.120 He believed that
X[t]he exercise of identifying the tributaries that add to access can give us
renewed faith that, by working on all of the elements of the system, full
access is, indeed, possible.U121

113.
See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 96, at 10; HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra
note 12, at 8.
114.
See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 62.
115.
See id.; discussion infra Sections IV.C.12.
116.
Byron Dobson, Sandy D’Alemberte, a Pillar of FSU with a Brilliant Legal
Mind, Dies at 85, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (May 21, 2019, 9:03 PM),
http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2019/05/20/sandy-dalemberte-pillar-fsu-brilliantlegal-mind-dies-85/3749117002/. D’Alemberte died on May 20, 2019, during the writing of
this article. Id. The universally beloved D’Alemberte served as Dean of Florida State
University College of Law (19841989), President of the American Bar Association (1991
1992), and President of Florida State University (19932003). Id.; Bill Cotterell, Fla. Has
Had Some Great Leaders, but D’Alemberte Had a Rare Trait — He was Universally Beloved,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, May 22, 2019, at A6.
117.
See D’Alemberte, supra note 46, at 63334. A shorter variant under the
same name was published in the Florida Bar Journal in 1999. See D’Alemberte, supra note
44.
118.
D’Alemberte, supra note 46, at 63334.
119.
Id. at 634 (quoting Amos 5:24). If the verse sounds familiar, it is because
Martin Luther King, Jr. quoted the same verse in his I Have a Dream speech. Martin Luther
King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Delivered on the Steps at the Lincoln Memorial in Wash. D.C.
(Aug. 28, 1963) (transcript available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/mlk01.asp).
120.
D’Alemberte, supra note 46, at 634.
121.
Id. at 649.
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D’Alemberte identified eight potential resource tributaries.122 Two
were existing revenue sources: LSC’s federal funding and Florida’s IOTA
program.123 Four were ideas for new revenue sources: A state filing fee
surcharge, a service tax on for-profit legal services, punitive damage awards
and the residue of class action awards, and a fee-shifting statute for actions in
which the poor successfully challenge government agencies to establish
entitlement to benefits.124 The other two were essentially human resources:
Pro bono services by lawyers and local access to justice plans.125
2.

A Metaphor for the New Model: Rawdon’s Convergence

Convergence is a brilliant technological metaphor for the new legal
aid delivery model discussed above, the one that employs a range of
initiatives beyond the traditional model.126 Microsoft’s Bill Gates first used
the term convergence in 1999 to refer to the integration of a number of
disparate technologies or functions into a single system.127 Glenn Rawdon,
122.
Id. at 63448.
123.
Id. at 634, 636.
124.
Id. at 63740.
125.
D’Alemberte, supra note 46, at 64149. Local access to justice plans
contemplated Xa system in which bar leaders, legal service providers, social agencies, and
others are called together by the chief judge of each circuit to share information on the legal
needs of the poor and to develop a local plan for access to justice.U Id. at 648. D’Alemberte’s
references to a Xcomprehensive lawyer pro bono planU and Xlocal plans for access to justiceU
came from rulings on petitions seeking rule changes to address the civil needs of Florida’s
poor that D’Alemberte had presented to the Supreme Court of Florida in the early 1990s on
behalf of the Florida Bar and the Foundation. Id. at 641, 649; see also In re Amendments to
Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar [ 13.-1(a) & Rules of Judicial Admin. [ 2.065 (Legal Aid),
573 So. 2d 800, 806 (Fla. 1990) (holding that Florida lawyers have a public responsibility to
provide legal services for the poor when appointed by a court and requiring each circuit to
develop a plan addressing the legal needs of the poor in that community, but declining to
adopt a proposed rule that would have made pro bono service mandatory); Amendments to
Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar [ 13.1(a) & Rules of Judicial Admin. [ 2.065 (Legal Aid),
630 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1993) (adopting a mandatory pro bono reporting requirement and
the aspirational goal of a minimum of twenty hours of pro bono service per year for each
member of the Florida Bar). Previously, in the early 1980s, the Supreme Court of Florida had
declined to implement a mandatory pro bono service requirement. See In re Emergency
Delivery of Legal Servs. to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1983). On the history of pro
bono service in Florida, see Judge William A. Van Nortwick, Jr. et al., Pro Bono Services in
Florida, 73 FLA. B.J., Apr. 1999, at 30, 3036.
126.
See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 12, at 5861; discussion supra
Section IV.B.
127.
Glenn Rawdon, Everyone, Anytime, Anywhere, MGMT. INFO. EXCH. J., Fall
2014, at 13, 13; Legal Services Corporation, supra note 95; LSC, supra note 95. See also the
following
definitions.
Convergence,
TECHOPEDIA,
http://www.techopedia.com/definition/769/convergence (last visited Dec. 21, 2019); Margaret
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LSC’s Program Counsel for Technology, borrowed the term from Gates and
brilliantly applied it in a brief speech he delivered in April 2014 at the White
House Forum on Increasing Access to Justice.128
Rawdon’s speech was about LSC’s Summit on the Use of
Technology to Improve Access to Justice, which had taken place the
previous December.129 The goal of the Summit had been to develop a
strategy to provide Xsome form of effective assistance to [one hundred
percent] of persons otherwise unable to afford an attorney for dealing with
essential civil legal needs.U130 Rawdon explained that Xsome form of
effective assistanceU did not mean providing a lawyer for everyone for every
matter.131 Rather, it meant Xnot turning anyone away with no assistance at
allU by providing everyone with at least one of three different levels of
assistance: Information, advice, and when needed, representation.132 At the
Summit, the participants designed a system with five components: (1)
statewide legal portals for triage to determine the level of assistance needed;
(2) automated document assembly; (3) mobile technologies; (4) expert
systems and intelligent checklists; and (5) business process analysis.133
In a constrained resource environment, Rawdon emphasized, each
component of the system should be built only once, by the member of the
access to justice community best able to do so.134 We shouldn’t Xeach be out
trying to build our own set of resources,U he said.135 Convergence, Rawdon
said, was about Xlegal aid, the bench, the bar, law schools, libraries, and
anyone else who cares about justice, coming together so all the pieces are
there. No more each building our own systems, but a cooperative approach
Rouse,
Network
Convergence,
SEARCHCONVERGEDIT.COM
(Feb.
27,
2019),
http://searchconvergedinfrastructure.techtarget.com/definition/network-convergence;
Technology Convergence, SYSTEMS INNOVATION, http://systemsinnovation.io/technologyconvergence-articles/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
128.
Legal Services Corporation, supra note 95; LSC, supra note 95.
Convergence inadvertently modernizes Tributaries: In D’Alemberte’s article, the image is a
natural one, of resources coming together like tributaries that feed a mighty river, whereas in
Rawdon’s speech, the image is a digital one, of resources coming together like technologies
combine into an integrated system or platform. See D’Alemberte, supra note 44, at 12. The
metaphor also carries the connotation of the destruction of walls around formerly isolated or
siloed resources. See Alan J. Porter, What Is Content Convergence?, SIMPLE A: TREASURY,
http://www.simplea.com/articles/what-is-content-convergence (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
129.
LSC, THE SUMMIT ON THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO EXPAND ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 1 (2013); Legal Services Corporation, supra note 95; Rawdon, supra note 127, at 13;
LSC, supra note 95.
130.
LSC, supra note 129, at 1.
131.
Rawdon, supra note 127, at 14.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.; LSC, supra note 129, at 410.
134.
Legal Services Corporation, supra note 95; LSC, supra note 95.
135.
Legal Services Corporation, supra note 95; LSC, supra note 95.
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to provide the information, advice, and representation needed.U136 Rawdon
declared, XI believe that the Access to Justice Community is now at our point
of convergence.U137
Rawdon’s speech was ostensibly about the role of technology in
transforming civil legal aid, but it was about more than that.138 The
metaphor of convergence that Rawdon borrowed from Bill Gates provides a
way to think about the coming together of disparate resources from all
sectors of society to create a unified access to justice system[not just
money and lawyers, but judges, government, academia, philanthropy,
business, community service providers, medical providers, schools, libraries,
and the like.139 Richard Zorza wrote that Rawdon’s speech was also about
Xhow technology offers the opportunity to help an organization or group rethink the potential reach of its own mission.U140 Convergence is technology
plus contribution by and cooperation among everyone with a stake in access
to justice.141
V.

THE STRATEGIC RESET: A WORK IN PROGRESS

We now return to the Strategic Reset.142 In Part III above, the
Author described the salient developments of the years 20082014.143 After
the discussion in the previous Part, the reader should now be equipped to
understand the process the Foundation has been going through from the
turning point year of 20142015 through the present.144

136.
Rawdon, supra note 127, at 15.
137.
LSC, supra note 95; Legal Services Corporation, supra note 95.
138.
See Richard Zorza, Glenn Rawdon’s Visionary White House Speech Is
About 100% Access, and More, Not Just About Technology, RICHARD ZORZA’S ACCESS TO
JUST. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.accesstojustice.net/2014/04/13/glenn-rawdonsvisionary-white-house-speech-is-about-100-access-and-more-not-just-about-technology/.
139.
See id.
140.
Id.
141.
See id.
142.
STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 6; Foundation Poised for a
Strategic Reset, supra note 43, at 1.
143.
See ANNUAL REPORT 201314, supra note 65, at 45; ANNUAL REPORT
201213, supra note 66, at 34, 6; ANNUAL REPORT 201112, supra note 66, at 34, 6;
ANNUAL REPORT 201011, supra note 66, at 2, 16; ANNUAL REPORT 200910, supra note 66,
at 23, 6, 10; ANNUAL REPORT 200608, supra note 66, at 10; discussion supra Part III.
144.
See ANNUAL REPORT 201415, supra note 66, at 3; ANNUAL REPORT
201516, supra note 66, at 8; ANNUAL REPORT 201617, supra note 66, at 10; ANNUAL
REPORT 201718, supra note 66, at 7; discussion supra Part III.
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A Research and Inquiry Project commissioned by the Foundation,145
as well as other studies of the justice gap,146 showed that Florida’s legal aid
system was meeting only a small fraction of the legal needs of the poor even
when IOTA revenue was at its peak.147 The Foundation’s pre-Strategic Reset
strategy clearly was not working to achieve the Foundation’s mission[
which is to provide greater access to justice in Florida, not merely to
distribute dwindling IOTA funds.148 Clearly too, the golden years of high
IOTA income were not coming back anytime soon.149 So, how could the
Foundation best make an impact on access to justice in Florida?150
The Foundation hosted a Legal Aid Summit in late 2015 that
engaged legal aid and law school personnel to work in teams to design and
test solutions to a handful of legal services problems.151 The five challenge
questions were as follows:
How do we tap new and varied resources to support our work?
How do we develop and retain a new generation of leaders? How
do we use data to enhance our resources, our work, and our
impact? How do we serve our communities in more clientcentered and strategic ways? How can we collaborate more inside
of our legal services network and beyond?152

LSC’s President James Sandman participated in the Summit as a
panelist and delivered the closing remarks.153 Sandman called the Summit
just extraordinary.154 Referring to the goal of creating a statewide system
that provides full access to justice, he said: XIf there is any place where it
can be done, I think it can be done in Florida.U155 XFrom the chief justice of
the Supreme Court [of Florida] to the other justices of the Supreme Court [of
Florida], to The Florida Bar, to The Florida Bar Foundation, to the legal

145.
BONNIE ALLEN, FLORIDA’S CIVIL LEGAL AID SYSTEM: STRENGTHS,
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND SUCCESS STORIES 9 (2015).
146.
See FLA. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO CIV. JUST., INTERIM REPORT 24 (2015);
JUSTICE GAP REPORT 2017, supra note 15, at 6; Steven Seidenberg, Unequal Justice: U.S.
Trails High-Income Nations in Serving Civil Legal Needs, A.B.A. J., June 2012, at 56, 58.
147.
STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
148.
Id. at 2.
149.
Id. at 4.
150.
Id. at 7.
151.
See Kinnally, supra note 30.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
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services providers represented in this room, to the business community,U the
necessary players were already collaborating.156
In early 2016, the Foundation’s Executive Team began to hold
monthly strategy meetings.157 At a leadership retreat in June 2016, after
extensive study and discussion, the participants recommended that the
Foundation undertake a strategic reset.158 After the Board passed the
Strategic Reset Resolution, the Foundation met and communicated with its
grantees and posted Strategic Reset-related informational materials on its
website.159
In mid-2017, approximately a year after the Board passed the
Strategic Reset Resolution, the Foundation released the Strategic Reset
Report.160 The Report detailed the circumstances that had Xdemand[ed] a
reconsideration of [the Foundation’s] traditional grant making role and
business modelU and set forth the strategic directions that would guide its
Xinvestments [of] time, energy, and funds for the next five years.U161 The
Strategic Reset Report articulated three primary strategic directions:
1.
Maximize the impact and effectiveness of civil
legal assistance provided to low and moderate-income individuals
and communities in Florida.
2.
Expand the role of The Florida Bar Foundation
as an expert facilitator of effective civil legal assistance for low
and moderate-income individuals and communities in Florida.
156.
Kinnally, supra note 30.
157.
See Memorandum from Bruce B. Blackwell, CEO & Exec. Dir., Fla. Bar
Found., on Strategic Direction to Exec. Dirs.: FBF AOJ & Children’s Legal Servs. Grantees
(July 1, 2016) (on file with Fla. Bar Found.); STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
158.
See Memorandum from Bruce B. Blackwell to Exec. Dirs.: FBF AOJ &
Children’s Legal Servs. Grantees, supra note 157. The attendees developed a consensus that
included the following points: First, access to justice in Florida was insufficient and would be
more strained in the future unless meaningful systemic changes were made. See id. at 2.
Second, grantee legal aid organizations were serving only a small fraction of the population at
risk of having unmet civil legal needs, a population that included not only the poor but also
the working poor and middle class. See id. Third, information and guidance on how to
navigate the justice system for self-represented persons were insufficient. STRATEGIC RESET
REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. Fourth, the Foundation has limited resources and cannot meet the
needs of the most at-risk populations (e.g., low income, working poor, children, elderly, and
military veterans). See id. at 4. Fifth, the rule of law and social stability are threatened when
eighty percent of people with civil legal problems do not seek or obtain legal help. Id. at 5,
15. Sixth, improving the justice system for everyone is in everyone’s interest. Id. at 1314.
Seventh, it strengthens the rule of law and is good for the economy. Id. at 13, 20. Money is
not the only solution to the problem. STRATEGIC RESET REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
159.
See id. at 1.
160.
Id.
161.
Id. at 2, 6.
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3.
Serve as a catalyst for broad-based, systemic
change and innovative solutions to reduce and eliminate the justice
gap in Florida’s civil justice system. 162

In fiscal year 20182019, the Foundation suspended its general
support grant program and began focusing on more project-specific grants
and competitive grantmaking, seeking proposals that would make the
greatest impact and further the specific strategies and goals of the Strategic
Reset.163 The Foundation now categorizes its grant programs in a new
way.164 In the past, there were three categories, corresponding to the three
approved purposes for IOTA revenue: LAP, AOJ, and LSA.165 There are
now only two categories:
Community Based Civil Legal Services
(XCBCLSU),166 which encompasses the former LAP and LSA categories,167
and AOJ.168
The Foundation has developed metrics (quantifiable measures) to
measure the impact of the Strategic Reset and to assess whether and to what
extent the Reset’s objectives are being accomplished.169 The purpose of the
metrics is not to measure the performance of grantees (which is done through
other means), but rather, to measure the impact of the Reset itself.170
VI.

HISTORY OF STATE FUNDING FOR CIVIL LEGAL AID IN FLORIDA

As previously noted, Florida is one of only three states that currently
do not fund civil legal aid.171 However, Florida has actually had a statutory
162.
Id. at 2.
163.
Interview with Kate York, Dir. of Grants Program, The Fla. Bar Found.
(Feb. 6, 2019); see also Grant Programs, supra note 60; Past Grants, supra note 60.
164.
Interview with Kate York, supra note 163; 2016–2017 General Support
Grants, FLA. B. FOUND., http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/what-we-do/grantprograms/2016-17-general-support-grants/ (last updated Dec. 7, 2016); Grant Programs,
supra note 60.
165.
Interview with Kate York, supra note 163.
166.
Id.; Community Based Civil Legal Services, FLA. B. FOUND.,
http://www.thefloridabarfoundation.org/what-we-do/grant-programs/community-based-civillegal-services/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
167.
Community Based Civil Legal Services, supra note 166. The LSA
program was suspended in 20112012 due to lack of funds, but the Foundation has been able
to revitalize some of the law student programs it had been forced to cut in the past. Interview
with Kate York, supra note 163.
168.
Community Based Civil Legal Services, supra note 166.
169.
SPARK POLICY INST., STRATEGIC RESET METRICS 23 (2019).
170.
Id.; Interview with Claud Nelson, Dir. of Pro Bono Program, The Fla. Bar
Found. (Feb. 8, 2019).
171.
Sandman, supra note 11, at 113; State Legislative Funding for Civil Legal
Aid, supra note 11.
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structure in place to fund civil legal aid since 2002.172 The Florida Access to
Civil Legal Assistance Act (XFACLAU or XActU) was shepherded through the
legislature by Republican legislators, passed with a bipartisan majority, and
signed into law by former Republican Governor Jeb Bush in 2002.173 The
Act’s purpose is Xto promote the availability of civil legal assistance to the
poor and improve access to justice by establishing a streamlined method to
utilize available state funds in furtherance of this goal.U174 The Act
authorizes Florida’s Department of Legal Affairs to Xcontract with a
statewide not-for-profit organization that provides funding for civil legal
assistance to the poor in this state [i.e., with the Foundation] to allocate funds
to not-for-profit legal aid organizations.U175 The Act stipulates what the
funds may and may not be used for.176
FACLA began as a pilot in a few circuits in the 20022003 fiscal
year with a $2 million appropriation and expanded statewide a few years
later, but with a smaller $1 million appropriation.177 Former Governor Bush
vetoed the $5 million appropriation in 2005, reportedly because he believed
the increase was too large.178 The legislature appropriated more modest
amounts from 2006 through 2010.179 Former Republican Governor Rick
Scott, who was elected governor in 2010 and served two four-year terms,
vetoed appropriations for civil legal aid under FACLA for four years in a
row during his first term from 20112014.180 After these four consecutive
172.
FLA. STAT. §§ 68.09468.105 (2019) (first enacted 2002).
173.
See FLA. STAT. § 68.094; Fla. H.B. 491, 2002 Leg., 104th Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2002); Jan Pudlow, Civil Legal Assistance Act Funded: Vetoed a Year Ago, Program Is Once
Again Back in Business, FLA. B. NEWS, June 15, 2006, at 1.
174.
FLA. STAT. § 68.095.
175.
FLA. STAT. § 68.097.
176.
FLA. STAT. § 68.105. Funds may not be used for lobbying, criminal or
post-conviction proceedings, suing the state or any of its agencies or political subdivisions,
suing colleges or universities, class actions, traffic or driver’s license infraction or
enforcement proceedings, regulatory decisions, and initiating employment-related actions. Id.
Funds may be used Xfor legal education or assistance in family law, juvenile law, entitlement
to federal benefits, protection from domestic violence, elder abuse, child abuse, [and]
immigration.U Id.
177.
Gary Blankenship, Civil Legal Assistance Act Vetoed: Foundation Plans
to Fight on for Funding Next Year, FLA. B. NEWS, June 15, 2005, at 1, 11; see also FLA. STAT.
§ 68.105.
178.
Blankenship, supra note 177.
179.
See Wilson Sayre, Study Shows Free Legal Services for the Poor Are
Good for Business, Not Just to Feel Good, WLRN (Feb. 9, 2017),
http://www.wlrn.org/post/study-shows-free-legal-services-poor-are-good-business-not-justfeel-good.
180.
See John Patterson, Elections Matter and Justice Issues Should Count,
LONGBOAT KEY NEWS, Oct. 26, 2018, at 6; Florida Governors, FLA. DEP’T ST: FLA. FACTS,
http://dos.myflorida.com/florida-facts/florida-history/florida-governors/ (last visited Dec. 21,
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line-item vetoes, the legislature gave up and stopped appropriating funds
altogether during former Governor Scott’s second term.181
As of this year, 2019, Florida has a new governor, Republican Ron
DeSantis.182 It remains to be seen whether the Florida Legislature will
recommence FACLA appropriations and, if so, whether Governor DeSantis
will or will not depart from former Governor Scott’s practice of vetoing
them.183
VII.
A.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

Access to Justice and the Rule of Law

Access to the civil justice system is a fundamental aspect of the rule
of law in the United States and around the world.184 In its broadest sense,
access to justice means the ability of ordinary people to understand the law
and to use our legal system effectively.185 The law Xshould be a body of
norms promulgated as public knowledge so that people can study it,
internalize it, figure out what it requires of them, and use it as a framework
for their plans and expectations and for settling their disputes with others.U186
In addition, the civil legal system Xshould be available to ordinary people to
uphold their rights, settle their disputes, and protect them against abuses of
public and private power.U187
The rule of law is an idea with a long history and no single
definition.188 One of its most important aspects is the idea that Xpeople in
positions of authority should exercise their power within a constraining
framework of well-established public norms rather than in an arbitrary, ad
hoc, or purely discretionary manner on the basis of their own preferences or

2019); Gov. Rick Scott Ignores Legal Aid for Floridians, SUN SENTINEL: OPINION (Feb. 7,
2017, 3:50 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/editorials/fl-editorial-legal-assistance20170206-story.html.
181.
Patterson, supra note 180.
182.
Florida Governors, supra note 180.
183.
See Jim Ash, Board Adopts Legislative Positions, FLA. B. NEWS, Jan. 10,
2019, at 6.
184.
See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 21; Access to Justice
Commissions, CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, http://www.ncsc.org/microsites/accessto-justice-/home/Topics/Access-to-Justice-Commissions.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2019);
Access to Justice, supra note 21.
185.
Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 22,
2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
See id.
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ideology.U189 In addition, the rule of law requires that Xthe law should be the
same for everyone, so that no one is above the law, and everyone has access
to the law’s protection.U190
The rule of law also requires that Xcitizens should respect and
comply with legal norms, even when they disagree with them. When their
interests conflict with others’ they should accept legal determinations of
what their rights and duties are.U191
The World Justice Project (XWJPU), a United States based
independent, multidisciplinary organization working to advance the rule of
law worldwide, has developed a conceptual framework or model of the rule
of law that it uses to measure the status of the rule of law around the world.
192
WJP notes:
The rule of law affects all of us in our everyday lives.
Although we may not be aware of it, the rule of law is profoundly
important[and not just for lawyers or judges. It is the foundation
for a system of rules to keep us safe, resolve our disputes, and
enable us to prosper. Every sector of society is a stakeholder in
the rule of law.193

B.

Technology

We must be careful not to view technology as the answer to
achieving full access to justice.194 In the recent book Rebooting Justice:
More Technology, Fewer Lawyers, and the Future of Law, the authors
propose that technology and process simplification will fix the access-tojustice crisis by lessening the need for lawyers.195 That may be true, but we
will always need a public civil justice system for the fair and efficient
resolution of non-criminal legal conflicts, and a civil justice system that is
fair and works for everyone will always need lawyers.196
The landscape of civil litigation in state courts looks very different
today than it used to.197 Our civil justice system was designed with the
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Waldron, supra note 185.
Id.
WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 5.
Id. at 11.
See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 96, at 8.
Id. at 78.
See PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT’L CTR.
THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS vi, 9 (2015).
197.
See id. at iii, 2122.
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assumption that all parties to a dispute would be represented by counsel.198
That is no longer the reality, if it ever was.199 XThe idealized picture of an
adversarial system in which both parties are represented by competent
attorneys who can assert all legitimate claims and defenses is an illusion,U a
2015 study performed for the National Center for State Courts asserted.200
The study’s findings offered Xa dramatically changed picture of civil
caseloads compared to . . . two decades ago and to perceptions held by many
civil trial lawyers and judges.U201 Among its key findings: Most cases are
Xlow-value debt collection, landlord/tenant, and small claims cases; threequarters of the judgments were $5,200 or lessU; there was a very low rate of
dispositions involving formal adjudication (e.g., trial, summary judgment,
binding arbitration); and in more than three-quarters of cases, at least one
party was self-represented.202
The enormous asymmetry of representation in state courts, where
more and more often people are going into court without representation to
face opponents represented by lawyers, raises serious questions about the
fairness of outcomes in civil legal matters.203 Technological solutions cannot
help people who cannot use technology or who cannot represent themselves
in court[for example, children, the developmentally disabled, and others
such as the elderly, the mentally ill, the institutionalized, the illiterate, and
those who do not read and speak English fluently.204 The most vulnerable
will always need lawyers,205 and lawyers will always be needed to litigate
cases involving complex issues, matters of policy, and practices that affect
entire populations.206
One thing technology will do is expand access to justice for those
who earn too much to qualify for civil legal aid but who still cannot afford a
lawyer.207 The Foundation’s new strategic initiatives encompass moderateincome, as well as low-income Floridians.208 This is not because the
198.
See Waldron, supra note 185.
199.
See Frank, supra note 16.
200.
HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 196, at vi.
201.
PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, NCSC Releases Report on The Landscape of
Civil Litigation in State Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/News-releases/2015/Civil-Justice-Initiative.aspx.
202.
PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
Abstract to THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS (2015).
203.
HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 196, at vvi.
204.
Id.; What Is Civil Legal Aid?, supra note 12; Zorza, supra note 138.
205.
See Frank, supra note 16.
206.
See id.; HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 196, at vi.
207.
LSC, LSC 2007 ACTION P LAN FOR PRIVATE ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT:
HELP CLOSE THE JUSTICE GAP, UNLEASH POWER OF PRO BONO 1 (2007); Foundation Poised
for a Strategic Reset, supra note 43, at 17.
208.
Foundation Poised for a Strategic Reset, supra note 43, at 17.
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Foundation is abandoning the poor, but because many access-to-justice
technologies such as websites and mobile apps will be available to
everyone.209
VIII.
A.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS TO FUND
CIVIL LEGAL AID
State Government

The public sector[government[is primarily responsible for
ensuring that a state operates according to the rule of law.210 This
responsibility extends beyond the judicial branch to the executive and
legislative branches.211
One of the fundamental purposes of government, mentioned in the
Preamble to the United States Constitution, is to establish justice.212 The
framers of the United States Constitution Xrecognized that a wellfunctioning, accessible system of justice is essential to societal stability. It’s
about the rule of law. You won’t long have a nation to defend, or worth
defending, without it.U213
Section 21 of Article I of the Florida Constitution provides, X[t]he
courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.U214
Access to the civil justice system supports the other core purposes of
government outlined in the United States and Florida Constitutions:
Ensuring domestic tranquility, maintaining public order, guaranteeing equal
civil and political rights to all, providing for the general welfare, and
securing liberty.215 Advocates for civil justice often focus their efforts on the
legislative and judicial branches, but the executive branch is tremendously
important, too: XGovernors[and those who work with them[increasingly
understand that incorporating civil legal help and partnering with legal-aid
and self-help service providers support state and federal goals of fiscal
responsibility and effective social services and produce better outcomes.U216
209.
See id.
210.
See Waldron, supra note 185.
211.
See id.
212.
James J. Sandman, President, Legal Servs. Corp., Address Before the
Hawaii Access to Justice Conference: Rethinking Access to Justice (June 20, 2014); see also
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
213.
Sandman, supra note 212.
214.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
215.
Lash, supra note 41, at 16061; see also U.S. CONST. pmbl; FLA. CONST.
pmbl.
216.
Lash, supra note 41, at 161.
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Federal funding for civil legal aid has been politically embattled
since its inception.217 State funding for civil legal aid should not be
controversial; it historically has not been and now should not be a partisan
issue in Florida.218 Again, Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Texas wrote: XLegal aid, like pro bono legal services, is not an
entitlement. It’s not welfare. It’s simply good government. This is an
American idea, not a liberal one or a conservative one.U219
Funding legal aid is good government because, as shown by an
economic impact study commissioned by the Foundation and published in
2016, it is cost-effective, good for the state’s economy, and saves taxpayer
money.220 The study found that every $100,000 invested in civil legal aid in
Florida creates an estimated $719,000 in economic impacts.221 Civil legal
aid helps lower-income Florida residents obtain money to which they are
entitled, including federal benefits (Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare,
veterans’ benefits), unpaid child support, unpaid or disputed wages, and
unemployment compensation, some of which comes from outside the State
and most of which is spent in Florida.222
Civil legal aid also reduces the financial burden on government
agencies.223 When the Florida Legislature passed FACLA in 2002, it found
Xthat the lack of adequate and equitable legal services available to the
indigent population, particularly the children and elderly of this State,
unnecessarily burdens existing social and human services programs.U224

217.
See id. at 163. In IOTA III, the opinion implementing Florida’s IOTA
program, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that Xcontinued funding for the Legal Services
Corporation is a matter of intense debate in Washington, D. C.U In re Interest on Tr. Accounts
(IOTA III), 402 So. 2d 389, 396 (Fla. 1981). Then-President Ronald Reagan had begun urging
Congress to abolish LSC and eliminate Federal legal aid financing. Stuart Taylor, Legal Aid
for the Poor: Reagan’s Longest Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1984, at A16. X[F]or most of the
last half century, legal aid for poor people has been a major political and ideological
battleground.U 1 Earl JOHNSON JR., TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES x (2013). The battle continues into the present. See
Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Closes Unit That Offers Legal Aid: [National Desk], N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2018, at A14. The U.S. Department of Justice established the Office for Access to
Justice (XATJU) in March 2010, during the Presidency of Barack Obama. Id. ATJ was quietly
closed down in 2017, shortly after Jeff Sessions was sworn in as Attorney General under
President Donald Trump. Id.
218.
See Hecht, supra note 34, at 191.
219.
Id.
220.
Economic Impact Study, supra note 32.
221.
Id.
222.
Id.
223.
See Lash, supra note 41, at 161.
224.
FLA. STAT. § 68.095 (2019).
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Funding civil legal aid helps ensure the effectiveness of state government
programs intended to assist people in meeting their basic needs.225
Finally, funding civil legal aid is good government because access to
justice promotes social stability and order.226 When people lose faith in their
ability to peaceably and effectively obtain redress in the legal system, they
may take to the streets or resort to property damage and violence.227
Ignoring the civil legal needs of the poor simply leads to bad results.228 Any
government that claims to care about the rule of law must fund civil legal
aid.229
B.

The Business Community’s Stake in Expanding Access to Justice

Business and industry depend on the rule of law.230 Supporting
access to justice is not only consistent with good corporate citizenship; it is
also aligned with corporate self-interest.231 Companies cannot operate
effectively if they cannot count on social stability and order[not merely the
absence of civil unrest, but also the basic integrity and fairness of
commercial transactions and the civil judicial system.232 Unmet civil legal
needs impose costs on businesses.233 Employees may experience civil legal
problems in any number of areas, such as personal finance, divorce, family
violence, child custody, special needs education for children, or landlordtenant disputes, for example.234 Employees may not know how to address
these issues or may lack access to the civil justice system to resolve them.235
Such problems affect employees’ work performance, causing employees to
be absent from work, to be less productive on the job, or to leave their jobs
altogether.236 And, of course, the more people who slip into poverty as a
result of civil legal problems, the less is spent on goods and services and the
worse is the economy in general.237
225.
Lash, supra note 41, at 16061.
226.
Id. at 161.
227.
See David Smiley, McDuffie Riots: Revisiting, Retelling Story — 35
Years
Later,
MIAMI
HERALD
(May
17,
2015,
3:37
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article21178995.html.
228.
See Lash, supra note 41, at 161.
229.
See Sandman, supra note 11, at 11819.
230.
Economic Impact Study, supra note 32.
231.
Id.
232.
See id.
233.
Id.
234.
See JUSTICE GAP REPORT 2017, supra note 15, at 31.
235.
See id. at 31, 33.
236.
See id. at 31.
237.
Id.; see also Economic Impact Study, supra note 32.
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CONCLUSION

The Foundation is uniquely qualified to point the way toward full
access to justice in Florida and to foster the convergence of resources
necessary to achieve it.238 Since its founding in 1956, the Foundation has
embodied the Florida Bar’s professional and moral commitment to public
service.239 From the inception of Florida’s IOTA program in 1981, the
Supreme Court of Florida has entrusted the Foundation with a large part of
the responsibility for determining how best to meet the civil legal needs of
the state’s poor.240 The Foundation has a nearly forty-year history of
providing funding for civil legal aid in the State.241 With the Strategic Reset,
the Foundation took on the role of leader of and catalyst for change in the
State’s civil legal aid delivery system and civil justice system.242 The
Foundation is situated in the nonprofit sector[i.e., largely outside the
governmental and private sectors.243 As such, the Foundation has a mostly
independent, non-political view of both the civil justice system and the civil
legal aid delivery system in this State.244 Perhaps most importantly, the
Foundation and its leadership have engaged in serious and meaningful study
of how to make the greatest impact on access to justice with limited
resources.245
The Author does not expect that the path to systemic change will be
free of difficulty, but she is confident that the Foundation’s new strategic
directions will lead to a future expansion of civil justice in Florida and
strengthen the rule of law.246

238.
See Economic Impact Study, supra note 32.
239.
Mission, supra note 9.
240.
Leadership and Funding for Justice in Florida, supra note 9.
241.
See id.
242.
See id.; Foundation Poised for a Strategic Reset, supra note 43, at 17.
243.
See Foundation poised for a Strategic Reset, supra note 43, at 17;
Leadership and Funding for Justice in Florida, supra note 9.
244.
See Community Based Civil Legal Services, supra note 166.
245.
Id.
246.
See Foundation Poised for a Strategic Reset, supra note 43, at 1.
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INTRODUCTION

The current political climate has raised the topic of sanctuary policy
as a point of contention between federal, state, and local government
authorities.1
On January 25, 2017, Executive Order 13,768, titled
“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” was signed by
President Donald Trump.2 The order stated that sanctuary jurisdictions that
refuse to comply with immigration enforcement measures would not be
“eligible to receive federal grants, except as deemed necessary for lawenforcement purposes.”3 The term sanctuary jurisdictions typically refers to
a city, state, or county that will generally protect undocumented migrants and
immigrants from deportation as well as welcome immigrants into the
community, while limiting their cooperation with the federal government’s
effort to enforce immigration laws.4
States that oppose bills banning sanctuary policies say that passing
these bills undermines trust between local law enforcement agencies and
local immigrant and migrant communities.5 Further, they claim that
sanctuary policies endanger the collaboration between immigrant
communities and local law enforcement.6 Conversely, supporters of bills
banning sanctuary cities say that a relationship between local law
enforcement and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) enables the
deportation of potentially dangerous criminals who are in the country
illegally.7
There are various methods sanctuary jurisdictions use to protect
immigrants.8 Scholars have looked into five different types of legal and
policy stances sanctuary jurisdictions have imposed:
“(1) barring
1.
Ann Morse et al., Sanctuary Policy FAQ: What’s a Sanctuary Policy?
FAQ on Federal, State and Local Action on Immigration Enforcement, NCSL (June 20, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/sanctuary-policy-faq635991795.aspx.
2.
Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); AM.
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER “ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE
INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES” 1 (2017).
3.
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 3; see also Exec. Order No.
13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799.
4.
Ann Deslandes, Sanctuary Cities Are as Old as the Bible, JSTOR DAILY
(Mar. 22, 2017), http://daily.jstor.org/sanctuary-cities-as-old-as-bible/; Morse et al., supra
note 1.
5.
Morse et al., supra note 1.
6.
Id.
7.
See Sanctuary Cities Undermine Law Enforcement and Endanger Our
Communities, WHITE HOUSE: IMMIGR. (Mar. 20, 2018), http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/sanctuary-cities-undermine-law-enforcement-endanger-communities/.
8.
See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding Sanctuary Cities, 59 B.C.
L. REV. 1703, 1704 (2018).

2019]

BANNING FAUX SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS

37

investigations into immigration violations; (2) limiting compliance with ICE
detainers and administrative warrants; (3) limiting ICE’s access to local jails;
(4) limiting disclosure of sensitive information; and (5) declining to
participate in joint operations.”9
On May 2, 2019, Florida Senate Bill 168 (the “Bill”) was passed,
banning sanctuary cities in Florida.10 Interestingly, however, “no city or
county [in Florida] has [ever] officially declared itself a sanctuary
jurisdiction.”11 Still, there are reports from Declined Detainer Outcome
Reports (“DDOR”) that indicate Florida has twenty-eight sanctuary cities
and counties.12 Most of the provisions of the Bill went into effect on July 1,
2019, except for one that became effective in October 2019.13 The Bill
requires all local authorities to honor requests from federal immigration
authorities, including holding detainees, so they can be picked up by an
agency like ICE and subjected to possible detainment or deportation.14
As previously noted, there are conflicting reports as to whether
Florida even has sanctuary jurisdictions.15 However, this has not stopped
ICE or the legislature from trying to prevent any sort of sanctuary policy in
the State.16
Importantly, the Bill will essentially “transform every
government agency, university, and law enforcement agency into [an arm of]
federal immigration officers.”17 One strategy ICE is using in addition to the
9.
Id. at 1737.
10.
FLA. STAT. § 908.103 (2019); Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1
(2019); Kate Sullivan, Florida Legislature Passes Ban on Sanctuary Cities, CNN: POL. (May
2, 2019, 9:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2019/05/02/politics/florida-legislature-sanctuary-cityban/index.html.
11.
Arian Campo-Flores, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis Signs Sanctuary-City
Ban, WALL STREET J. (June 14, 2019, 3:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/florida-gov-rondesantis-signs-sanctuary-city-ban-11560536897.
12.
Melissa S. Razdrih, It’s a Law: No More Sanctuary Cities as of July 1,
FLAPOL: HEADLINES (July 1, 2019), http://floridapolitics.com/archives/300159-florida-saysgoodbye-to-sanctuary-cities-and-counties-as-new-law-takes-effect-today; see also Steve Salvi,
The Original List of Sanctuary Cities, USA, OHIO JOBS & JUST. PAC (Aug. 29, 2019),
http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp.
13.
FLA. STAT. §§ 908.101–09; Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 6; Fla. S.
Comm. on Rules, SB 168 (2019) Fiscal Note 1 (Apr. 18, 2019) available at
http://flsenate.gov/session/Bill/2019/168/Analyses/2019s00168.rc.PDF.
14.
Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1; Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, supra
note 13, at 9–11.
15.
Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, supra note 13, at 4; see also Elizabeth Koh,
Florida Bans Sanctuary Cities, but There Aren’t Any in the State, GOVERNING: PUB. SAFETY
(June 17, 2019, 8:46 AM), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/tns-floridagovernor-signs-sanctuary-cities-ban.html.
16.
See Koh, supra note 15.
17.
Samantha J. Gross, Ban on Sanctuary Cities to Become Florida Law After
Anguished Debate, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 2, 2019), http://www.tampabay.com/florida-
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Bill’s ban on sanctuary jurisdictions to find and deport immigrants is
implementing a Basic Ordering Agreement (“BOA”) with local sheriffs’
offices.18 A BOA allows for a jail that is holding an immigrant on a detainer
from ICE to be “reimbursed [fifty dollars] for up to [forty-eight] hours of
detention.”19 Another strategy ICE is using in conjunction with the Bill is
the 287(g) program.20 Under the program, “local law enforcement agents are
deputized to work as federal immigration officials, but the program is
restricted to county jails.”21
The impact of this Bill may be catastrophic to the Florida business
community.22 The State faces to potentially lose $76.7 million in federal
taxes, and $44.7 million in state and local taxes if ten percent of the
immigrant population leaves Florida.23 This Bill could also play into the
hands of human traffickers, as well as affect the health of immigrant
communities.24 For purposes of clarity, in this Comment, the term sanctuary
jurisdictions will be used to denote sanctuary cities, counties, and states.*

politics/buzz/2019/05/02/sanctuary-cities-to-become-florida-law-after-anguished-debate/; see
also FLA. STAT. §§ 908.104, 908.105; Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1.
18.
Fighting Basic Ordering Agreements: A Toolkit for Florida Advocates, S.
POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/basicorderingagreements (last visited Dec. 21,
2019); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 908.104, 908.105; Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1.
19.
FAQs on ICE’s New Enforcement Partnerships in Florida, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/fact-sheet/faq-ices-new-enforcement-partnerships-florida (last visited
Dec. 21, 2019).
20.
Ana Ceballos, Senate Signs off on Sanctuary City Ban: Lawmakers Must
Work Out Differences with House to Send Bill to Governor, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 27,
2019, at 6; see also FLA. STAT. § 908.106; Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 3.
21.
Dara Kam, With DeSantis Urging Cooperation with ICE, Florida Sheriffs
Are Looking at Options, SUNSHINE ST. NEWS: POL. (Mar. 12, 2019, 8:15 AM),
http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/desantis-urging-cooperation-ice-florida-sheriffs-arelooking-options.
22.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy,
NEW
AM.
ECON.
(Mar.
6,
2019),
http://research.newamericaneconomy.org/report/economic-cost-of-florida-senate-bill-168and-house-bill-527/; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 908.104, 908.107; Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB
168, at 1.
23.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22.
24.
Paul DiMare, SB 168 Is Anti-Business, Anti-Immigrant and Threatens the
Safety of Floridians Statewide, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 5, 2019, at 13A; Marissa RaymondFlesch, The Negative Health Consequences of Anti-Immigration Policies, 62 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 505, 505 (2018); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 908.104, 908.107; Fla. CS for CS for CS for
SB 168, at 1.
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HISTORY AND DEFINITIONS OF SANCTUARY CITIES

Sanctuary jurisdiction ordinarily refers to a place that has declared
itself as one that will typically protect undocumented migrants and
immigrants from deportation and also limit their cooperation with the federal
government’s effort to enforce immigration laws.25 It is similar to the
concept referred to in the sanctuary movement of the 1980s, when religious
institutions declared their territories to be safe havens for refugees and
migrants escaping turmoil and persecution in Central America.26 A common
thread between the way different places operate as sanctuary jurisdictions is
typically through an ordinance that allows local government law enforcement
and institutions to refuse to give information about immigrants’ residency
statuses to federal immigration agents, when an immigrant resident has been
arrested for a non-immigration-related offense.27
From a definitional point of view, the terms sanctuary and sanctuary
jurisdictions mean those states and cities that receive federal funds from the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) and refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.28 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is a
section in the Immigration and Nationality Act that provides that a federal,
state, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way
restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.29
Another definition of sanctuary jurisdiction refers to areas which
“do not honor civil detainer requests by ICE officials.”30 An ICE civil
detainer request asks a local law enforcement agency to continue to keep an
inmate who is in jail because of real or suspected violations of criminal laws
for up to forty-eight hours after his or her scheduled release, so that ICE can
determine if it wants to take that individual into custody.31 ICE civil detainer

25.
SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44795, “SANCTUARY”
JURISDICTIONS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICIES AND RELATED LITIGATION 4 n.18
(2019).
26.
Id. at 3.
27.
Id. at 3–4.
28.
Id. at 16–17.
29.
8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018), declared unconstitutional by City and County of
San Francisco v. Sessions, 372 F. Supp. 3d 928 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
30.
Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks,
103 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1220 (2019).
31.
County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
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requests are typically voluntary and local governments are not obligated to
honor them.32
President Trump’s administration considers areas that decline to
honor detainer requests as sanctuary jurisdictions and has recognized them
through the publication of lists of nonfederal jurisdictions that decline
detainer requests.33 Among the jurisdictions included in the list are those
that require the federal government to obtain a warrant before they agree to
hold a noncitizen in custody after the noncitizen should be released under
state or local law.34 Law enforcement definitions and connotations of
sanctuary jurisdictions are generally portrayed as jurisdictions that violate
laws and endanger communities.35 On the other hand, immigrant advocates’
definitions and connotations of sanctuary jurisdictions are portrayed as those
jurisdictions that provide a safe-haven for undocumented immigrants and
where “local law enforcement officers have the trust of the community.”36
III.

TYPES OF SANCTUARY CITIES AND PERCEPTION

“There are various types of sanctuary [jurisdiction] policies.”37
Some are called sanctuary jurisdictions purely by symbolic means because
they welcome immigrants, while “others are more proactive by their
establishing protocols geared at the confidentiality of an individual’s
undocumented status and [to] ensure open communication between residents
and public employees, especially law enforcement officers.”38 As previously
noted, scholars have identified five principle types of legal and policy
initiatives adopted by sanctuary jurisdictions: “(1) barring investigations into
immigration violations; (2) limiting compliance with ICE detainers and
administrative warrants; (3) limiting ICE’s access to local jails; (4) limiting
disclosure of sensitive information; and (5) declining to participate in joint
operations.”39
Public perception of sanctuary jurisdictions varies tremendously,
especially when polled, depending on the wording of questions and

32.
Id.
33.
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 30, at 1221.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.; see also Sanctuary Cities Undermine Law Enforcement and Endanger
Our Communities, supra note 7.
36.
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 30, at 1221–22.
37.
Id. at 1236.
38.
Id.
39.
Lasch et al., supra note 8, at 1737.
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specifically when poll takers consider what type of crime an immigrant
commits.40
A.

Types of Sanctuary Jurisdictions

A new, innovative way sanctuary jurisdictions “have legally resisted
federal immigration enforcement is the establishment of policies that provide
free legal assistance to undocumented immigrants and children in removal
hearings.”41 The federal government does not provide legal services for
noncitizens and they must find and pay for their own lawyers, leading most
immigrants to be underrepresented or unrepresented in removal hearings.42
Violations of federal immigration law may be criminal or
civil in nature. Removal proceedings are civil, although some
[behavior] that makes an [immigrant] alien removable may also
[permit] criminal prosecution. For example, an [immigrant] alien
who knowingly enters the United States without authorization is
not only potentially removable, but could also be charged with the
criminal offense of unlawful entry. Other violations of the
[Immigration and Nationality Act] are exclusively criminal or civil
in nature.
Notably, an [immigrant] alien’s unauthorized
immigration status makes him or her removable, but absent
additional factors (e.g., having reentered the United States after
being formally removed), unlawful presence on its own is not a
criminal offense.43
Whereas localities have a range of policy options
available to them to ensure that all individuals are treated equally
regardless of their immigration status, a common thread that runs
through sanctuary jurisdictions is their acknowledgement that
detainers infringe on Fourth Amendment and due process rights.
To be clear, such localities are not refusing to comply with the
law. In fact, every single jurisdiction still shares fingerprint data
upon arrest with the [Federal Bureau of Investigation], which in
turn shares these data with the DHS for immigration status checks.
Rather, in declining a detainer request, localities are choosing not
to hold an individual beyond the point at which the person would
otherwise be released from custody, which is generally the point at
40.
See Louis Jacobson, Anatomy of a Statistic: Do 80 Percent of Americans
Oppose
Sanctuary
Cities?,
POLITIFACT
(Feb.
24,
2017,
2:50
PM),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/feb/24/anatomy-statistic-do-80-percentamericans-oppose-s/.
41.
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 30, at 1240.
42.
Id.
43.
PECK, supra note 25, at 11.

42

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

which the legal authority to continue detaining the individual is
over.44

In conclusion, “sanctuary [jurisdictions] today continue to provide
safe havens to undocumented immigrants.”45 The scope of protection has
changed from barring law enforcement officers from communicating data
about a person’s immigration status with federal immigration officers to
wider “forms of protections, including refusing to honor detainer requests
and providing free legal assistance to immigrants to directly challenge their
removal from the United States.”46
B.

Perception of Sanctuary Jurisdictions

As previously noted, public perception of sanctuary jurisdictions
varies tremendously when polled depending on the wording of questions.47
Notably, in February 2017, the Harvard-Harris poll released findings which
indicated that eighty percent of Americans were against sanctuary
jurisdictions.48 However, the wording of the poll question matters.49 The
question was phrased as: “Should cities that arrest illegal immigrants for
crimes be required to turn them over to immigration authorities?”50 In this
case, the poll-takers were asked about crimes.51 To many, that typically
means “violent crimes, especially when placed with the term arrest.”52
Although there has not been much polling on the issue of sanctuary
jurisdictions, there was a poll that appeared to support the idea behind the
notion that the wording of a poll can greatly affect the results.53 The
aforementioned poll was conducted by Quinnipiac University and asked:
“Thinking about people who have immigrated to the [United States] illegally,
who do you think should be deported: Should no illegal immigrants be
deported; only illegal immigrants that have committed serious crimes; only
illegal immigrants that have committed any crime; or should all illegal
immigrants be deported?”54 In response to this question, only three-percent
44.
TOM K. WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE EFFECTS
POLICIES ON CRIME AND THE ECONOMY 4 (2017).
45.
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 30, at 1242.
46.
Id.
47.
See Jacobson, supra note 40.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Jacobson, supra note 40.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.

OF

SANCTUARY
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said “no illegal immigrants should be deported, and [nineteen] percent said
all illegal immigrants should be deported.”55 Fifty-three percent of polltakers said “deportations should only be done for serious crimes, compared
to [twenty-two] percent for any crime.”56 Many believe that sanctuary
jurisdictions actually put immigrants at risk “who are not necessarily the
primary targets of ICE . . . because ICE is forced to make more at-large
arrests in immigrant communities—at workplaces, dwellings, and on the
street, rather than in controlled jail or courthouse environments.”57
C.

Pros and Cons of Sanctuary Policy

Limited cooperation or sanctuary policies may bring about negative
public safety outcomes in a couple of ways.58 For example, “the adoption of
limited cooperation policies could bring about behavioral changes in the
local immigrant population by increasing the likelihood that individuals will
engage in crime.”59 As an example, perhaps certain immigrants may think
that there is a lower risk of deportation in a sanctuary jurisdiction where local
law enforcement limits its cooperation with ICE.60 This is unlikely for two
reasons.61
First, many immigrants “may not fully understand the nuances of
limited cooperation policies, especially in contexts where the federal and
local governments possess opposing policy orientations towards
immigrants,” making this detrimental effect of sanctuary policy unlikely.62
Second, and even more salient, even if immigrants have a pristine
comprehension of sanctuary policies, local law enforcement often do not
abide by sanctuary policy when it comes to violent and serious felony
offenses.63 Therefore, the most serious crimes will likely have the same risk
of punishment associated despite any sanctuary policy in place.64
Another way sanctuary policies may bring about negative public
safety outcomes, is that the existence of limited cooperation policies could
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Preston Huennekens, Identifying the Super-Sanctuaries, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Jan. 15, 2019), http://www.cis.org/Huennekens/IdentifyingSuperSanctuaries.
58.
Daniel E. Martínez et al., Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A
Review of the Research on Sanctuary Cities and Crime, SOC. COMPASS, Nov. 8, 2017, at 1, 5.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
See id.
62.
Id.
63.
Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 5.
64.
Id.
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attract immigrants that are more inclined to be convicted of crimes.65 Thus,
“[i]f the proportion of criminally-inclined noncitizens increased in a specific
area, then we would expect crime rates to also increase. . . .”66 Like in the
previous example, this line of reasoning assumes that immigrants are aware
of specific jurisdictions with sanctuary policies “but are not sufficiently
informed to understand that such policies do not provide true sanctuary.”67
Further, this reasoning also generally associates immigrants with criminality
even though a “large body of research relying on both self-report surveys and
official statistics reveals that immigrant adults and youths, relative to the
general [United States] population, have lower levels of criminality and are
consequently less likely to engage in criminal or delinquent behavior.”68
Lastly, a possible connection may exist between sanctuary policies,
immigration, and crime from something called a social disorganization
framework.69 This framework provides that “dense community social and
institutional network structures inhibit crime and delinquency by fostering
informal social control mechanisms such as the supervision of
adolescents.”70 Community crime is more likely to increase under social
disorganization, often linked to immigrant communities.71 However, studies
concluded that “the concentration of recent immigrants is negatively
associated with homicide,” but there was no evidence of a relationship
between immigrants and crime.72
On the other hand, sanctuary policies could bolster the relationship
between the community and local law enforcement because immigrant
community members will not feel at risk for deportation.73 Thus, immigrant
communities “may be more willing to seek assistance from law enforcement
officials or cooperate with criminal investigations.”74 Greater cooperation
and coordination with local law enforcement “should facilitate the clearance
of crimes by arrest, which has been shown to incapacitate and deter would-be
criminals.”75 Notwithstanding these dependable and persistent findings,
many policymakers and lawmakers continue to question and ban sanctuary
policies on the basis of public safety concerns.76 One reason for this is that
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 1, 5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 6; see also Morse et al., supra note 1.
Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 1, 6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 1, 8.
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the “discourse has less to do with crime and safety concerns and more with . .
. public conceptualizations of what [it] means to be [a] real American.”77
This implied manifestation of racism becomes a shadow in the sanctuary
policy oppositions’ narrative that undocumented immigrants infringe on the
rule of law and law and order.78 This is likely why many policymakers and
lawmakers “continue to recycle empirically inaccurate arguments that
limited cooperation policies and noncitizens, more broadly, represent public
safety concerns.”79
IV.

SENATE BILL 168

One of President Trump’s most frequent promises during his
campaign was: “Cities that refuse to cooperate with federal [immigration]
authorities will not receive taxpayer dollars.”80 Seeking to punish sanctuary
jurisdictions that continued to defy 8 U.S.C. § 1373, President Trump issued
Executive Order 13,768 to withdraw federal funds from those jurisdictions.81
Shortly thereafter, there were multiple lawsuits filed contesting the
provisions of the Executive Order.82 Eventually, the court in the County of
Santa Clara v. Trump83 enjoined the enforcement of Executive Order 13768,
finding it facially problematic because the Order was too broadly written.84
Further, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that President
Trump went beyond his authority with an executive order he signed and that
the executive branch may not refuse to disperse the federal grants without the
approval of Congress.85
As previously stated, in Florida, on May 2, 2019, the Bill was
passed, banning sanctuary jurisdictions.86 The Bill went into effect on July
1, 2019, except for one section that became effective in October 2019.87
Specifically, the Bill requires all local authorities to honor requests from
federal immigration authorities by holding detainees, so they can be picked
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1, 9.
Id.
Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 9.
Lasch et al., supra note 8, at 1713; Donald Trump Immigration Speech in
Arizona,
POLITICO
(Aug.
31,
2016,
10:54
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-immigration-address-transcript-227614.
81.
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 30, at 1219.
82.
Lasch et al., supra note 8, at 1717.
83.
250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
84.
See id. at 537.
85.
City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th
Cir. 2018).
86.
Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1 (2019); Sullivan, supra note 10.
87.
Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 6.
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up by an agency like ICE and be subjected to detainment or deportation.88
Minor offenses, like jaywalking or driving without a license, could be
grounds for deportation for illegal immigrant aliens.89 Florida Governor Ron
DeSantis has supported the measure and signed the Bill into law on June 14,
2019.90 The Bill creates Chapter 908 in the Florida Statutes entitled Federal
Immigration Enforcement.91
The [B]ill seeks to ensure that state [as well as] local entities and
law enforcement agencies cooperate with federal government
officials to enforce, and not obstruct, immigration laws. In its
most general and broad terms, the [B]ill prohibits sanctuary
jurisdictions and requires state and local entities to comply with
federal immigration detainers when they are supported by proper
documentation.92

The Bill “requires every Florida county and municipality to
expend maximum local resources to enforce federal immigration law
and participate in civic liberties violations. Moreover, it does not
provide any funding or reimbursement for its costly mandate.”93
Specifically, the Bill ensures that no state agency, law enforcement
agency, local government agency, or state university can adopt or
have a sanctuary policy.94 The Bill “ban[s] policies that limit local
cooperation and information-sharing with federal authorities on
immigration matters.”95

88.
89.

Id. at 1, 2.
Xander Peters, Florida’s New Anti-Sanctuary Cities Law Goes into Effect
Today,
ORLANDO
WKLY.
(July
1,
2019,
11:32
AM),
http://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2019/07/01/floridas-new-anti-sanctuary-citieslaw-goes-into-effect-today.
90.
Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 6.
91.
Id. at 1.
92.
Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, supra note 13, at 1.
93.
Joe Gruters, Senate Bill 168: Anti-Immigrant Attempts to Ban Sanctuary
Policies and to Require Local Law Enforcement to Enforce ICE Detainer Requests, ACLU
FLA.,
http://www.aclufl.org/en/legislation/senate-bill-168-anti-immigrant-attempts-bansanctuary-policies-and-require-local-law (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
94.
Id.
95.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22.
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Notable Sections in the Bill

The Bill contains different sections, most notable of which are
summarized and contextualized as follows by legislative history
documents.96
1.

Criminal Cases

Judges must determine and assign the defendant-immigrant to a
secure correctional facility.97 There, the facility must decide whether a
reduction “by not more than [twelve] days” would aid in the handover of the
defendant-immigrant to federal officers, granting the defendant-immigrant
has an immigration detainer out for him/her.98

If a judge does not have this information at the time of
sentencing, but a law enforcement agency receives the information
after sentencing, the law enforcement agency must notify the judge
and he or she must issue the order to the secure correctional
facility as soon as the information becomes available.99

2.

Transport

At the time a county correctional facility verifies with federal
immigration authorities that there exists a possible situation where an
arrested person may have an immigration detainer out for them, the federal
authorities may then pick up the person and transfer them to a federal
facility.100 Nonetheless, it is prohibited for federal authorities to pick up the
person and transfer them before the twelve-day period elapses.101
Additionally, federal authorities who wish to transfer an immigrant alien in
custody need to go through the process of securing an authorization from a
judge before being allowed to move the person across state lines.102

A.

96.

See Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, supra note 13, at 1; discussion infra Section

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, supra note 13, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, supra note 13, at 10.
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Victims or Witnesses

Witnesses to or victims of crimes are exempt from this section,
meaning that state or local law enforcement agencies are not required to give
any information to federal authorities about these witnesses or victims.103
However, this is so long as these witnesses or victims work with law
enforcement in a good faith and timely manner in furtherance of an
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense.104
4.

Duties Related to Immigration Detainers

There are certain duties related to immigration detainers that law
enforcement personnel need to be aware of if they have someone in their
custody that may have an immigration detainer out for him or her.105 In the
event that a law enforcement agency has someone that is subject to an
immigration detainer, law enforcement personnel should notify a judge, all
the while making sure to detail the immigration detainer’s information in the
person’s file.106 Further, law enforcement agencies need to abide by and
comply with the immigration detainer and any requests it may note as long as
the detainer is consistent with the requirements set forth in section 908.102,
Florida Statutes.107
Interestingly, law enforcement personnel do not have to notify a
judge, comply with detainer requests, or record the information in the
person’s file, if the person is coming from another law enforcement agency
that already performed the above duties before transferring the person.108
Further, judges who know that a person is subject to an immigration detainer
are required to include the detainer information in the court record.109
5.

Enforcement

The enforcement section, section 908.107, Florida Statutes, became
effective in October 2019.110 The Bill states that “[a]ny executive or
administrative state, county, or municipal officer who violates his or her
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
908.107 (2019).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 10.
Fla. S. Comm. on Rules., supra note 13, at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 6 (2019); see also FLA. STAT. §
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duties under this chapter may be subject to action . . . under the State
Constitution and state law.”111 Moreover, the Bill establishes that “[i]f a
local governmental entity or local law enforcement agency violates this
chapter, the court must enjoin the unlawful sanctuary policy.”112
6.

Basic Ordering Agreements and the 287(g) Program

The Bill provides that each county jail must enter into an agreement
with ICE for temporary housing of immigrants that are subject to
detainers.113 In order to be compliant with this section of the Bill, the jail
must enter into a BOA or an agreement authorized by section 287 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.114
V.
A.

THE SITUATION IN FLORIDA

No Declared Sanctuary Jurisdictions
To be clear,
[i]n Florida, no city or county has officially declared itself a
sanctuary jurisdiction. [However], as an example of the type of
policy that could be affected, the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office
in central Florida has [long] declined requests by federal
immigration authorities to hold immigrants beyond their release
date, unless they had a court order or criminal warrant . . . .115

Alachua County is the only county listed on the Center for
Immigration Studies Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States List.116 There are
other reports from DDORs that indicate Florida has twenty-eight sanctuary
cities and counties, including Hillsborough, Pinellas, Miami-Dade, and
Orange counties, and cities Tampa, Miami, St. Petersburg, and Orlando.117
DDORs report on state jurisdictions that refuse to “honor detainers issued by

111.
FLA. STAT. § 908.107.
112.
Id.
113.
Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 5.
114.
Id. at 6; Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 287, 66
Stat. 163, 233 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).
115.
Campo-Flores, supra note 11.
116.
Bryan Griffith & Jessica M. Vaughan, Maps: Sanctuary Cities, Counties,
and States, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Apr. 16, 2019), http://www.cis.org/Map-SanctuaryCities-Counties-and-States.
117.
Razdrih, supra note 12; Salvi, supra note 12.
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ICE to that jurisdiction.”118 Despite the existence of these reports, it still
remains
difficult to determine how many sanctuary jurisdictions . . . exist in
Florida because organizations use different criteria for making
their determinations, and because the information necessary to
make these determinations is not readily available. For [instance],
the Federation for American Immigration Reform (“FAIR”)
released a list of sanctuary jurisdictions in May 2018 which stated
that, as of April 2018, [twelve] counties and [three] cities qualified
as Florida sanctuary jurisdictions.119

Further, in October 2018, The Center for Immigration Studies
provided a list of sanctuary jurisdictions, which included Florida counties
Alachua and Clay, although Clay County is not currently listed there.120
There was
[o]nly one Florida municipality, the City of West Palm Beach,
[that] appeared on a compliance review list released by the DOJ, in
January 2018. The city was required to submit documentation to
the [DOJ] demonstrating whether its employees could
communicate with DOJ, DHS, ICE, or their agents. The City of
West Palm Beach now appears on the current [Florida Department
of Law Enforcement] list of jurisdictions that have submitted
certifications stating that it is in compliance with federal
immigration laws.121

As of July 10, 2019, there may already be a legal challenge to the
Bill.122 The South Miami City Commission unanimously voted to hire a
lawyer to challenge the Bill along with the Southern Poverty Law Center and
the University of Miami.123 South Miami was approached by the Southern
Poverty Law Center, “which argues that the [B]ill is unconstitutional and in
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against . . . unreasonable
118.
See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS: WEEKLY DECLINED DETAINER OUTCOME REPORT 1 (2017).
119.
Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, supra note 13, at 4.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 5.
122.
See Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1 (2019); Jessica Lipscomb,
South Miami to File Lawsuit Challenging Florida’s New Ban on Sanctuary Cities, MIAMI
NEW TIMES (July 10, 2019, 8:00 AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/south-miamiflorida-and-southern-poverty-law-center-will-sue-over-states-sanctuary-city-ban-11215198.
123.
Lipscomb, supra note 122; see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at
1.

2019]

BANNING FAUX SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS

51

seizure.”124 South Miami City Attorney, Thomas Pepe, stated that “state law
conflicts with federal law about whether a city such as South Miami would
be reimbursed for having its police [force act in tandem] with immigration
agents [and that] the city could be sued for wrongfully detaining
immigrants.”125 Pepe also indicated that “seven nonprofit organizations will
join the city as plaintiffs in the lawsuit.”126
B.

Basic Ordering Agreements

As previously noted, another strategy ICE is using in conjunction
with the legislature’s ban on sanctuary jurisdictions to find and deport
immigrants, is by implementing a BOA.127 Various “federal courts have
ruled that it is unconstitutional for local law enforcement agencies to keep
people detained in jail once their criminal cases have ended” under ICE
detainers.128 Those court holdings made many Florida sheriffs concerned
that they would be sued because of the unlawful holds.129 To get around this,
Pinellas County Sheriff, Bob Gualtieri, along with the Florida Sheriffs
Association, and ICE came up with the BOA.130
“A BOA is not an enforceable contract and does not [require] the jail
to [act on a] detainer.”131 Rather, it allows for a jail that does hold an
immigrant for ICE to be reimbursed fifty dollars for up to forty-eight hours
of detention.132 Under a BOA, the jail agrees “to give ICE free access to
their jails to interrogate inmates.”133 Under a BOA, “[sheriffs] shall provide
[ICE] with reasonable access to all detainees or inmates for purposes of
interviewing such individuals for immigration enforcement related
purposes.”134 “[BOAs] aim to prevent the release of criminal aliens back

124.
Julia Ingram, South Miami Says It Will Challenge Florida’s Ban on
Sanctuary Cities in Court, MIAMI HERALD, July 14, 2019, at 24SE; Lipscomb, supra note 122;
see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1.
125.
Lipscomb, supra note 122.
126.
Id.
127.
See Fighting Basic Ordering Agreements: A Toolkit for Florida
Advocates, supra note 18.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
FAQs on ICE’s New Enforcement Partnerships in Florida, supra note 19.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
E-mail from Matt Dunagan, Deputy Exec. Dir. of Operations, Fla. Sheriffs
Ass’n, to Sheriffs, Fla. Sheriffs Ass’n (June 17, 2019, 9:59 AM) (on file with author).
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into the community.”135 An ICE news release stated that “sheriffs will no
longer have to choose between releasing criminal illegal [immigrant] aliens
from their custody back into the community or exposing themselves to
potential civil liability for violating the immigrant alien’s civil rights.”136
The participating sheriffs in the agreements will receive reimbursement for
complying with the detainers.137
On January 17, 2018, the ICE office issued a news release
announcing that seventeen BOAs had been agreed to with sheriffs around the
State.138 By January 2019, sheriffs in ten additional counties signed BOAs:
DeSoto, Flagler, Martin, Okeechobee, Palm Beach, St. Lucie, Seminole,
Highlands, Nassau, and St. Johns counties.139 As of early July 2019, fortyone out of sixty-seven counties in Florida had formally reached a BOA with
ICE.140 Counties that did not have formal agreements as of early July 2019
are: Miami-Dade, Broward, Duval, Baker, Bradford, Calhoun, Citrus, Clay,
Collier, Dixie, Escambia, Gadsden, Gilchrist, Glades, Hamilton, Holmes,
Jackson, Jefferson, Liberty, Okaloosa, Osceola, Osceola, Putnam, Sarasota,
Sumter, Union, Volusia, and Wakulla counties.141 Counties have ninety days
to comply with the Bill’s provisions and either enter into a BOA or an
intergovernmental service agreement.142 “If not, officials can be sued or
even face removal from the Governor or the Attorney General.”143
However, in some Florida counties, there are obstacles to
compliance.144 “In Citrus County, for example, the county’s detention
facility is operated by Core Civic, a private for-profit company” which may
result in “confusion between the Citrus County Sheriff’s Office and Core
Civic about who should enter into the agreement.”145 Alachua County, one
of the only publicized sanctuary jurisdictions in Florida, has also signed an
135.
ICE, 17 FL Sheriffs Announce New Enforcement Partnership, U.S.
IMMIGR.
&
CUSTOMS
ENF’T
NEWSROOM,
(Jan.
17,
2018),
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-17-fl-sheriffs-announce-new-enforcement-partnership.
136.
Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, supra note 13, at 7.
137.
Id.
138.
See ICE, 17 FL Sheriffs Announce New Enforcement Partnership, supra
note 135.
139.
See Fighting Basic Ordering Agreements: A Toolkit for Florida
Advocates, supra note 18.
140.
Daniel Rivero, Many Florida Counties Don’t Have ICE Agreements
Required by New Law, WLRN (July 3, 2019), http://www.wlrn.org/post/many-floridacounties-dont-have-ice-agreements-required-new-law.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.; see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1 (2019); E-mail from
Matt Dunagan to Sheriffs, supra note 134.
143.
Rivero, supra note 140.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
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agreement with ICE to start honoring the requests.146 “The agreement states
ICE will pay a fixed rate of [fifty dollars] for up to [forty-eight] hours of
detention.”147 It is unclear if the agreement includes fifty dollars a day or
fifty dollars for the entire forty-eight hours.148 It costs the Alachua Sheriff’s
Office about $185 a day to keep an inmate.149
C.

287(g) Program

The 287(g) program is named after section 287 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act and allows sheriff offices to “train and authorize
personnel to identify and process undocumented immigrants.”150 The
program requires local law enforcement agents to complete two months of
training from federal officials in South Carolina, according to the local
sheriff.151 Under the program, “local law enforcement agents are deputized
to work as federal immigration officials, but the program is restricted to
county jails.”152 Currently, “there are five counties in Florida that participate
in the program [and] the local law enforcement agency is in charge of
covering the costs of out-of-state training, such as travel expenses.”153
Members of civil rights organizations as well as advocates for immigration
communities have regarded the 287(g) program as a tool for racial profiling
and have indicated that the program even deters immigrants from reporting
crimes and abuse.154
VI.

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE BILL IN FLORIDA

One outcome of the Bill will likely be hostility.155 It may go so far
as causing immigrants in Florida to leave the State entirely.156 Further, it
“could also result in significant economic losses for the [S]tate and would
146.
Id.; see also Griffith & Vaughan, supra note 116.
147.
Cindy Swirko, Sheriff Will Hold Inmates 48 Hours for ICE, GAINESVILLE
SUN, (June 18, 2019, 6:34 PM), http://www.gainesville.com/news/20190618/sheriff-will-holdinmates-48-hours-for-ice.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Ceballos, supra note 20; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub.
L. No. 82-414, § 287, 66 Stat. 163, 233 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).
151.
Kam, supra note 21.
152.
Id.
153.
Ceballos, supra note 20.
154.
See Kam, supra note 21.
155.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22; see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1 (2019).
156.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22; see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1.
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also threaten key parts of Florida’s workforce in industries like agriculture
and construction.”157 Crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary
jurisdictions compared to non-sanctuary jurisdictions, and economies are
stronger in sanctuary jurisdictions.158 There are “higher median household
income, less poverty, and less reliance on public assistance, to higher labor
force participation, higher employment-to-population ratios, and lower
unemployment” in sanctuary jurisdictions.159 The threat of deportation may
also scare potential human trafficking victims into silence.160 Lastly, there is
a basis to believe that the Bill’s goal is “to prohibit local law enforcement
agencies from placing any limit on their compliance with detainers and
would therefore amplify the consequences of ICE’s mistakes,” and may
create negative health outcomes for immigrant families.161
A.

Crime

“Crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary [jurisdictions]
compared to non-sanctuary [jurisdictions].”162 To put it in context, crime is
described as the totality of violent crimes and property crimes per ten
thousand people.163 Murders, rapes, robberies, and assaults are examples of
violent crimes, while burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson are
categorized as property crimes.164 What we can see is that crime is actually
much lower in sanctuary jurisdictions that constitute “large central metro
counties, small metro counties, micropolitan counties, and noncore, rural
counties.”165 The large central metro areas project just how pronounced the
difference is between sanctuary and non-sanctuary jurisdictions.166 The data
shows that large central metro sanctuary jurisdictions have 65.4 fewer crimes
per ten thousand people as compared to large central metro non-sanctuary
jurisdictions, which may be surprising to some.167

157.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22.
158.
WONG, supra note 44, at 1.
159.
Id.
160.
DiMare, supra note 24.
161.
ACLU FLA., CITIZENS ON HOLD: A LOOK AT ICE’S FLAWED DETAINER
SYSTEM IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY 2 (2019); Raymond-Flesch, supra note 24, at 505; see also
FLA. STAT. § 908.107 (2019); Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1.
162.
WONG, supra note 44, at 1.
163.
Id. at 6.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
WONG, supra note 44, at 6.
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The Major Cities Chiefs Association, which represents the
[sixty-eight] largest [law enforcement agencies] in the United
States, similarly concluded that commingling the work of local
police with federal immigration enforcement efforts “would result
in increased crime against immigrants and in the broader
community, create a class of silent victims and eliminate the
potential for assistance from immigrants in solving crimes or
preventing future terroristic acts.”168

B.

Economy

Median household income is pointedly higher in sanctuary
jurisdictions compared to non-sanctuary jurisdictions.169 The “median
household income is, on average, $4,352.70 higher in sanctuary counties
when statistically matching and then controlling for population
characteristics.”170 Not surprisingly, with higher median household income,
poverty is significantly lower in sanctuary jurisdictions compared to nonsanctuary jurisdictions.171 “[T]he percentage of people who live at or below
the federal poverty line is, on average, 2.3[%] lower in sanctuary
counties.”172 Further, unemployment is significantly lower in sanctuary
jurisdictions compared to non-sanctuary jurisdictions.173 Demonstratively,
sanctuary jurisdictions boast a 1.1% average unemployment rate lower than
non-sanctuary jurisdictions.174
Florida could be following Arizona’s example.175 In 2010, the
Arizona Legislature enacted SB 1070.176 This piece of legislation gave local
law enforcement the authority to expend more resources on undocumented
immigrants, giving them the potential to act as pseudo immigration
officers.177 Studies conducted after the passing of SB 1070 showed that the

168.
Id. at 3 (quoting CRAIG E. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., M.C.C. IMMIGRATION
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY LOCAL POLICY
AGENCIES 6 (2006)).
169.
Id. at 7.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
WONG, supra note 44, at 8.
173.
Id. at 10.
174.
Id.
175.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22; see also S.B 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
176.
Ariz. S.B. 1070.
177.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051 (2019); How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill
527 Would Hurt Florida’s Economy, supra note 22; see also Ariz. S. B. 1070.
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law may have caused a large decline in tax revenue.178 This is largely
attributed to some key industries in the state struggling to make ends meet
after an estimated ten percent of Arizona’s undocumented population left the
state after the law was passed.179 Unsurprisingly, vital industries such as
construction and hospitality were largely affected because many of the
immigrants that left the state worked in those industries.180
Like in Arizona, undocumented immigrants in Florida are very much
employed.181 Data shows that 85.8% of undocumented immigrants in
Florida are of working age which ranges from ages sixteen to sixty-four.182
“They pay $1.7 billion each year in taxes, including more than $543.2
million in state and local taxes, and hold $13 billion a year in spending
power to inject into the local economy.”183 Florida’s economy may end up
feeling the brunt of the effects should large portions of the immigrant
population leave the State.184
New American Economy created a model to project the potential
economic impact if ten percent, or even five percent of undocumented
immigrants left Florida because of the Bill.185 The results were shocking—
“if [ten] percent of undocumented immigrants leave Florida, the [S]tate
[may] lose $76.7 million in federal taxes, and [up to] $44.7 million in state
and local taxes.”186
As a whole, Florida may lose $3.5 billion in Gross Domestic Product
(“GDP”).187 $38.4 million in federal taxes and $22.4 million in state and
local taxes may be lost if even five percent of undocumented immigrants
leave the State as a result of feeling threatened.188 Overall, Florida may lose
$1.8 billion in GDP.189 In either scenario, the losses are staggering.190
The role undocumented immigrants play in the State labor market—
including their crucial role in labor-intensive jobs—is vital and
178.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051; How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527
Would Hurt Florida’s Economy, supra note 22; see also Ariz. S. B. 1070.
179.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
Id.
184.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22.
185.
Id.; see also S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
186.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
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irreplaceable.191 Workers born in America that have different skill sets and
professional interests, would not be able to fill the void immigrants would
leave if they choose to leave the State.192 The results of this void would force
businesses to shut down totally because they will not be able to find the
appropriate workforce to fill vacant positions.193 Not surprisingly, this will
ultimately lead to job losses for the United States citizen workers employed
by those businesses and others.194 Continuing the domino effect, economic
activity will likely eventually stagnate across the board, impacting United
States citizen workers too.195 “Florida accounts for [fifty-six] percent of
United States citrus production and ranks second in value of vegetable
production.”196 Laws like the Bill will drive away the agricultural labor force
and leave Florida farmers without options to hire and harvest.197
C.

Trafficking

The Bill could “discourage immigrants from reporting crimes [for]
fear of deportation.”198 “Many of trafficking victims are lured into the
system with the promise of legitimate jobs, while others are kidnapped or
entrapped in a myriad of ways.”199 It plays right into traffickers’ hands who
use the fear of deportation to manipulate their immigrant alien victims.200
“They ensure their victims are afraid to talk to the police, or even go to the
hospital.201 Traffickers condition their victims to fear authority, specifically
law enforcement, planting it in victims’ minds that if they were to report
abuse, law enforcement would deport them and their families.202
“Unfortunately, they are also at constant risk for engagement with law
enforcement.”203 It is important to note that reporting a crime is a problem in
191.
How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
DiMare, supra note 24.
197.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 908.101 (2019); Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB
168, at 1 (2019).
198.
DiMare, supra note 24; see also FLA. STAT. § 908.101; Fla. CS for CS for
CS for SB 168, at 1.
199.
Stephen Wood, The Intersection of Human Trafficking and Immigration,
BILL HEALTH (June 27, 2018), http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/27/theintersection-of-human-trafficking-and-immigration/.
200.
DiMare, supra note 24.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Wood, supra note 199.
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every state, “and is not confined to any one segment of the population.”204
Most crimes are never reported, notwithstanding the victim’s immigration
status or ethnicity.205
Whether the victims are subjected to prostitution or illegal drugs,
these are people whose lifestyles are targeted by law enforcement
agencies.206 While most law enforcement goals are to protect trafficked
people, these vulnerable individuals are still at a high risk for deportation if
they are undocumented.207 Even though “police and prosecutors try to afford
protection and build their case, federal officers may take charge and initiate
the process of deportation.”208 The Bill, “no matter how nuanced the final
product may be, gives traffickers another tool to terrorize and enslave their
victims.”209
D.

Health

The effects of racism and trauma have well-documented detrimental
impacts on the long-term health of children, so it should be obvious that the
current administration’s recent public policies and climate of racial tension is
damaging the health of immigrant populations.210 A study was conducted
immediately following President Trump’s issuance of Executive Order
rescinding Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals from parents of Latino
youth in one community.211 This was in the midst of speculation about the
fate of immigrant groups deportation statuses, and during pending court
cases related to policies such as the Muslim ban, penalties for sanctuary
cities, and the legality of the proposed border wall were being widely
publicized.212 It was not surprising that parents with more questionable
immigration statuses “reported greater worry about family separation,
negative impacts on their children, and concern about their children’s
educational attainment.”213
204.
Jessica M. Vaughan, The Effect of Sanctuary City Policies on the Ability
to Combat the Opioid Epidemic, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Feb. 15, 2018),
http://www.cis.org/Testimony/Effect-Sanctuary-City-Policies-Ability-Combat-OpioidEpidemic.
205.
See Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 6.
206.
Wood, supra note 199.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
DiMare, supra note 24; see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1
(2019).
210.
Raymond-Flesch, supra note 24, at 505.
211.
Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25,
2017).
212.
Raymond-Flesch, supra note 24, at 505.
213.
Id.
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Despite this, what appeared more chilling was “the isolation from
support systems, including health care, that some parents are employing as a
strategy for promoting their children’s safety in the current climate of
fear.”214 Further, policy changes “may further erode access to health care by
limiting access to employer or state-based insurance for youth and
families.”215 This leaves immigrant parents at risk to incorrectly make
choices regarding healthcare, especially when they have no mechanism to
know for certain which healthcare providers are immigrant-friendly.216
Lastly, a child’s immigration status has the “potential to compound a
parent’s psychological stress and isolating behaviors.”217 As an example,
some parents may try to isolate children with tenuous or no immigration
status or may experience stress because they have children with varying
immigration statuses.218
E.

ICE Mistakes

The City of Miami recently procured its detainer information “as
part of a lawsuit brought by a [United States] citizen, named Garland
Creedle, who Miami held on an ICE detainer in 2017.”219 The data shows a
very high number of detainers issued in a short period of time for people that
were identified as United States citizens.220 “Between February 2017 and
February 2019—less than two years—ICE sent 420 detainers” for
individuals identified as United States citizens.221 That comes out to “nearly
[four] detainers every single week, or [seventeen] per month.”222 It is
difficult to ascertain why ICE is making these errors when issuing detainers,
but some potential reasons include: (1) ICE has “removed any limits on
agents’ discretion when they issue detainers, and instead instructed agents to
target as many people as possible”; (2) ICE’s databases are known to be
unreliable; (3) ICE agents are sometimes “issuing administrative arrest
warrants—which typically accompany detainers—without the supervisory
review that is required by law.”223 The aforementioned cycle is concerning
for all those involved or otherwise because it sheds light on the fact that
some states and localities are essentially being asked to arrest people for
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Raymond-Flesch, supra note 24, at 506.
Id.
ACLU FLA., supra note 161, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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ICE.224 This is especially true because the Bill prohibits “local law
enforcement agencies from placing any limit on their compliance with
detainers.”225
VII.

PARTING THOUGHTS AND OTHER POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES

The Bill bans sanctuary jurisdictions, which refers to a place that has
declared itself one that will typically protect undocumented migrants and
immigrants from deportation and also limit their cooperation with the federal
government’s effort to enforce immigration law.226 The Bill will essentially
destroy “the trust between local law enforcement and immigrant
communities.”227 The Bill requires “every Florida county and municipality
to expend maximum local resources to enforce federal immigration law and
participate in civic liberties violations.”228
Previously, states could prevent law enforcement agencies from
communicating certain information about a person’s immigration status with
federal authorities.229 Now, there are broader forms of protections that states
can and should participate in—refusing to honor detainer requests providing
free legal assistance to immigrants, at the very least.230 However, there are
no cities or counties in Florida that have officially declared themselves a
sanctuary jurisdiction, although there are reports from DDORs, the Center
for Immigration Studies, and others that there may be more sanctuary
jurisdictions in Florida.231
As previously stated, one strategy ICE is using in conjunction with
the legislature’s ban on sanctuary jurisdiction to find and deport immigrants,
is by implementing a BOA which allows for a jail to detain an immigrant for

224.
ACLU FLA., supra note 161, at 8; see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB
168, at 1 (2019).
225.
ACLU FLA., supra note 161, at 2.; see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB
168, at 1.
226.
FLA. STAT. § 908.103 (2019); Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1;
DiMare, supra note 24; Deslandes, supra note 4.
227.
DiMare, supra note 24; see also Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1;
FLA. STAT. § 908.101.
228.
Gruters, supra note 93; see also FLA. STAT. § 908.101; Fla. CS for CS for
CS for SB 168, at 1.
229.
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 30, at 1242.
230.
Id.
231.
See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 118, at 4; Griffith &
Vaughan, supra note 116.
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ICE for up to forty-eight hours and be reimbursed fifty dollars for the
detention.232
Advocates of the Bill say that the Bill will only impact people who
have been charged with a crime and “ensure compliance with federal
laws.”233 Opponents of the Bill, on the other hand, believe it will “have
unintended consequences [like] splitting immigrant families and hurting
minority communities.”234 Sanctuary policies could bolster the relationship
between the community and local law enforcement because immigrant
community members will not feel at risk for deportation.235 Further, “when
local law enforcement focuses on keeping communities safe, rather than
becoming entangled in federal immigration enforcement efforts,
communities are safer and community members stay more engaged in the
local economy.”236 This, then, derives benefits and incentives “to individual
households, communities, counties, and the economy as a whole.”237
By keeping out of federal immigration enforcement,
sanctuary [jurisdictions] are keeping families together—and when
households remain intact and individuals can continue
contributing, this strengthens local economies. These effects
appear particularly pronounced in smaller counties, as removing
one person from the economy of a small population has a larger
effect than removing one person from the economy of a large
population.238

The Bill will likely impact Florida businesses, economy, agriculture,
human trafficking trends, crime rates, health of immigrant youth and their
parents, and increase ICE mistakes.239 Human traffickers take advantage of
their victims’ isolation and inability to reach out to law enforcement for
help.240 Some believers in the Bill believe that limited cooperation or
232.
Fighting Basic Ordering Agreements: A Toolkit for Florida Advocates,
supra note 18; see also FAQs on ICE’s New Enforcement Partnerships in Florida, supra note
19.
233.
Koh, supra note 15; see also FLA. STAT. § 908.101; Fla. CS for CS for CS
for SB 168, at 1.
234.
Koh, supra note 15.
235.
Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 6; Morse et al., supra note 1.
236.
WONG, supra note 44, at 2.
237.
Id.
238.
Id. at 11.
239.
ACLU FLA., supra note 161, at 2–6; Raymond-Flesch, supra note 24, at
505; DiMare, supra note 24; How FL Senate Bill 168 & House Bill 527 Would Hurt Florida’s
Economy, supra note 22; see also FLA. STAT. § 908.101 (2019); Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB
168, at 1 (2019).
240.
DiMare, supra note 24.
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sanctuary policies may bring about negative public safety outcomes in a
couple of ways by enabling criminal immigrants to commit crimes because
they know sanctuary policies will protect them.241 However, this is unlikely
because these immigrants probably do not know the scope or legalities of
sanctuary policies.242 In conclusion, the Bill is likely to result in legal battles
and litigation and have an overall negative impact on communities in
Florida.243

241.
See FLA. STAT. § 908.101; Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1;
Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 5.
242.
See FLA. STAT. § 908.101; Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 1;
Martínez et al., supra note 58, at 5.
243.
See FLA. STAT. § 908.101; Fla. CS for CS for CS for SB 168, at 6; ACLU
FLA., supra note 161, at 3; DiMare, supra note 24.
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“With open hearts, families and professionals across America work
each day to give foster youth the resources, warmth, and care they need.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Children in foster care “are in the temporary custody of the state
while their birth parents are given the opportunity to complete services that
will allow the children to be returned to them if it is in the children’s best
interest.”2 The majority of the four hundred thousand children in care today
were casualties of threatened or actual abuse, neglect, or abandonment by
their guardians or parents.3 More than half of the children who enter foster
care are ultimately returned to their families.4
In 2017, over seven million children were the subject of Child
Protective Service (“CPS”) investigations.5 Following the investigations,
approximately twenty percent of victims of maltreatment were placed in
foster care.6 Although the number of foster children in out-of-home care
declined for over ten years—in 2012, the situation began to deteriorate.7
1.
Proclamation No. 9432, 81 Fed. Reg. 26,663 (Apr. 28, 2016).
2.
About Adoption from Foster Care, ADOPTUSKIDS: ADOPTION & FOSTER
CARE, http://www.adoptuskids.org/adoption-and-foster-care/overview/adoption-from-fostercare (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
3.
Testimony from Jerry Milner on the Opioid Crisis: Implementation of the
Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) Before Comm. on Ways & Means, Subcomm.
on Human Res., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Jerry Milner, Assoc. Comm’r, The
Children’s Bureau, Admin. for Children & Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.);
see also Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., HB 7099 (2019) Staff Analysis 2 (Apr.
2, 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2017 xii (2017).
4.
About Adoption from Foster Care, supra note 2.
5.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at xii.
6.
Id. at 81.
7.
Angie Schwartz & Sean Hughes, On Child Welfare, an Insufficient
Federal Response to the Opioid Epidemic, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Apr. 24, 2018),
http://www.chronicleofsocialchange.org/opinion/child-welfare-insufficient-federal-opioid-
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There was an almost three percent rise of victims, and a ten percent increase
of CPS investigations from 2013 to 2017.8 Nearly seventy-five percent of
the children were neglected, and most of the other children were physically
or sexually abused.9 More than a quarter of the victims of maltreatment in
2017 were infants and toddlers.10 Tragically, some children die at the hands
of their parents or guardians before CPS can help them.11 Which is what
happened in 2017 to over sixteen hundred children who died from abuse and
neglect.12
The ongoing opioid epidemic may be responsible for the escalation
of CPS investigations and victimized children.13 Especially because thirtytwo percent of foster placements are caused by parent substance use.14 In
response to mounting foster care caseloads overwhelming social workers and
service providers, President Donald Trump signed the Family First
Prevention Services Act (“FFPSA”) on February 9, 2018.15
Anyone outside of child welfare services hardly recognized the
FFPSA, which was “[t]ucked inside the $1.3 trillion spending bill,”16 the

epidemic/30551; see also Implications of Passage of Families First Prevention Services Act,
ALLIANCE FOR CHILD. RTS. (Apr. 24, 2018), http://www.kids-alliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/FFPSA-webinar-final.pdf.
8.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at ii. “[A] victim
is defined as a child for whom the state determined at least once maltreatment is substantiated
or indicated. This includes a child who died of child abuse and neglect.” Id. at 20.
9.
Id. at 22.
Neglect allegations are usually the easiest to substantiate, but other
forms of abuse are often also present in the same families. Moreover, neglect
involving a dangerous lack of supervision or failure to provide the basic necessities
of life often indicates the presence of drug abuse and/or mental health issues in a
home. Chronic neglect has devastating impacts on brain development, and as a
predictor of child fatalities neglect is just as dangerous for children as abuse.

Implications of Passage of Families First Prevention Services Act, supra note 7.
10.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 19.
11.
Id. at ii.
12.
Id.
13.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7; Kalena Thomave, Family First Act
Brings Major Changes One Year After Passage, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY & OPPORTUNITY
(Feb. 27, 2019), http://www.spotlightonpoverty.org/spotlight-exclusives/family-first-actbrings-major-changes-one-year-after-passage/.
14.
Lorna Collier, Young Victims of the Opioid Crisis, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
Jan. 2018, at 18.
15.
Family First Prevention Services Act of 2017, H.R. 253, 115th Cong. § 1
(2017) (enacted); Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7; Family First Prevention Services Act,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 16, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/family-first-prevention-services-act-ffpsa.aspx.
16.
Mattie Quinn, Fostering Change: Inside the Federal Government’s Big,
Bold — and Potentially Messy — Plan for Overhauling How States Manage Child Welfare,
GOVERNING, Mar. 2019, at 32, 34.
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Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.17 The new law significantly restructures
federal child welfare financing from the established format of 1980 Title IVE of the Social Security Act (“Title IV-E”).18 After an overview of how
child welfare services are funded, this Article will assess the effects the
FFPSA may have on Florida’s child welfare system.19
II.

OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FUNDING

The child welfare system identifies families whose
children are in danger of suffering or have suffered abuse,
abandonment, or neglect, and works with those families to address
the problems that are endangering children, if possible. If the
problems cannot be addressed, the child welfare system finds safe
out-of-home placements for these children.20

In 2016, about twenty-seven percent of the estimated thirty billion
dollars spent by states on child welfare was funded by the federal
government.21 Most of federal funding is authorized by programs under the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”), Title IV-E, the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”), Promoting Safe and
Stable Families (“PPSF”), and the Social Services Block Grant (“SSBG”).22

17.
Family First Prevention Services Act, CHILD. DEF. FUND: POLICIES,
http://www.childrensdefense.org/policy/policy-priorities/child-welfare/family-first/
(last
visited Dec. 21, 2019); see also H.R. 253 § 1.
18.
John Kelly, CliffsNotes on Family First Act, Part Two: Limiting Support
for Congregate Foster Care, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Feb. 14, 2018),
http://www.chronicleofsocialchange.org/finance-reform/cliffsnotes-family-first-act-part-oneservices-prevent-foster-care/29896; Title IV-E: Federal Payments for Foster Care and
&
FAM.
SERVICES
REVIEWS,
Adoption
Assistance,
CHILD.
http://training.cfsrportal.acf.hhs.gov/section-2-understanding-child-welfare-system/2994 (last
visited Dec. 21, 2019).
19.
See THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS &
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH DELAYED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAMILY
FIRST PREVENTION SERVICES ACT OF 2018 1 (2018); EMILIE STOLTZFUS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., IF10590, CHILD WELFARE: PURPOSES, FEDERAL PROGRAMS, AND FUNDING 1 (2019);
discussion infra Parts II–III.
20.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at 2.
21.
STOLTZFUS, supra note 19, at 1.
22.
See id.; Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101–
5116 (2018); CHILDREN’S BUREAU, PROMOTING SAFE AND STABLE FAMILIES 1 (2019); FLA.
DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): AN
OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 2 (2016); Title IV-E: Federal Payments for Foster
Care and Adoption Assistance, supra note 18; KAREN LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94953, SOCIAL SERVICES BLOCK GRANT: BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 3 (2016).
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Aid to Families with Dependent Children

Before the FFPSA, funding for foster children was part of the Aid to
Dependent Children Program (“ADC”).23 Under the Flemming Rule, states
were required to “pay families ADC while making efforts to improve home
conditions, or place children in foster care.”24 After states protested the
Flemming Rule, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) of
1935 established federal funding for children from unsafe households.25
Essentially, grants were given to states to “provide cash welfare payments
for needy children who had been deprived of parental support or care
because their [parent] was absent from the home, incapacitated, deceased, or
unemployed.”26 The AFDC allowed states to determine who needed support
based on income limitations, but required them “to provide aid to all persons
who were in classes eligible under federal law and whose income and
resources were within state-set limits.”27
AFDC federal welfare funding was ultimately abolished in 1996 by
the cash welfare block grant, TANF.28 A block grant is a fixed amount of
money that is given to the states to provide necessary services.29 Under this
structure, TANF eliminated AFDC as an individual entitlement.30 Instead,
23.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FEDERAL FOSTER CARE
FINANCING: HOW AND WHY THE CURRENT FUNDING STRUCTURE FAILS TO MEET THE NEEDS OF
THE CHILD WELFARE FIELD 3 (2005).
At first [ADC] functioned mainly to provide federal grants to help the states
maintain their mothers’ aid laws that had been passed in [forty] states between 1910
and 1920. With the federal government providing [a third] of costs, the program
offered aid to poor parents, imagined at that time to be always female, caring for
children without a husband.

Linda Gordon & Felice Batlan, Aid to Dependent Children: The Legal History, VA.
COMMONWEALTH U. (Feb. 26, 2018), http://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/public-welfare/aidto-dependent-children-the-legal-history/.
24.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 3.
25.
Id.; see also Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) — Overview, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/aid-families-dependent-children-afdcand-temporary-assistance-needy-families-tanf-overview-0.
26.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) — Overview, supra note 25.
27.
Id.
28.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 3; see also Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) — Overview, supra note 25.
29.
The Problems with Block-Granting Entitlement Programs, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/the-problems-with-block-grantingentitlement-programs (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
30.
Timeline of Major Child Welfare Legislation, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE
AM.,
http://www.cwla.org/wp-
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grants from TANF are considered entitlements of the state and “[a]ssistance
is often, but not exclusively, in the form of a cash benefit.”31 The statutory
goals of TANF are to help “needy families so that children can be cared for
at home; to end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work and marriage; to prevent and reduce the
incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and to encourage the formation
and maintenance of two-parent families.”32
B.

Title IV-E of the Social Security Act

In 1980, Title IV-E allowed states to be reimbursed for foster care
costs.33 There were some requirements—safeguards had to be established
and children needed to be “eligible for the pre-welfare reform AFDC
program.”34 But, one of the most appealing aspects of Title IV-E was there
were no limits on reimbursements for approved services.35 All approved
services included efforts to provide a stable and safe environment for each
child, at least until a permanent placement option was available.36
Title IV-E authorized federal and state governments to share costs
for services to provide mistreated and vulnerable children safe out-of-home
care.37 Some shared costs included monthly maintenance payments for daily
care, the cost of training staff and foster care parents, administrative
expenses, recruitment of foster and adoptive parents, and guardianship and
adoption assistance.38 In 2018, over six-hundred thousand children were
supported by Title IV-E funding.39

content/uploads/2014/05/TimelineOfMajorChildWelfareLegislation.pdf (last visited Dec. 21,
2019).
31.
GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32748, THE TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: A PRIMER ON TANF FINANCING
AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 2 (2017).
32.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) — Overview, supra note 25. TANF still required states
to use former AFDC requirements to determine eligibility of Title IV-E Foster Care and
Adoption Assistance funding. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 3.
33.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 3.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 1.
36.
Title IV-E: Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance,
supra note 18.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.; see also Family First Prevention Services Act, supra note 17.
39.
STOLTZFUS, supra note 19, at 2.
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The Adoption and Safe Families Act

Title IV-E remained mostly untouched until the Adoption and Safe
Families Act (“ASFA”).40 The ASFA was established in 1997 and initiated
the first significant change to Title IV-E and child welfare funding since
1980.41 The new law “responded to concerns that children were too often
left in unsafe situations while excessive and inappropriate rehabilitative
efforts were made with the family.”42 To remedy these issues, the ASFA
declared that a child’s safety is the most important concern in every decision
made for the child.43
The new law established timelines to help place children in
permanent homes and continues to reward states for adoptions of foster
children.44 The ASFA requires states to terminate parental rights (“TPR”)
for children in care for fifteen months and states may do so sooner for
children in severe harm.45 The states must prefer qualified relative
caregivers over nonrelative caregivers and need to conduct criminal
background checks on foster and adoptive parents.46 The law also authorizes
concurrent planning, which permits states to search for other placement
options for the child while simultaneously attempting to reunify them with
their parents.47
Overall, the ASFA has been a successful program.48 The incentives
helped thousands of foster children.49 In 1998, there were thirty-eight
thousand adoptions of foster care children.50 In 2017, sixty thousand
children were adopted out of care.51 The time that children remained in care
40.
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–89, § 101, 111
Stat. 2115, 2116 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 3.
41.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 3.
42.
Id. “It also addressed what was at least a perceived reluctance on the part
of child welfare agencies and judges to seek terminations of parental rights and adoption in a
timely fashion when reunification efforts were unsuccessful.” Id.
43.
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), CHILD. & FAM. SERVICES
REVIEWS,
http://training.cfsrportal.acf.hhs.gov/section-2-understanding-child-welfaresystem/2999 (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
44.
Timeline of Major Child Welfare Legislation, supra note 30.
45.
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), supra note 43.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
See Kim Phagan-Hansel, One Million Adoptions Later: Adoption and
Safe Families Act at 20, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Nov. 28, 2018),
http://chronicleofsocialchange.org/adoption/one-million-adoptions-later-adoption-safefamilies-act-at-20/32582.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
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decreased as well.52 In 1999, approximately fifteen percent of foster children
remained in care for three to four years.53 That number decreased to just
nine percent by 2017.54
D.

Federal Funding for Prevention Services

Even before the FFPSA, states could receive federal funding for
many prevention services.55 Prevention services “are designed to improve
child-rearing competencies of the parents and other caregivers via education
on the developmental stages of childhood and provision of other types of
assistance.”56 Most states receive federal funding for these services through
grants.57
1.

Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act

Under Title I of CAPTA, grants fund investigations, risk and safety
assessments, training of CPS staff, and services for severely vulnerable
infants.58 Two categories of funding are authorized under CAPTA—
discretionary grants and community-based prevention grants.59 Title II of
CAPTA introduced the Community-Based Child Abuse Prevention Program
(“CBCAP”).60 CBCAP allows states to receive grants to fund a governor
designated lead agency.61 Once designated, the lead agency is permitted “to
develop, operate, expand, and enhance community-based, prevention-

(2018).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.
supra note 30.
60.

Id.
Phagan-Hansel, supra note 48.
Id.
See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 78.
Id.
See id. at 78–79.
Id. at 78; Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a
42 U.S.C. §§ 5106a(a)–(b); Timeline of Major Child Welfare Legislation,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 79.

CAPTA was most recently amended by the Victims of Child Abuse Act
Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-424, 1/7/2019). The law amends section
106(b)(2)(B)(vii) of CAPTA to provide immunity from civil and criminal liability
(it previously provided immunity from only prosecution) for people who make
good-faith child abuse or neglect reports or who provide information or assistance,
including medical evaluations or consultations, in connection with a report,
investigation, or legal intervention pursuant to a good-faith report of child abuse or
neglect.

CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ABOUT CAPTA: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3 (2019); see also
42 U.S.C. § 5106b; Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, H.R. 5955, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018)
(enacted).
61.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 79.
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focused programs and activities designated to strengthen and support
families to prevent child abuse and neglect.”62
“CAPTA [also] . . . required a Guardian Ad Litem or Court
Appointed Special Advocate . . . to be appointed for each child . . . .”63 Over
four-hundred-thousand children received services through CBCAP in 2017.64
“[CBCAP] grants provide critical support for locally-driven services that are
essential to building healthy and thriving communities, including voluntary
evidence-based home visiting programs, parental skills-building, self-help
programs, mental health and substance use services, and other family support
services.”65
2.

Promoting Safe and Stable Families

Grants are also available to states through PPSF of the Title IV-B of
the Social Security Act.66 PPSF replaced “the Family Preservation and
Family Support program.”67 Funds were expanded by PPSF to include
reunification and adoption services.68 Funding is accessible by states “on a
discretionary and a capped mandatory basis for PSSF.”69 Essentially, states
must fund one dollar for every three dollars they receive from the federal
government.70
PPSF grants fund services to prevent children from being removed
from their homes, alternative placement services, and reunification costs.71
62.
Id. “[CAPTA] [r]equires states to have policies and procedures for
hospitals to notify Child Protective Services (CPS) of all children born who are affected by
illegal substance use or withdrawal symptoms resulting from prenatal drug exposure or
indications of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder.” New Mexico Family First Prevention
Services Act Subcommittee: Federal Substance Use Disorder Services Grants and Potential
for State FFPSA Implementation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 27, 2018),
http://www.nmlegis.gov/handouts/FFPAS%20112718%20Item%205%20NCSL%20Family%
20First%20Prevention%20Services%20Act%20Subcommittee%20Meeting%20Presentation.p
df.
63.
James Payne, Reasonable Efforts — It’s Time to Review and Reconsider,
PUB. CONSULTING GROUP (June 24, 2019), http://www.publicconsultinggroup.com/newsperspectives/reasonable-efforts-it-s-time-to-review-and-reconsider/.
64.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 85.
65.
PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AM., 2019 FEDERAL PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA 2
(2019).
66.
42 U.S.C. § 629i (2018); STOLTZFUS, supra note 19, at 1; U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 102.
67.
Timeline of Major Child Welfare Legislation, supra note 30.
68.
Id.
69.
STOLTZFUS, supra note 19, at 2.
70.
Id.
71.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 22, at 1; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 79.
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The grants also funds foster youth education vouchers and mentoring for
children of incarcerated parents.72 No federal criteria must be met to be
eligible for PPSF.73 So, children in foster care or living at home may receive
PPSF funded services.74 This may be why PPSF was the most used funding
source in 201775 and approximately five-hundred-thousand children received
services funded through this grant.76
3.

Social Services Block Grant

As stated above, most states receive funding through the CBCAP
and PSSF grants.77 However, the SSBG may also be used by states to fund
prevention services.78
These services include, “child daycare, child
protective services, information and referral, counseling, and foster care, as
well as other services that meet the goal of preventing or remedying neglect,
abuse, or exploitation of children.”79
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE FFPSA

Although productive, some argue that the ASFA program did not
help reunite families or keep them together.80 ASFA was blamed for quickly
separating children from their parents and for not tending to the parents’
needs to prevent foster care and adoptions.81 Critics of CAPTA contended
that “CAPTA . . . is primarily focused on intervention-based child welfare
strategies that are implemented after crisis occurs, rather than on the
prevention of crisis through family strengthening and support.”82 These
issues led to a demand for more prevention services to help parents remain
with their children and to avoid foster care altogether.83

72.
Timeline of Major Child Welfare Legislation, supra note 30; see also
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 22, at 1.
73.
STOLTZFUS, supra note 19, at 2.
74.
Id.
75.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 79.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Phagan-Hansel, supra note 48. Almost two million children received
grant-funded prevention services in 2017. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra
note 3, at 79.
81.
Phagan-Hansel, supra note 48.
82.
PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AM., supra note 65, at 2.
83.
See Phagan-Hansel, supra note 48.
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Purpose of the FFPSA

The FFPSA provides supportive services and programs to prevent
placing children in foster care.84 The new law has two ambitious goals.85
The first, is to allow states to fund prevention services to enable parents or
kin caregivers to continue to live with their children.86 The second, is to
limit the use of congregate or group home placements of children.87
B.

Eligibility

In 2020, federal funding will be available for twelve-month’s worth
of approved prevention services for all eligible cases.88 Regardless of
whether they meet AFDC eligibility requirements, all eligible participants
may receive prevention services.89 Authorized prevention service recipients
are candidates for foster care, foster care children who are expectant mothers
or are already parents, or “parents or kin caregivers of candidates for foster
care.”90
1.

Candidates for Foster Care

A child is considered a candidate for foster care when “they are
identified in a prevention plan as being at imminent risk of entering care but
can safely remain at home or in a kinship placement if provided services that
prevent entry into foster care.”91 Even if the child has an adoption or
guardianship arrangement in place, they may still be considered a candidate
for foster care, as long as there is a “risk of disruption or dissolution that
would result in entry into foster care.”92 Basically, funding is provided if it is
necessary to prevent foster care or “directly relate[d] to the child’s safety,
permanence, or well-being.”93
84.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, THE FAMILY FIRST PREVENTION SERVICES ACT 1
(2018); see also Family First Prevention Services Act of 2017, H.R. 253, 115th Cong. § 101
(2017) (enacted); Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7; Family First Prevention Services Act,
supra note 15.
85.
See Family First Prevention Services Act, supra note 15.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
EMILIE STOLTZFUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10858, FAMILY FIRST
PREVENTION SERVICES ACT (FFPSA) 1 (2018).
89.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 1.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
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What does imminent risk mean?94 CAPTA’s definition of child
abuse and neglect must be used by the states.95 Child abuse and neglect is
defined by CAPTA as “any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent
or caretaker which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm,
sexual abuse or exploitation, [and] an act or failure to act which presents
imminent risk of serious harm.”96 The definitions refer only to parents and
caregivers.97 However, states define the terms—child abuse and neglect and
imminent risk in many ways and usually with much more detail.98 So, it will
be the state’s responsibility to define candidate for foster care and imminent
risk based on their own definitions of abuse and neglect in their child welfare
plan.99
2.

Child Welfare Plan

States must have a child welfare plan to use Title IV-E prevention
services.100 The plan must detail how states will assess child safety.101
States are also required to conduct “risk assessments for each child,” to
describe and qualify intended services and programs, to explain how the state
will monitor and evaluate the services, improve practices, and train staff.102
States are not eligible to receive Title IV-E funding until the plan is approved
by United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and it
must be updated every five years.103
States may only “receive federal funding equal to at least [fifty
percent] of their cost, as long as the services and programs [meet] certain
94.
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY, RESPONSIBLY DEFINING CANDIDACY
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FFPSA: FIVE PRINCIPLES TO CONSIDER (2019).
95.
Id.
96.
Id. “In 2015, the [f]ederal definitions of child abuse and neglect and
sexual abuse were expanded . . . to include a child who is identified as a victim of sex
trafficking or severe forms of trafficking in persons.” CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra
note 60, at 1.
97.
What Is Child Abuse or Neglect? What Is the Definition of Child Abuse
and Neglect?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.hhs.gov/answers/programs-for-families-and-children/what-is-childabuse/index.html.
98.
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY, supra note 94.
99.
Id.; see also CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 2.
100.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 2.
101.
Id. “State plans must include steps to track and prevent child
maltreatment fatalities. This plan must address strategies to engage the courts and other
partners.” PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, SUMMARY OF FAMILY FIRST PREVENTION SERVICES ACT FOR
JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS 1 (2018).
102.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 2.
103.
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 629 (2018).
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evidence-based standards, and the spending [is] above the state’s
maintenance of effort (MOE) level.”104 The MOE requirement mandates
states to spend as much as they did in 2014 for foster care prevention
expenditures.105 The purpose of the MOE requirement is to prevent states
from “substituting their current state/local prevention dollars with the new
Title IV-E funds.”106
C.

Support for Prevention Services

If a state elects the Title IV-E prevention program under the FFPSA,
the state will be afforded funding for twelve months of prevention services
for eligible recipients.107 FFPSA prevention services include “mental health
and substance abuse prevention and treatment services provided by qualified
clinicians, and in-home parent skill-based programs that include parenting
skills training, parent education, and individual and family counseling that
have been rated and approved.”108
Any services under Title IV-E “must be rated as promising,
supported, or well-supported,” and must be approved by HHS.109 Promising
prevention services are “[c]reated from an independently reviewed study that
uses a control group and shows statistically significant results.”110 A
program is supported if it “[u]ses a random-controlled trial or rigorous quasiexperimental design [and] [m]ust have sustained success for at least six
months after the end of treatment.”111 A treatment is well-supported if it
“[s]hows success beyond a year after treatment.”112

104.
105.
106.
107.

STOLTZFUS, supra note 88, at 1.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 3.
Id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM INSTRUCTION:
STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTING TITLE IV-E PREVENTION AND FAMILY SERVICES AND
PROGRAMS 3–4 (2018); Family First Prevention Services Act of 2017, H.R. 253, 115th Cong.
§ 1 (2017) (enacted).
108.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 107, at 3. “[The] Opioid
package, authorize[d] [twenty] million [dollars] in funding for HHS to award to states to
develop, enhance, or evaluate family-focused treatment programs to increase the number of
evidence-based programs that will later qualify for funding under [FFPSA].” New Mexico
Family First Prevention Services Act Subcommittee: Federal Substance Use Disorder
Services Grants and Potential for State FFPSA Implementation, supra note 62; see also H.R.
253 § 1.
109.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 107, at 3.
110.
Family First Prevention Services Act, supra note 15.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
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Eligible services must be beneficial, have a manual, and be included
in a state’s plan.113 The services must also align with a trauma-informed
approach explained by HHS instructions:
[P]revention services must be provided under an organizational
structure and treatment framework that involves understanding,
recognizing, and responding to the effects of all types of trauma
and in accordance with recognized principles of a trauma-informed
approach and trauma-specific interventions to address trauma’s
consequences and facilitate healing. [HHS is] not further defining
what a trauma-informed approach to service delivery means.114

If a child is eventually placed in foster care because the parents or
relatives cannot care for them, the parents are no longer “eligible for
substance abuse treatment through IV-E.” 115 A family that is eligible for
services may only receive Title IV-E funded prevention services for twelvemonths.116 The twelve-months begins when the child is considered a
candidate for foster care or is a pregnant or parenting youth.117 The only
exception to the twelve-month limitation is if the family is eligible again at
another time.118 In addition, the prevention services must be evidence-based
and will be backed as an entitlement, much like Medicaid.119
To receive prevention services, the eligible candidate for foster care
or pregnant or parenting youth must have a written prevention plan.120 A
prevention plan for a candidate for foster care must include trauma-informed
services or programs, a plan to keep the child “safely out of foster care, and
the list of services or programs needed for the child or on behalf of the
child.”121 For a pregnant or parenting youth, the prevention plan must have
“their case plan, list of services or programs needed to ensure that a youth is
prepared or able to be a parent, and a foster care prevention strategy for any
child born to that youth.”122

113.
Id.
114.
U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 107, at 3.
115.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7.
116.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 1.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Teresa Wiltz, This New Federal Law Will Change Foster Care as We
Know
It,
PEW
(May
2,
2018),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2018/05/02/this-new-federal-law-will-change-foster-care-as-weknow-it.
120.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 2.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
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Approved Placements to Receive Funding
1.

Congregate Care and Group Homes

Before the FFPSA, there were no limits on federal funding for group
homes or congregate care.123 Title IV-E now limits reimbursements for
congregate or group home care and adoption assistance.124 Under the
FFPSA, states will only be reimbursed for two weeks of a child’s stay in
congregate care and group housing settings.125 By the third week of a child
entering foster care, states are only reimbursed for children in foster family
homes (“FFH”) or child care institutions (“CCI”).126 So, if a child is placed
into a group home or into congregate care, no Title IV-E funding is available
after fourteen days, unless it is a FFH or a specific CCI.127
The only other exception to the fourteen-day restriction is for
funding administrative costs.128 Only administrative expenses for a child’s
case for a child in a group or congregate home may be paid after fourteen
days.129 Administrative costs “include activities to develop necessary
processes and procedures to establish and implement the provision of
prevention services for eligible individuals, policy development, program
management, and data collection and reporting.”130
2.

Child Care Institutions

A CCI is “defined as a licensed private or public child-care
institution with no more than [twenty-five] children . . . .”131 The FFPSA
allows states to seek reimbursements for only specific CCIs.132 CCIs under
the FFPSA are: (1) Qualified residential treatment programs (“QRTP”), (2)
settings for prenatal and parenting support, (3) eighteen and older supervised
123.
Wiltz, supra note 119.
124.
John Kelly, CliffsNotes on Family First Act, Part Three: Adoption, Foster
Home Recruitment, Reunification and More, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Feb. 15, 2018),
http://chronicleofsocialchange.org/finance-reform/cliffsnotes-family-first-act-part-threeadoption-foster-home-recruitment-reunification/29897; see also Family First Prevention
Services Act of 2017, H.R. 253, 115th Cong. § 101 (2017) (enacted); Kelly, supra note 18;
Wiltz, supra note 119.
125.
Wiltz, supra note 119; see also H.R. 253 § 101.
126.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 7–8; Wiltz, supra note 119.
127.
Kelly, supra note 18; Wiltz, supra note 119.
128.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 8; Kelly, supra note 18; Wiltz,
supra note 119.
129.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 7–8; Kelly, supra note 18.
130.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 107, at 8.
131.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 7.
132.
See id. at 7–8.
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independent living settings, (4) high-quality residential care and support
facilities for children and youth at-risk of sex trafficking, and (5) residential
licensed substance abuse treatment facilities where the child is placed with
the parent for up to twelve months.133 CCIs are not “detention facilities,
forestry camps, training schools, or any other facility operated primarily for
the detention of children determined to be delinquent.”134
3.

QRTP

QRTP programs must have a trauma-informed treatment model, on
call nursing and clinical staff, and “discharge planning and family-based
aftercare supports available for at least [six] months post-discharge.”135 The
programs must also aid and document family outreach, which includes
“maintain[ing] contact information for any known biological family and
fictive kin of the child.”136 In addition, programs must facilitate and record
family participation during and after discharge, if in the best interest of the
child.137 The efforts used to preserve sibling relationships must also be
documented by a QRTP program.138 All QRTPs must be accredited, which
“generally takes [twelve] to [eighteen] months.”139 The standard to evaluate
whether a QRTP program is appropriate for a child is as follows:
Within [thirty] days of a child being placed in a QRTP setting, a
qualified individual must assess the child’s strength and needs
using an age-appropriate, evidence-based, validated, functional
assessment tool to determine if the child’s needs can be met with
family members or in a foster family home, or in one of the other
approved settings . . . consistent with the short- and long-term
goals of the child and their permanency plan.140

133.
Id. at 7–8.
134.
Id. at 8.
135.
Id.
136.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 8.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Therapeutic Group Homes: Needed Programs in Danger from Family
First
Act,
CHILD
WELFARE
MONITOR
(Mar.
4,
2019),
http://www.childwelfaremonitor.org/2019/03/04/therapeutic-group-homes-needed-programsin-danger-from-family-first-act/. A court must decide whether a prospective QRTP is
approved within sixty days. CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 9.
140.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 8.
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Family Foster Homes

An FFH is defined as an establishment with less than seven
children.141 They must be approved by the state or licensed to care for
children.142 They also need to have constant care for children separated from
their family.143 Exceptions to these requirements may be made for foster
youth who are expectant mothers, to keep family relationships maintained,
and to help disabled children.144
5.

Kinship Caregivers

The ASFA required kinship caregivers and relative caregivers “to
meet the same licensing standards as foster parents.”145 The FFPSA provides
kinship caregivers, or relatives of a child to “take primary responsibility for
the care of children who are in need of a safe and stable placement.”146
Through a kinship navigator program (“KNP”), Title IV-E funds may be
used to assist kinship caregivers “in learning about, finding, and using
programs and services to meet the needs of the children they are raising and
their own needs, and to promote effective partnerships among public and
private agencies to ensure kinship caregiver families are served.”147 One
concern with the KNP is that there is no funding under Title IV-E prevention
programs for children already in foster care because they are not considered
candidates for foster care.148 Yet, foster care is defined as placement of
children “in a licensed or unlicensed kinship” home by the state.149
6.

Adoption Assistance

Prior to the FFPSA, all children were eligible for federal adoption
assistance.150 However, the FFPSA stopped federal adoption assistance for
141.
Kelly, supra note 18.
142.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 7.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
New Mexico Family First Prevention Services Act Subcommittee: Federal
Substance Use Disorder Services Grants and Potential for State FFPSA Implementation,
supra note 62.
146.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM INSTRUCTION: FISCAL
YEAR 2018 FUNDING AVAILABLE FOR DEVELOPING, ENHANCING OR EVALUATING KINSHIP
NAVIGATOR PROGRAMS 2 (2018).
147.
Id. at 3.
148.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 107, at 7.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
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“children adopted before their [second] birthday,” until June 30, 2024.151
Also, any child with special needs is not eligible for adoption assistance until
July 1, 2024.152 “Each state sets its own special needs definition, which may
include the child’s ethnic background; age; sibling group status; medical
condition; or physical, mental, or emotional disabilities.”153 Therefore, “[a]
child with special needs should not be confused with a child who requires
special education.”154
Supporters of the FFPSA have claimed that the new law protects
children from the trauma of being removed from their home and separated
from family.155 Nearly three hundred child welfare organizations praised the
law as, “landmark bipartisan legislation [that] will strengthen families so
more children can remain safely with their parents and kinship caregivers
and avoid unnecessary placement in foster care.”156
IV.

THE FFPSA AND FLORIDA’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM

The FFPSA may demand significant changes to Florida’s child
welfare system model and federal revenue.157
A.

Community-Based Care Model

In 1998, Florida began using a community-based care model to unite
local communities and resources for vulnerable children.158 The model
requires child welfare services to be outsourced to community-based care
organizations (“CBCs”), which are also known as lead agencies.159

151.
STOLTZFUS, supra note 88, at 3; see also Family First Prevention Services
Act of 2017, H.R. 253, 115th Cong. § 101 (2017) (enacted).
152.
CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, supra note 84, at 13; see also H.R. 253, § 111.
153.
Eligibility and Benefits for Federal (Title IV-E) Adoption Assistance, N.
AM.
COUNCIL
ON
ADOPTABLE
CHILD.
(Feb.
9,
2017),
http://www.nacac.org/resource/eligibility-benefits-federal-assistance/; see also H.R. 253 §
101.
154.
About the Children, ADOPTUSKIDS: MEET THE CHILDREN,
http://www.adoptuskids.org/meet-the-children/children-in-foster-care/about-the-children (last
visited Dec. 21, 2019); see also H.R. 253 § 101.
155.
H.R. 253 § 101; Family First Prevention Services Act, supra note 17.
156.
Letter from Abriendo Puertas/Opening Doors et al., Nat’l Orgs., to Mitch
McConnell et al., Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (May 15, 2018) (on file with Ass’n of Univ.
Ctrs. on Disabilities).
157.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at 4; see
also H.R. 253 § 101; Quinn, supra note 16, at 35.
158.
Quinn, supra note 16, at 35.
159.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at 2.
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CBCs are responsible for providing foster care and related
services.
These services include, but are not limited to,
counseling, domestic violence services, substance abuse services,
family preservation, emergency shelter, and adoption. The CBC
must give priority to services that are evidence-based and trauma
informed. CBCs contract with a number of subcontractors for case
management and direct care services to children and their families.
There are [seventeen] CBCs statewide, which together serve the
state’s [twenty] judicial circuits.160

Under the model, the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”)
oversees legal services for cases involving the welfare of children and
handles contracts and funding for CBCs.161 DCF must work to keep children
safely at home with their families.162 “When possible, child protective
investigators and CBC case managers place children with relatives or
responsible adults whom they know and with whom they have a
relationship.”163 However, when it is impossible to keep children with their
families, they may be placed in temporary out-of-home care.164 Which is
where more than twenty thousand Florida foster children are placed today.165
More than half of those children are in non-relative placements such as,
group homes, licensed foster care, residential treatment centers, or some
other housing situation.166 Ultimately, the goal of foster care is to find
children permanent homes.167 Which includes reunifying the children with
their parents or facilitating adoptions.168
“Florida uses funds from a variety of sources for child welfare
services, such as the federal [SSBG], the federal [TANF] block grant, federal
Title XIX Medicaid administration, federal Title IV-B, federal Title IV-E,
various other child welfare grants, and state general revenue.”169
Many states are understandably worried about losing federal funds
if they fail to comply with [the FFPSA] and are scrambling to
implement changes. Florida has already spent a lot of time and
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at 2.
See Children in Out-of-Home Care: Statewide, FLA. DEP’T OF CHILD. &
FAMILIES,
http://www.myflfamilies.com/programs/childwelfare/dashboard/c-in-ooh.shtml
(last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
166.
Id.; see also Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human. Servs., supra note 3,
at 7, 9.
167.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at 7.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at 2.
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money setting up a plan called Path Forward to deal with
implications of the legislation. But with a child welfare system
that is among the largest and most diverse in the country, serving
more than [twenty-three thousand] children from the Panhandle to
South Florida, we cannot expect a federal bill to solve the system’s
shortcomings.170

One of the most concerning issues with the new funding structure
under the FFPSA happens when a child is placed with relative caregivers
because Florida may be “forced to deny relatives the funding they need to
support the daily care of a child.”171 Essentially, the State must determine if
Title IV-E funds should be used to help the parents or to support the relative
caring for the child.172 This is problematic for relative caregivers and the
children placed in their care.173 “[R]ecent research suggests that children
placed with relatives . . . have a higher risk of poverty, which is likely linked
to the fact that relatives are less likely to receive foster care payments and
other income supports.”174 Prevention services are funded under the FFPSA
for parents of children not in foster care, so there is “little incentive to use the
model standards in order to license kin and get them the financial aid they so
desperately need.”175
B.

Guardianship Assistance Program

In 2018, the Guardianship Assistance Program (“GAP”) was
established in Florida.176 GAP “provide[s] guardianship assistance
payments for the care of children by relatives who have assumed
legal guardianship of children for whom they previously cared for as
foster parents.”177 The GAP program began in Florida on July 1,
2019.178

170.
Bill Frye, The Future of Child Welfare in Florida, TAMPA BAY TIMES:
OPINION (Feb. 1, 2019), http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-the-future-ofchild-welfare-in-florida-20190201/; see also Family First Prevention Services Act of 2017,
H.R. 253, 115th Congress § 1 (2017) (enacted).
171.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7; see also H.R. 253 § 1.
172.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7.
173.
See id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.; see also H.R. 253 § 1.
176.
THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 5.
177.
Id.
178.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at 11.
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Establishment of the GAP framework allows the State to receive
other Title IV-E funds to support guardians, which could mitigate
the aggregate loss of the Title IV-E funds because of the expiration
of the waiver. Florida’s GAP also allows DCF to provide
caregivers who establish legal guardianship with a larger monthly
stipend relative to existing State programs.179

DCF cannot request reimbursements for children without
documented information to prove that the child is still being supported by the
guardian.180 “However, once the guardian begins receiving GAP payments,
the child’s case is closed because permanency has been achieved.”181
Because the court does not supervise the case plan after a child is in
permanent placement, a child’s case plan may not be updated with required
information for GAP.182 Since there is no law in Florida that terminates
payments based on whether the child is still being supported by the guardian,
“Florida’s GAP will provide stipends to children and guardians . . .
regardless of whether they qualify for federal Title IV-E reimbursement.”183
C.

Relative Caregiver Program

There are four funding types for children placed with relatives or
fictive kin.184 The options “vary in the amount of funding, funding source,
and the relationship of the caregiver with the child.”185 Two of the four
options are under the Relative Caregiver Program (“RCP”).186 RCP was
created in 1998 and expanded in 2014.187 Through the RCP, two groups may
receive financial support based on the child’s age—fictive kin or relatives.188
The RCP is funded by TANF and state money.189 Other caregivers not
eligible for RCP may receive funding from Florida’s Temporary Cash
Assistance.190 A child may also be placed in permanent guardianship
without funding.191 “The RCP and GAP programs will run concurrently
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 13.
181.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at 13.
184.
Id. at 10.
185.
Id. “A fictive kin is a person who is unrelated to the child but has such a
close emotional relationship with the child that he or she may be considered family.” Id. at 7.
186.
Id. at 10.
187.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., supra note 3, at 10.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Id. at 11.

84

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

starting July 1, 2019, and relative and nonrelative caregivers can choose to
apply for either program.”192
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF FFPSA ON FLORIDA’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM

Complying with the FFPSA’s strict standards may be an expensive
and time-consuming process.193
A.

Time

It is unclear whether Florida can comply with the FFPSA
timelines.194 Instituting trauma-informed and evidence-based services is not
only costly, but also time consuming.195 For instance, each service and
program requires assessments, manuals, curriculum, training of all staff, and
evaluations.196 Accrediting QRTPs may also be “a long and arduous
process.”197 It will also be a particularly expensive and demanding process
for smaller homes.198 So, some high-quality group homes and congregate
care facilities may not become accredited before the FFPSA is effective in
Florida.199 Not only will accreditation be difficult for the homes, but the
State may have a very difficult time finding enough qualified professionals to
conduct the assessments, especially because qualified professionals cannot
be State employees.200 It is essential that the State has a sufficient amount of
approved group homes for children, because without them “many children
will experience a string of failed foster home placements, with each one
leading to further damage to the child.”201
In addition to finding professionals for assessments, DCF and lead
agency staff will need to be retrained to follow FFPSA requirements for
192.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Hum. Servs., supra note 3, at 13.
193.
See Family First Prevention Services Act of 2017, H.R. 253, 115th Cong.
§ 111 (2017) (enacted); THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS &
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 3, 9.
194.
See H.R. 253 § 111; THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY
ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 9.
195.
THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 9.
196.
Id.
197.
Therapeutic Group Homes: Needed Programs in Danger from Family
First Act, supra note 139.
198.
See id.
199.
See H.R. 253 § 111; Therapeutic Group Homes: Needed Programs in
Danger from Family First Act, supra note 139.
200.
See Therapeutic Group Homes: Needed Programs in Danger from
Family First Act, supra note 139.
201.
Id.
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claims and tracking costs.202 Currently, the State uses the Florida Safe
Families Network (“FSFN”) to manage child welfare cases.203 FSFN
“contains [thirty] years of child welfare data and includes information on
more than [eight] million people.”204 DCF must update FSFN to comply
with the FFPSA, which will undoubtedly be a tiresome process due to the
large amount of information already compiled and narrow guidelines set by
the new law.205
B.

Money

Besides time, money is a potential problem.206 Beginning in 1994,
states could waive provisions of Title IV-E to develop child welfare projects
with HSS approval.207 In 2006, Florida’s Title IV-E demonstration waiver
was effective, and a project was established and approved.208 The waiver
allowed funds to be allocated to CBCs, to children ineligible for Title IV-E
funding, and for other services for children not in out-of-home care.209
The FFPSA will affect Florida’s waiver which expired in September
2019.210
When the waiver expires, [Florida] will be required to
revert to a traditional Title IV-E service model, which will both
eliminate federal support for many current services and create a
significant funding deficit for the State. DCF estimates that
expiration of the waiver will lead to an operating deficit of roughly
[seventy to ninety] million [dollars] per year over the next five
fiscal years.211

202.
THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 8; see also H.R. 253 § 111.
203.
THE FLA. LEGISLATURES OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 8.
204.
Id.
205.
Id.; see also H.R. 253 § 1.
206.
See THE FLA. LEGISLATURES OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS &
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 11; Bill Frye, We Need Flexibility to Get Child
Welfare Right in Florida, TAMPA BAY TIMES: OPINION (July 5, 2019),
http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/we-need-flexibility-to-get-child-welfare-right-inflorida-column-20190705/.
207.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human. Servs., supra note 3, at 1.
208.
Id. at 4; see also FLA. LEGISLATOR’S OFFICE PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS
& GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 20, at 1.
209.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Human. Servs., supra note 3, at 4.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
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Under traditional Title IV-E, Florida could be reimbursed for fifty to
seventy-five percent of specific trainings.212 Now, Florida will share more
costs of trainings since the FFPSA reimburses only fifty percent of the
costs.213 Because of this, it will be difficult for the State to provide the same
amount and level of training it did in 2017–2018.214 To do so, Florida will
“need to double the existing match to $6.8 million or reduce IV-E.”215
Moreover, FSFN must also be updated for GAP, which is estimated
to cost over fourteen million dollars and is not funded through FFPSA.216 To
avoid the costs of children in group care or CCIs for more than the fourteen
days allotted under the FFPSA, “DCF would need to either reduce the
number of children in out-of-home care or recruit additional foster
parents.”217
Based on data from 2017–2018, Florida could expect
unreimbursed group homes and congregate care costs of about fifty-five to
sixty million dollars per year.218
C.

The Implications of the FFPSA on Florida’s Vulnerable Children
1.

Lack of Support for Residential Group Homes

Is the FFPSA best for Florida’s vulnerable children?219 Florida
already has a painful history with trying to find vulnerable children homes.220
Thankfully, residential group homes have been an option for children with
nowhere else to go.221 Residential group homes keep children with their
siblings and “[i]n many cases, parents or guardians voluntarily bring their
child to a family style group home.”222 Residential group homes in Florida,
“like the Florida Sheriffs Youth Ranches, United Methodist Children’s
Home, Boys Town, St. Augustine Youth Services, and other high-quality
homes . . . take care of thousands of children.”223
212.
THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 9.
213.
Id. at 9–10.
214.
See id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 8.
217.
THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 11; see also Family First Prevention Services Act of 2017,
H.R. 253, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017) (enacted).
218.
THE FLA. LEGISLATURE’S OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 19, at 11.
219.
See Frye, supra note 170.
220.
Id.
221.
See id.
222.
Frye, supra note 206.
223.
Frye, supra note 170.
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Sometimes residential group homes are better options for children.224
Especially if the one placement can help them avoid the trauma of multiple
placements.225 Yet, under the FFPSA, Florida may lose federal funding by
placing children in resident family-style and residential group homes, which
could severely limit placement options for children.226
2.

Reliance on Relative Caregivers

Rather than placing children in congregate care or group homes, the
FFPSA endorses placing children with relative caregivers—“a practice often
called diversion.”227 Diversion can be a major issue.228 Mainly because
FFPSA services “are authorized only once conditions in a home have
deteriorated to the point where a child is at imminent risk of removal.”229
Since these services are delayed until there is a risk that the child will have to
be placed into foster care, “the law increases the likelihood that the children
of addicted parents entering treatment will have to be moved, at least
temporarily, to another home—often, and preferably, the home of a
relative.”230 Placing a child with a relative may not alleviate all, or even
most of the danger to the child.231 It can even be detrimental to children
since there is usually “generational cycles of abuse and neglect within
families, and placing a child with a relative allows the abuse to continue.”232
Furthermore, many children who go into foster care because of
parental substance abuse, are also affected by other family issues.233 This
includes, “domestic violence, mental illness, and long histories of traumatic
experiences.”234 Considering how severe opioid addiction can be, and the
other issues that may affect the families, the twelve-month limit to receive
prevention services may not be enough to help families long-term.235 In fact,
“[a] 2010 study of 109 opiate-dependent patients released from residential
224.
Id.
225.
See Therapeutic Group Homes: Needed Programs in Danger from
Family First Act, supra note 139.
226.
See Family First Prevention Services Act of 2017, H.R. 253, 115th Cong.
§ 101 (2017) (enacted); Frye, supra note 170.
227.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7; H.R. 253 § 101.
228.
See Frye, supra note 170; Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7.
229.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7; see also H.R. 253 § 111.
230.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7.
231.
See Frye, supra note 170.
232.
Frye, supra note 170; see also Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7.
233.
Frye, supra note 170; Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7.
234.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7.
235.
Id. “Some child welfare advocates . . . worry that [twelve] months of
preventive care isn’t enough for parents struggling with opioid addiction. People with opioid
addictions often relapse multiple times on the road to recovery.” Wiltz, supra note 119.
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treatment found that [ninety-one] percent of [patients] relapsed.”236 The
FFPSA twelve-month limitation could also cause “limited availability of
services, wait lists, and other barriers,” and families may receive less than
twelve months of reimbursable prevention services based on these
problems.237
Overall, the prevention services and programs offered under the
FFPSA may not be enough to help children:
Due to the complex interrelated issues occurring in the
homes . . . families require a broad range of services for both the
children and the parents, including “family therapy, programs
building parenting skills, child development services, and
interventions addressing domestic violence.” Of these, only
parenting skills programs are supported through [the FFPSA], and
only those that meet evidence-based criteria yet to be developed by
HHS.238

VI.

CONCLUSION

The opioid epidemic has destroyed families across the United States
and continues to threaten the lives of children.239 It is clear that the FFPSA is
a remarkable step in the right direction towards helping families.240 Offering
states the ability to be reimbursed for prevention services and programs
creates a pathway that avoids unnecessary foster care placements.241
Prevention is certainly key242 and basic values should direct all child
welfare legislation—“all parents and families could become vulnerable with
a twist of fate . . . all families are worthy and deserve respect . . . all children
love their parents, and everyone needs a little help at times in overcoming

236.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7.
237.
Testimony from Jerry Milner on the Opioid Crisis: Implementation of the
Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) Before Comm. on Ways & Means, Subcomm.
on Human Res., supra note 3; Family First Prevention Services Act of 2017, H.R. 253, 115th
Cong. § 111 (2017) (enacted).
238.
Schwartz & Hughes, supra note 7; see also H.R. 253 § 111.
239.
See Wiltz, supra note 119.
240.
Jerry Milner, Trump’s Top Child Welfare Official: Family First a Good
First Step, but True Prevention Is Key, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Feb. 14, 2018),
http://www.chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/trumps-top-child-welfare-official-familyfirst-good-first-step-true-prevention-key/29901; see also H.R. 253 § 111.
241.
See Testimony from Jerry Milner on the Opioid Crisis: Implementation of
the Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) Before Comm. on Ways & Means,
Subcomm. on Human Res., supra note 3.
242.
Milner, supra note 240.
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life’s challenges.”243 Unfortunately, “[p]revention, in the context of federal
reform often refers to prevention of foster care entry, not prevention of
maltreatment,”244 and the main goal of prevention services should always be
to prevent maltreatment of children.245
With the [FFPSA], we have reached one more step in the
continuum of services to children and families in the United States.
We now have prevention of foster care placement for those
children brought to the attention of child welfare agencies, a
limited population, but a critical one in the continuum. That adds
to the existing array of child welfare services that includes foster
care and reunification support services, adoption services, and
emancipation and transitional living services for youth exiting
from foster care.
What remains missing is the ability to use substantial
federal funds to strengthen families before maltreatment creates
lasting, usually life-long trauma to children. We also lack the
ability to provide strong community-based, universal family
support services to families. Absent such services and support,
many of those families will inevitably knock on the doors of public
child welfare and cost us infinitely more in federal foster care
dollars and in remediation efforts, that could so clearly be avoided.
Failure to redefine the system to stem the tide of children
entering care and keep families strong comes at great expense to
everyone. Those costs are financial and societal. It’s an expense
that is paid in inter-generational cycles of trauma that affect all
sectors of our society. The family is the foundation of American
society; we must treat it as such.246
Florida and the nation can expect to face many obstacles while
introducing the new law and the requirements.247 However, as long as
Florida ensures all vulnerable children are protected and supported, the

243.
Testimony from Jerry Milner on the Opioid Crisis: Implementation of the
Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) Before Comm. on Ways & Means, Subcomm.
on Human Res., supra note 3.
244.
Implications of Passage of Families First Prevention Services Act, supra
note 7.
245.
See Testimony from Jerry Milner on the Opioid Crisis: Implementation of
the Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) Before Comm. on Ways & Means,
Subcomm. on Human Res., supra note 3.
246.
Milner, supra note 240.
247.
See Quinn, supra note 16, at 35.
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State’s child welfare system could certainly improve with help from the
FFPSA.248

248.

See Frye, supra note 170.
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INTRODUCTION

XOn October 26, 2017, President Donald Trump declared
[America’s] opioid crisis a public health emergency.U1 This nationwide
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declaration was in response to a 540% increase in fentanyl related deaths
over the past three years.2 Correspondingly, the rapid rise of opioid abuse
has led to numerous treatment and recovery facilities opening their doors
across the nation.3 With the marketability of sunny beaches and a relaxed
lifestyle, addiction treatment has become a big business in South Florida.4
However, with Florida’s weak legislative regulation over recovery
residences, fraud and corruption have taken over the recovery industry, thus
allowing addicts to become cash cows for the personal gain of unscrupulous
treatment and recovery residence providers.5
With paramedics and
firefighters responding to roughly Xtwenty overdose calls in a day,U in what
is deemed to be the nation’s recovery capital, it is clear that Florida needs to
take greater action.6 However, with addiction treatments having the potential
to generate fast money, those involved in Florida’s one-billion-dollar market
may not want government entities monitoring their actions.7
This Comment takes the position that stronger government oversight
is needed to combat the ongoing recovery residences crisis in Florida.8 This
Comment also proposes a possible reasoning as to why greater legislative
action has not been taken to combat this issue, pointing out the financial
incentives of minimal regulation over the industry.9 Part II of this Comment
discusses the opioid epidemic and maps out what has led this country into the
current public health emergency it finds itself in today. 10 Part III highlights
the problems in the recovery residence industry that has left countless addicts
in the hands of unscrupulous treatment and recovery residence owners.11
Part IV examines how the Sunshine State has retained its reputation of fraud
and corruption, as well as discusses the recent legislative regulations enacted
1.
Danielle L. Liberman, Not Too Sunny in the Sunshine State: The Need to
Improve Florida’s Opioid Abuse Treatment Centers to Combat the National Public Health
Crisis, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 723, 731 (2018).
2.
Id.
3.
Heather Stratman & Dave Aronberg, Sober Living Homes and the
Regulation
They
Need,
GOVERNING
(May
14,
2018,
6:15
AM),
http://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-regulation-sober-living-homes-recoveryresidences-need.html.
4.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 73334.
5.
Id. at 734.
6.
Id. at 736.
7.
See Lisa Riordan Seville et al., Florida’s Billion-Dollar Drug Treatment
Industry is Plagued by Overdoses, Fraud, NBC NEWS (June 25, 2017, 11:46 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/megyn-kelly/florida-s-billion-dollar-drug-treatmentindustry-plagued-overdoses-fraud-n773376.
8.
See infra Section IV.B.
9.
See infra Part VI.
10.
See infra Part II.A.
11.
See infra Part III.A.
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to combat the currently corrupt industry.12 Part IV also highlights a recently
proposed bill to strengthen regulation that died in committee action and
examines the problems with the current regulations in Florida.13 Part V
discusses federal regulations that pose as a roadblock to strong government
oversight at the state and local level.14 Part VI addresses the financial
incentives for duel operators of treatment centers and sober homes to oppose
strong government oversight, and presents the notion that these large
operators indirectly lobby against regulation by using federal law as
roadblocks to more stringent regulation.15
II.

THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: THE ROOT OF THE SOBER HOME CRISIS

As drug overdose deaths continue to increase in the United States,
the opioid epidemic continues to be one of the largest medical epidemics the
country has yet to face in recent decades.16 Since the beginning of the
epidemic, over half a million Americans have died as a result of drug
overdose.17 XAnnual deaths due to drug overdoses [have] now exceed[ed]
deaths due to car accidents, gun violence, and even HIV at the height of the
1990s HIV epidemic.U18 XThe current leading cause of drug [overdose] is . . .
a family of chemicals called opioids.U19 With two out of three drug overdose
deaths involving an opioid, the CDC reported 47,000 opioid overdose-related
deaths across the nation in 2017.20 Opioids are a class of drugs that include
illegal substances such as heroin and fentanyl as well as legally obtained
prescription pain relievers such as oxycodone (OxyCotin), hydrocodone
(Vicodin), codeine, and morphine.21 The pain relieving effect opioids have
on the body occurs when the drug binds to and activates opioid receptors on
the cells located in the brain, spinal cord, and other organs in the body that
12.
See infra Part IV.
13.
See infra Part IV.
14.
See infra Part V.A.
15.
See infra Part VI.
16.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 725; Data Overview, CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 19, 2018), http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html.
17.
The Triple Wave Epidemic: Opioids, Heroin and Fentanyl: Supply Issues
and Public Health Consequences: Hearing on Tackling Fentanyl: The China Connection
Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Glob. Health, Glob. Human Rights, & Int’l Org. of the Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, (2018) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Daniel Ciccarone, M.D.,
M.P.H., Professor, Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of California
San Francisco).
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Data Overview, supra note 16.
21.
Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE: DRUGS OF ABUSE,
http://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
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are involved with the feelings of pain and pleasure.22 When the opioids
attach to these receptors located in various places throughout the body, they
block pain signals sent from the brain and release large amounts of dopamine
which creates a high-like effect, causing the user to want to repeat the
experience.23
As millions of Americans suffer from pain across the nation, opioids
are often prescribed to treat their conditions.24 While prescription opioids are
generally safe when taken for a short period, misuse in combination with
overprescribing by physicians can have deadly effects on the user.25
According to the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
the estimated number of Americans who misuse prescription opioids is a
staggering 11.4 million.26 Misuse of prescription opioids can occur by taking
the medicine in a way other than prescribed, taking someone else’s
prescription, and taking the medicine for its high-like effect.27 With legal
prescription opioids such as hydrocodone, oxycodone, and morphine
eliciting similar effects to illegal opioid substances such as heroin and
fentanyl when taken incorrectly, such misuse can lead to future heroin use. 28
Because of their highly addictive quality, after just five days of prescription
opioid use, the likelihood that a user will develop a long-term dependency on
the drug rises steeply thus increases the risk of eventual addiction and
overdose.29 Consequently, in a 2016 study, Xhalf of heroin users reported
using prescription opioids before [beginning to use] heroin.U30

22.
Prescription Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE: PUBLICATIONS, (June
2019), http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/prescription-opioids.
23.
Id.
24.
Overview, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 13, 2019,
12:00 AM), http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html.
25.
See Prescription Opioids, supra note 22; see also Liberman, supra note 1,
at 728.
26.
What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES (Sept. 4, 2019), http://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html.
27.
Prescription Opioids, supra note 22.
28.
Shelby Leheny, The Connection Between Prescription Opioids and
Heroin,
PHARMACY
TIMES
(Sept.
12,
2016),
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/shelby-leheny-pharmd-candidate2017/2016/09/the-connection-between-prescription-opioids-and-heroin.
29.
Mayo Clinic Staff, How to Use Opioids Safely, MAYO CLINIC: PATIENT
CARE & HEALTH INFO (Apr. 24, 2019), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/prescription-drug-abuse/in-depth/how-to-use-opioids-safely/art-20360373.
30.
Leheny, supra note 28.
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The Three Waves of the Opioid Epidemic

The rise in opioid abuse is outlined in three distinct waves that
correlates directly to the progression of Xthree [separate] classes of opioids:
[P]rescription pills . . . heroin, and [synthetically] manufactured fentanyl.U31
With countless people falling victim to the misrepresentation given by
various pharmaceutical companies, abuse and addiction of opioids
skyrocketed, thus creating a pressing supply and demand issue which
ultimately led to each wave of the epidemic becoming more and more
dangerous.32
1.

The First Wave

XThe first wave began in 1991U as a result of a sharp increase in
prescribing opioid-based medications.33 The increase in prescriptions written
by providers was influenced by reassurance from Xpharmaceutical companies
and medical societies [that claimed] the risk of addiction to prescription
opioids was [extremely] low.U34 As a result, areas where opioids were
Xreadily available and prescribed liberallyU were the first to experience an
increase in opioid abuse and illegal diversion of prescription pills that occurs
when the original person prescribed the medication transfers it to others who
do not have a prescription.35
As this new found epidemic swept the nation, Florida found itself as
the pill mill capital of the country.36 Pain clinics proliferated throughout the
State.37 XDoctors in Florida prescribed [ten] times more [opioid-based pain
killers] than every other state in the country combined.U38 The reason for
such proliferation was the result of the lack of prescription drug
monitoring.39 Unlike most states across the country, Florida did not have a
prescription drug database.40 Such databases prevent doctor shopping that

note 17.

31.
32.

Hearings, supra note 17.
See What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, supra note 26; Hearings, supra

33.
Lindsy Liu et al., History of the Opioid Epidemic: How Did We Get
Here?, POISON CONTROL: POISON & PREVENTION INFO, http://www.poison.org/articles/opioidepidemic-history-and-prescribing-patterns-182 (last visited Dec 21. 5, 2019).
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
See Greg Allen, The Oxy Express: Florida’s Drug Abuse Epidemic, NPR
(Mar. 2, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/02/134143813/the-oxy-expressfloridas-drug-abuse-epidemic.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
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allows Xpeople [to] travel from one clinic to another, [to purchase] hundreds
of doses of prescription drugsU undetected.41 However, Florida did not take
immediate action to combat the issue.42 It took Xyears of lobbying by law
enforcement [before] the state [l]egislature passed a billU to create a
monitoring program that would combat the problem.43
2.

The Second Wave

The second wave started in 2010, as a result of pressing efforts to
decrease opioid prescribing; thus making prescription pills harder to obtain.44
Without a means to support their addiction due to the lack of accessibility of
prescription pills, the focus changed to the Xcheap, widely available, and
potent illegal opioid,U heroin.45 Thus, an unintended consequence of
restrictions on opioid pill prescribing led to a drastic increase in heroin use
across the nation.46 From 20022013, heroin related overdose deaths
increased by 286%.47 Furthermore, roughly X80% of heroin users admitted
to misusing prescription opioids before turning to heroinU to feed their
addiction.48
The rapid rise of heroin use has also led to different health
concerns.49 As heroin is commonly injected into the body, Xusers [are] at
risk for injection-related diseases [such as], HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B and C,
skin infections, bloodstream infections, and infections of the heart.U50
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, Xone-quarter of AIDS
cases stem from intravenous drug use.U51
3.

The Third Wave

The third and most current wave of opioid abuse started in 2013 as
an increase in opioid related deaths were linked synthetic opioids such as

41.
Allen, supra note 36.
42.
See id.
43.
Id.
44.
Liu et al., supra note 33.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
See Liu et al., supra note 33.
50.
Id.
51.
How Does Drug Abuse Affect the HIV Epidemic?, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE: PUBLICATIONS (July 2012), http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/researchreports/hivaids/how-does-drug-abuse-affect-hiv-epidemic.
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fentanyl.52 XFentanyl is a highly potent drug, about 80-100 times [stronger
than] morphine by weight, which makes it 30-40 times stronger than heroin
by weight.U53 XFentanyl is a well-regarded pharmaceutical used in surgery to
control severe pain,U however, the fentanyl that has flourished due to the
epidemic has been illicitly manufactured.54 Fentanyl has Xintegrated into the
illicit drug supply [by being] sold as heroin in powder form, or as counterfeit
opioids.U55 The increase in fentanyl being mixed with other drugs sold on
the streets is the result of its high potency.56 X[B]ecause it takes very little to
produce a high with fentanyl,U it is cheaper to produce.57 Thus, creating a
higher profit for the manufacturers and distributers.58 XFentanyl is the main
chemical in a growing family of chemicalsU that pose a threat to the nation.59
In addition to its dangerous potency, rapid changes in purity have profound
effects on overdose rates in each location these changes occur.60 Because of
its much stronger potency, synthetic opioid related overdoses and deaths
occur as a result of users ingesting heroin, or opioid pills purchased on the
streets, without knowledge that fentanyl has been mixed in as an unexpected
contaminant.61
Carfentanil is another form of Xopioid that is used by veterinarians
for very large animals [such as] elephants.U62 As opposed to fentanyl, it has
never been approved for human use and Xis approximately [one hundred]
times more toxic than fentanyl and ten thousand times more toxic than
morphine.U63 Like fentanyl, Xcarfentanil is being cut into other illicit drugs
like heroin and counterfeit pills made to look like [regular] prescription
opioids.U64 With chemical compounds that can be altered and no way of
knowing the potency of the opioids being sold on the streets, the third wave
of this ongoing epidemic has become the most dangerous.65

52.
Liu et al., supra note 33.
53.
Hearings, supra note 17.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Fentanyl, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE: PUBLICATIONS (Feb. 2019),
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/fentanyl.
57.
Id.
58.
See id.
59.
Hearings, supra note 17.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Fentanyl
and
Carfentanil,
OTTAWA
PUB.
HEALTH,
http://www.ottawapublichealth.ca/en/public-health-topics/fentanyl-and-carfentanil.aspx (last
visited Dec. 21, 2019).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
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See Hearings, supra note 17.
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RECOVERY RESIDENCES

As unintended consequences of strict prescription opioid regulation
worsen the epidemic, secondary measures such as recovery residences, also
known as sober homes, have proliferated throughout the country to help
combat the ongoing issue.66 Because access to stable living is fundamental
to a person’s health and well-being, safe and properly regulated recovery
residences are vital in the recovery process.67 A recovery residence, as
opposed to a treatment facility, does not provide drug abuse rehabilitation
treatment.68 However, the purpose of a recovery residence is to provide a
safe and supportive environment for those who are still vulnerable to
mainstream society in the early stages of their recovery.69
With
rehabilitation in treatment facilities typically lasting for a twenty-eight-day
period due to the standard cap set by many insurance companies, most
patients move to recovery residences to continue the recovery and integration
process into mainstream society.70 This type of model is known as the
Florida Model, as it advocates a slow integration back into the everyday
stresses of life.71 Under this model of rehabilitation, X[r]ecovery residences
serve as a bridge between the twenty-four-hour highly supervised treatmentU
and care provided at treatment facilities and the full return to independent
living.72 XThe National Institute on Drug Abuse suggests that recovering
[addicts] should spend ninety days in some form of recovery housing,U
however, many individuals in recovery stay as long as several months to
even years in these types of residences.73 Because relapse rates are high for
individuals who do not live in supportive recovery environments during the
early stages of the recovery process, Xthe progress they make while attending
[these facilities] can be lost or compromisedU at the hands of poorly run
sober living houses.74

66.
Id.; see also Beth Ann Middlebrook & Pat Taylor, Addressing the Opioid
Crisis Through Quality Recovery Housing, HEALTH LAW., Dec. 2018, at 24, 24.
67.
Middlebrook & Taylor, supra note 66, at 24.
68.
Sober Living Vs Rehab Centers, DIST. RECOVERY CMTY. (Jan. 12, 2018),
http://www.thedistrictrecovery.com/blog/sober-living-vs-rehab.
69.
See id.
70.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 735.
71.
Id.
72.
Middlebrook & Taylor, supra note 66, at 24.
73.
Id.
74.
Middlebrook & Taylor, supra note 66, at 24.
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Problems in the Recovery Residence Community

In another attempt to combat the opioid epidemic, the Affordable
Care Act and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, require
insurers to cover addiction treatment for substance abuse users.75 This
legislation also makes it easier for people to obtain insurance to cover their
substance abuse treatment by giving everyone access to private insurance,
Xwhich is legally bound to pay for rehabilitation.U76 However, while these
laws have provided substantial amounts of coverage for addicts to seek
treatment, they have also led to these same addicts becoming targets for
fraud and corruption.77 While there are many treatment centers and recovery
residences that truly wish to aid those in recovery by following strict codes
of ethics, many unscrupulous actors have opened their doors with the sole
purpose to commit fraudulent practices and entice payments from insurance
companies to gain personal access into the now billion-dollar industry.78
Such corruptive practices can be seen in activities such as patient brokering,
bed flipping, intentional drug exposure, human trafficking, prostitution,
fraudulent medical billing, unnecessary medical testing, and overbilling for
urinalysis exams.79
1.

Unethical Practices

Treatment facilities and recovery residences often work together by
means of patient brokering, kickbacks, bed flipping, insurance fraud and
expensive urine testing to profit off one another at the addict’s expense.80
XPatient brokering is the act of trading a patient [of] a treatmentU facility to a
recovery residence in exchange for a financial kickback.81 Patient brokering
can also be conducted by third party marketers who look for vulnerable
addicts on the streets with hefty insurance policies to bring to facilities and
sober homes for a fee.82 Once the patient is traded off to the participating
recovery residence, the owners then prey on their newly acquired vulnerable
tenants by insisting on several months’ rent up front with full intentions of
75.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 732; see also Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2018); Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 6938, 110th Cong. § 1 (unenacted).
76.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 732.
77.
Id.
78.
See id. at 734.
79.
Id. at 736.
80.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 734; Mike Vogel, Addicted to Rehab, FLA.
TREND, May 2017, at 80.
81.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 734.
82.
Id. at 73435.
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bed flipping.83 Bed flipping can occur in different forms. 84 One way bed
flipping occurs is when recovery residence owners evict their tenants for
simple rule violations and/or intentionally allow drugs onto the property with
hopes of an overdose to start the process all over again.85 By keeping their
residents on a continuous cycle of relapsing and/or taking their money up
front and kicking them out to create space for another person to be taken
advantage of, the sober homes and treatment facilities make a substantially
larger amount of money at a faster rate.86 The second way bed flipping can
occur is by exploiting insurers until the addict’s insurance is exhausted.87 At
that point, addicts are shown the door and often times become homeless and
subject to body snatchers, also known as third party marketers, who look for
struggling or relapsed addicts to start the cycle all over again.88
Unfortunately, the exploitation does not stop there.89 Numerous recovery
residences subject their tenants to unsafe conditions such as overcrowding,
theft, rape, human trafficking, and prostitution on top of the elaborate
insurance fraud schemes.90
Furthermore, urine tests supply a great deal of revenue to the billiondollar industry.91 Unscrupulous doctors, labs, treatment centers, and sober
homes work together in the elaborate kickback schemes by issuing numerous
and unnecessary drug tests to check if the addicts are staying clean, thus
allowing the treatment facilities to soak insurers with extensive billing.92
The facilities bill insurers $150 to $200 for one standard urine test that costs
roughly $10 to conduct.93 The facilities then send the urine samples to labs
for confirmatory testing that can range anywhere from $1,500 to $2,000 for
one sample.94 In more egregious cases, clinic employees will provide their
own urine to be tested so that the insurers can continue to be billed even after
the patient has left the facility.95 In 2017, Xthe grand jury found one well
83.
Id. at 73536.
84.
See id.
85.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 73536.
86.
See id.
87.
See Vogel, supra note 80, at 84.
88.
Id.
89.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 736.
90.
Id.
91.
Vogel, supra note 80, at 83.
92.
See id.; Arthur Mondale, Palm Beach County State Attorney Announces
Arrests in Major Drug Treatment Fraud Case, WPTV: NEWS (Apr. 2, 2019, 6:47 PM),
http://www.wptv.com/news/region-c-palm-beach-county/palm-beach-county-sober-homestask-force-to-announce-arrests-in-major-fraud-case.
93.
Vogel, supra note 80, at 83.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
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known [facility] that billed [an insurer] $600,000U in urine analysis testing
for a single patient over a seven month period.96
2.

The Reality of an Addict

In 2017, Kenneth Chatman, a sober home and drug treatment center
operator in Florida, was sentenced to twenty-seven years in federal prison.97
Chatman plead guilty to conspiracy to Xcommit health care fraud, money
laundering and sex trafficking.U98 Between 2013 and 2016, Chatman and his
associates Xdefrauded insurance companies of an estimated $24 million.U99
However, Xthe toll on sober home residents was even worse than the
financial crime.U100 Under Chatman’s care, many of the two thousand
residents who lived in his facilities died of drug overdoses.101 XInstead of
helping his patients to achieve sobriety, Chatman exploited the vulnerable
victims to satisfy his personal greed.U102 He also Xprovided drugs to addicts,
solicited and accepted kickbacks and bribes, and used his position of power
to sexually exploit his patients.U103 Chatman would force Xwomen into
prostitution, giv[e] the addicted women drugs and then withhold[] those
drugs if they would not comply. He [also] told the women the prostitution
would pay their rent.U104
Throughout his trial, both families of victims lost due to overdose
under Chatman’s care and victims that made it out alive shared their
stories.105 XOne was a [twenty-two] year old woman who testified that she
was forced to have sex with [roughly one hundred and fifty] men in less than
a month while staying at a sober home [owned by Chatman].U106 She further
testified that she was brought to one of Chatman’s sober homes when she
96.
Id.
97.
Paula McMahon, Sober Homes Fraudster Who Gave Drugs to Addicts
Sentenced to 27 ½ Years in Prison, SUN SENTINEL (May 17, 2017, 6:30 PM), http://www.sunsentinel.com/news/crime/fl-reg-kenneth-chatman-sentenced-sober-homes-20170516story.html.
98.
Id.
99.
Sober Home and Drug Treatment Center Owner Sentenced, FBI: NEWS
(Feb. 21, 2018), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/florida-sober-home-owner-sentenced.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Drug Treatment Center Operator Gets 27 Years in Prison for Fraud, Sex
Trafficking: United States v. Chatman, WESTLAW J. HEALTH CARE FRAUD, June 9, 2017, at 2,
2017 WL 2505013.
103.
Id.
104.
Sober Home and Drug Treatment Center Owner Sentenced, supra note
99.
105.
McMahon, supra note 97.
106.
Id.
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was nineteen years old by men who had worked for him. 107 Upon entering
the home, she was physically assaulted causing her to lose consciousness.108
Upon waking, she found herself tied to a bed post with restraints on her
wrists and ankles.109 They had taken all of her belongings and clothes and
proceeded to drug her with an unknown sedative that allowed men to enter
the room in which she was tied and continuously rape her.110
XChatman [would also conspire] with other sober home owners to
refer patients to his facilities in return for [financial] kickbacks.U 111
According to his indictment, X[the] kickbacks came in the form of checks
with memo lines indicating they were for commissions, case management
fees, and consulting fees.U112 Chatman would also allow Xpatients to
continue using illegal drugs while he billed their health insurers for
nonexistent, ineffective or medically unnecessary medical treatment and
testing . . . .U113 To keep the cycle moving, Xwhen a patient’s insurance
benefits were close to running out, Chatman would provide illicit substances
so the patient would test positive for drugs. He would then convince the
insurance company that the patient had relapsed and required additional
treatment, allowing him to continue billing for the fraudulent services.U114
IV.

THE PRESSING ISSUES IN FLORIDA

With an atmosphere that emanates a relaxed lifestyle, it is no wonder
that Florida has become an epicenter for recovery residences.115 The palm
trees and sunny beaches grasp the attention of families looking for places to
send their loved ones for substance abuse treatment and recovery.116
Because of this, out-of-state addicts are the primary driver of revenue for the
Florida industry.117 In a recent study conducted by a Minnesota based health
care company, it was found that seventy-five percent of people treated in
Florida for substance abuse were from out of state.118 However, Florida is

107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
McMahon, supra note 97.
111.
Drug Treatment Center Operator Gets 27 Years in Prison for Fraud, Sex
Trafficking, supra note 102, at 1.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
114.
Id. at 12.
115.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 73334.
116.
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117.
Id.
118.
Vogel, supra note 80, at 82.
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not the Xrecovery oasisU it is marketed to be.119 Deception has been an
ongoing issue for those who continue to send their loved ones into the poorly
regulated State.120 While many recovery residence facilities market a ninety
percent success rate, seventy percent of overdoses occur within a quarter
mile of a sober home in Delray Beach, Florida.121
XDelray Beach, Florida has become the recovery capital of AmericaU
as it is currently home to the largest recovery community in the country.122
For a city that is sixteen square miles, Delray Beach is estimated to have
more than eight hundred treatment facilities.123 However, with Florida’s
current regulation over the recovery community, combined with the
unscrupulous actors who engage in bad practices, there is no real way to
know how many sober homes exist within the city limits.124
In 2016, first responders went out on fourteen hundred overdose
calls in Delray Beach, equating to roughly four a day.125 Of the fourteen
hundred emergency calls, ninety-five percent were out-of-state occupants of
sober homes and treatment centers.126 With the cost of a 911 call averaging
$2,500, the city is forced to spend thousands of dollars and divert responders
away from serving regular residents of the city.127
Furthermore, with the rising rate of opioid overdoses sweeping the
State, Florida has been forced to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on
Narcan, an overdose antidote.128 Naloxone, known as XNarcan,U is a drug
that Xkicks opioid molecules off receptors in the brain, reviving overdose
victims and allowing them to start breathing again.U129 As the drug is not
new, being discovered in the 1960s, Xit has cost less than $5 per doseU for
decades.130 However, being that it is the only drug that can reverse an opioid
overdose fast enough to save a victims life, in combination with the
escalating number of overdoses due to the epidemic, the price of Narcan has
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 80.
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Liberman, supra note 1, at 733; Patricia Liverpool, Regulating Sober
Living
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REG.
REV.
(Aug.
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http://www.theregreview.org/2018/08/20/liverpool-regulating-sober-living-homes/.
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Liberman, supra note 1, at 733 (quoting Jane Gross, On Florida Coast,
Addicts Find Home in an Oasis of Sobriety, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at A1).
123.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 733.
124.
Id. at 735.
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Vogel, supra note 80, at 84.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 85.
128.
Id.
129.
Peter Haden, We Can’t Do Without It: First Responders Pay Soaring
Price for Overdose Antidote Naloxone, WLRN (Mar. 11, 2018), http://www.wlrn.org/post/wecan-t-do-without-it-first-responders-pay-soaring-price-overdose-antidote-naloxone.
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Id.
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skyrocketed.131 XDelray Beach Fire Rescue used to spend $2,100 on
naloxone.U132 However, as a result of the increased price due to supply and
demand issues, Delray Beach Fire Rescue, spends fourteen times that
amount.133 Additionally, XPalm Beach County’s Fire Rescue’s naloxone bill
went from $18,000 to $205,000[an increase of more than 1,100[%].U134 In
response to these numbers, former Delray Beach Mayor, Cary Glickstein,
was quoted saying, X[Florida is] now subsidizing the care and treatment of
this industry that is reaping millions of dollars in insurance proceeds.U135
Insurance companies have even taken a stand against the unregulated
rehabilitation industry in Florida.136 In 2016, Southwest Floridians who
purchased Cigna insurance were forced to switch providers as the insurance
company decided to pull out of the Florida health marketplace.137 The
company withdrew from Florida in an attempt to avoid fraudulent billing
from substance abuse treatment centers.138 In support of their decision,
Cigna claimed that certain outpatient facilities were taking advantage of
plans that offer out-of-network benefits for addicts that flocked to South
Florida for substance abuse treatment.139 The company also stated that the
abuse included Xkickbacks to doctors and excessive, high-cost drug
testing.U140
A.

How Florida Is Addressing the Problem

In an attempt to combat the pressing issues sober homes have posed
to the State, the Florida Legislature has passed several laws in the recent
years.141 Delray Beach created the Delray Beach Drug Task Force, which
served as a Xnon-profit consortium of law enforcement agencies, treatment
providers, and other people involved in addiction industry that run
educational and health initiatives, and meets regularly to discuss better
solutions.U142 Additionally, in 2014, Xthe FBI partnered with Florida Ron a
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Haden, supra note 129.
135.
Vogel, supra note 80, at 85.
136.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 737.
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2015,
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task force investigating fraud’ in the recovery industry.U143 However, despite
these efforts, problems in the recovery community continued to flourish, thus
requiring more action.144
1.

Current Legislation

In 2015, House Bill No. 21 passed, currently known as Florida
Statute Section 397.487, which required the Florida Department of Children
and Families (XDCFU) to create a voluntary certification program for
recovery residences.145 While certification does not equate to licensure, it
does require adherence to industry sanctioned best practice standards.146 As
a result of this legislation, treatment facilities are legally only allowed to
refer participants of their programs to certified recovery residences.147 Per
designation by the DCF, to become certified, recovery residence providers
must obtain a certificate of compliance from the Florida Association of
Recovery Residences (XFARRU).148 FARR is the Florida affiliate to the
National Association of Recovery Residences (XNARRU) and is responsible
with certifying compliance to the standard of recovery residences set by
NARR.149
The NARR Standard does not instruct providers how to
specifically operate their recovery residence. Instead, thirty-eight
standards organized under six domains provide a measurement
platform upon which certification may be achieved. By way of
example: Standard 1.08 states: XRecovery Residences provide
drug and alcohol free environments.U Applicants for certification
submit a policy and procedure for implementation of this particular
standard. If FARR Certification staff are satisfied, this policy and
procedure achieves the objective, then nothing further is required
to meet the standard. Conversely, if staff have concerns regarding
the efficacy of the providers policy and procedure, they then

143.
Id. (quoting Cat Ferguson, In Florida Rehabs, Addicts Are Bought and
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2016,
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See id.
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Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 397.487 (2019); H.R. 21, 2015 Leg., 108th Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2019).
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See FLA. ASS’N OF RECOVERY RESIDENCES, FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF
RECOVERY RESIDENCES (FARR) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, (2017).
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148.
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149.
Id.
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consult with the provider to arrive at an alternative path by which
150
the applicant might achieve compliance.

While exact policies and procedures are not specifically mandated
under the certification process, recovery residences seeking certification are
still bound by the standards set by FARR as the standards must be met before
a certificate of compliance can be issued.151 Such standards include:
Organizational standards, fiscal management standards, operation standards,
recovery support standards, property standards, and good neighbor
standards.152 However, there is no requirement under Florida law that
recovery residences have to obtain certification.153 Therefore, sober homes
are legally allowed to operate in Florida without being certified.154
In 2016, XFlorida’s lawmakers funded a Sober Home Task Force.U155
The task force was spearheaded by State Attorney Dave Aronberg and is
comprised of state and federal police agencies, as well as civilians.156 The
agencies investigate, arrest, and prosecute unscrupulous operators for a
variety of legal violations, while civilian experts and concerned citizens
recommend changes to the State laws.157 The task force was created with the
goal to shut down insurance fraud and patient brokering that controls the
recovery community.158
In 2017, Florida enacted Statute Section 817.505, the Florida Patient
Brokering Act, Xa criminal statute that makes it Ra crime for any person,
including health care providers and facilities, to offer or receive kickbacks,
bonuses, commission or rebates, or engage in any split-fee arrangement in
return for referral of patients or patronage to or from a healthcare
provider/facility.’U159 The statute also makes it a third-degree felony, that is
punishable up to five years in state prison, to receive financial incentives,
also known as kickbacks, to entice facilities to use their services.160
House Bill No. 807, Practices of Substance Abuse Service Providers
Act, which was promoted by the Sober Home Task Force, was also signed
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 738.
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See id.
155.
Middlebrook & Taylor, supra note 66, at 2627.
156.
Caroline Bell, Task Force Seeks to Clean Up Florida’s Drug Treatment
Industry, MEDIUM (Apr. 15, 2019), http://www.medium.com/the-sunshine-report/sober-hometask-force-seeks-to-clean-up-drug-treatment-industry-5da0b0fb0dfd.
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Id.
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Id.
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Liberman, supra note 1, at 739; see also FLA. STAT. § 817.505 (2019).
160.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 739; see also FLA. STAT. § 817.505.
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into action in 2017.161 The bill added Xtougher penalties for patient
brokering, increased protection against deceptive marketing practices, and
[made] it easier for law enforcement to investigate the abuse occurring in
treatment centers.U162
Most recently, during the 2019 legislative session, the Florida Senate
passed and adopted Florida House Bill 369, Substance Abuse Services.163
The bill was drafted, once again, upon recommendation from State Attorney
Aronberg’s Sober Home Task Force and became effective on July 1, 2019.164
The new piece of legislature allows non-violent drug offenders to qualify to
provide peer support services by certifying them with the State.165 XPeer
support services allow individuals with similar life circumstances to work
with those struggling with addiction to overcome it.U166 Prior to the
legislation, individuals in positions of ownership or employment in recovery
residences were subject to level two background screenings under Florida
law.167 However, the bill amends this law and exempts prior drug offenders
who qualify to become peer specialists.168
2.

Recently Proposed Legislation

House Bill No. 369 was not the only proposed piece of legislation set
out to strengthen Florida’s sober home regulation during the 2019 legislative
session.169 House Bill No. 103 and corresponding Senate Bill No. 102
sought to amend Florida Statute Section 397.487, Voluntary Certification of
Recovery Residences.170 The amendment proposed to remove the voluntary
aspect of the recovery residence statute, thus requiring that all residences be
161.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 739; see also Fla. CS for CS for HB 807
(2017) (Practices of Substance Abuse Service Providers Act).
162.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 739; see also Fla. CS for CS for HB 807
(2017).
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Jeffrey Lynne, Breaking News — Florida Legislature Passes Latest Sober
Homes Task Force SUD Treatment and Recovery Residence Legislation, SOBER LAW NEWS
(May 3, 2019), http://www.soberlawnews.com/breaking-news-florida-legislature-passeslatest-sober-homes-task-force-sud-treatment-and-recovery-residence-legislation/; see also Fla.
CS for CS HB 1 (2019) (Substance Abuse Services).
164.
Lynne, supra note 163.
165.
Janelle Irwin Taylor, Substance Abuse Peer Mentoring Bill Clears the
Florida House, FLA. POL. (Apr. 24, 2019), http://www.floridapolitics.com/archives/294671substance-abuse-peer-mentoring; see also Fla. CS for CS for HB 369.
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168.
Taylor, supra note 165.
169.
See H.R. 103, 2019 Leg., 121st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019); S. 102, 2019 Leg.,
121st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019).
170.
Fla. H.R. 103; Fla. S. 102.
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certified.171 Under this legislation, all sober homes would be subject to the
same FARR standards required under the current voluntary certification
program.172 Additionally, the law would further impose criminal penalties
for persons who operate a recovery residence without a certificate of
compliance.173 However, the bills died in committee action, never making it
to either floor for a vote.174
B.

Why Stronger Regulation Is Necessary

Florida has an ongoing history of waiting until it is too late to take
action.175 From the pill mill epidemic that left Florida with its current
reputation to the sober home crisis that is leaving thousands of addicts in
worse conditions than before entering the State for help, it is clear that
Florida does not like to take drastic proactive measures.176 While the Florida
legislature has made an attempt to combat the ongoing sober home crisis
with its recent legislative action, the recently proposed bill to mandate the
certification process makes it clear that it is not enough.177 Some state
legislatures want stronger regulation.178
1.

Problems with the Current Regulations in Florida

With cities in Florida, such as Delray Beach, being nicknamed the
relapse capital of the country, it is the Florida Legislature’s responsibility to
set the tone for sober home regulation.179 While the voluntary certification
method may be the solution for states such as Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts, who have both enacted voluntary certification laws, it is not
enough for Florida.180
Pennsylvania’s Sober Home Task Force made the recommendation
for voluntary certification of recovery residences in 2017.181 The proposal
171.
Fla. H.R. 103; Fla. S. 102.
172.
See Fla. H.R. 103; Fla. S. 102.
173.
Fla. H.R. 103; Fla. S. 102.
174.
H.B
103:
Recovery
Residences,
FLA.
SENATE,
http:www.flsenate.gov/session/bill/2019/103 (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
175.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 736; Greg Allen, Beach Town Tries to
Reverse Runaway Growth of Sober Home, NPR (Aug. 10, 2017, 7:25 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/08/10/537882989/beach-town-tries-to-reverserunaway-growth-ok-sober-homes.
176.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 736; Allen, supra note 175.
177.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 737; H.R. 103; Fla. S. 102.
178.
See H.R. 103; Fla. S. 102.
179.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 736.
180.
See Middlebrook & Taylor, supra note 66, at 26, 28.
181.
Id. at 26.
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was in response Xto [seventeen] medical dispatch calls for overdoses at
recovery housesU that occurred in 2016, which resulted in two deaths.182 To
compare state numbers, Delray Beach alone suffered 412 overdoses in just
the first half of 2016.183 Additionally, thirty-seven of those overdoses
resulted in death.184 With such a staggering difference in numbers, it is clear
that Florida and Pennsylvania should not have similar regulation over sober
homes.185
Furthermore, back in 2015 when the legislation began, only thirteen
of Florida’s thousands of recovery residences qualified for certification.186
With the voluntary certification legislation being in place for almost four
years now, only eighty-seven recovery residence companies currently meet
the standard required for a certificate of compliance.187 With such a low
number of certifiable facilities in comparison to the thousands that are not
currently participating nor meet the standard for the voluntary certification
process, greater regulatory action needs to be taken.188
Despite the Florida Legislature’s efforts, the voluntary certification
program for recovery residences is just that[voluntary.189 As a result,
unscrupulous actors can still legally own and operate sober homes without
adhering to the standards set by NARR.190 The standard molded by NARR
was constructed atop the Social Model of Recovery Philosophy (XSMRPU),
which takes the position that peer support is integral to an addict’s
recovery.191 As numerous studies have found as such, NARR has complied
the most effective evidence based practices and molded an overarching
standard that recovery residences can implement to provide the most
effective recovery practices for their residence.192 By only implementing a
voluntary certification program, there is no way to enforce the NARR
Standard to all operating sober homes across the State.193

182.
Id.
183.
Ifran Uraizee & Ryan Van Velzer, Drug Overdoses Rampant in Delray’s
Sober Home Neighborhoods, SUN SENTINEL (July 14, 2017, 5:15 PM), http://www.sunsentinel.com/local/palm-beach/fl-pn-delray-overdoses-20170706-story.html.
184.
Id.
185.
See Middlebrook & Taylor, supra note 66, at 26; Uraizee & Van Velzer,
supra note 183.
186.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 73839.
187.
Id. at 739.
188.
See id.
189.
Id. at 738.
190.
Id.
191.
FLA. ASS’N OF RECOVERY RESIDENCES, supra note 148.
192.
Id.
193.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 738.
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Furthermore, while Florida’s voluntary certification program has
made it illegal for treatment facilities to refer participants of their programs
to uncertified recovery residences, bad actors in the recovery business can
still find ways to retain a healthy flow of business without such referrals.194
Deceptive marketing scams use the State’s resort-like atmosphere to target
out-of-state addicts looking for supportive environments as they continue
their journey into recovery.195 Therefore allowing unscrupulous sober home
owners to retain business without the process of referrals from treatment
centers.196
The fact that recovery residences can legally operate in anonymity
also poses a problem for the State.197 Without a requirement for certification
or another means to know where these homes are located, there is no way to
monitor and oversee how the residents are being treated.198 Without some
form of mandatory oversight, unscrupulous actors can continue to prey on
addicts in recovery by legally opening recovery facilities to lure and
manipulate the already vulnerable as a money-making scheme.199 While
tougher patient brokering laws have been put in place to deter some unethical
behavior, there have been no laws enacted that criminalize bad actors from
just opening their doors.200 Furthermore, as there is an apparent link between
addicts in recovery and overdoses, absent certification, government agencies,
law enforcement officials, and health departments cannot take the proactive
measures needed to adequately distribute necessary resources that can
prevent the overdose death toll from rising.201
V.

ROADBLOCKS TO REGULATION

With the recent proposition during the 2019 legislative session to
mandate certification of all sober homes across the State, it is clear that some
Florida lawmakers believe stronger governmental oversight is necessary to
combat the sober home crisis.202 Being that both corresponding bills (House
Bill 103 and Senate Bill 102) died in committee action, the question is
194.
See id. at 739.
195.
Allen, supra note 36; Liberman, supra note 1, at 73334.
196.
Allen, supra note 36.
197.
See Lisa Kashinsky, Sober Homes Spark Legal Battles, Calls for More
Oversight,
BOS.
HERALD.COM:
NEWS
(Apr.
24,
2019,
12:58
PM),
http://www.bostonherald.com/2019/04/23/sober-homes-spark-legal-battles-calls-for-moreoversight/.
198.
Id.
199.
See Allen, supra note 36.
200.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 739.
201.
See Liverpool, supra note 121.
202.
See Fla. H.R. 108; H.R. 103; see Fla. S. 102.
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why.203 Regulation over the recovery industry has been and continues to be a
controversial topic.204 Supporters of regulation claim stronger governmental
oversight is still needed to combat the problems that exist in the recovery
community in order to fully protect those seeking sobriety.205 However,
critics of stronger oversight use federal regulations such the Fair Housing
Act (XFHAU) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (XADAU) to contend
that increased regulations imposed on sober homes would violate federal
law.206
A.

Federal Roadblocks

The FHA and ADA are two federal laws that prevent discriminatory
housing practices against individuals with disabilities.207 The FHA was
originally enacted in 1968 to eliminate housing discrimination on the basis of
race, color, national origin, and religion.208 However, in 1988, XCongress
passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act (XFHAAU), which extended fair
housing protection[s] to prohibit housing discrimination against individuals
suffering from a handicap.U209 The amendment to the FHA defines handicap
as X(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having such an
impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.U210 Due to
the language of the statute, courts have recognized that recovering alcoholics
and drug addicts qualify as handicapped and thus require protection from
discrimination.211
Because of this classification, Xstate and local
governments are prohibited from enacting or enforcing land use or zoning
laws that discriminate againstU addicts in recovery.212 Additionally, Xthe
ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas
of public life, including public accommodations.U213 Because the ADA
definition of disability is almost identical to the FHAA’s definition of
203.
204.
205.
206.

HB 103: Recovery Residences, supra note 176; Fla. H.R. 103; Fla. S. 102.
See Liverpool, supra note 121.
Id.
Id.; Lillie Werner Singh, Federal Law and State Sober Living Regulations
Intersect,
BEHAV.
HEALTHCARE
EXECUTIVE
(June
19,
2018),
http://www.behavioral.net/article/policy/federal-law-and-state-sober-living-regulationsintersect; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (2017); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2017).
207.
Singh, supra note 206.
208.
Dana K. Maine & Connor M. Bateman, Regulation of Sober Living
Facilities Under Federal Fair Housing Legislation, FOR DEF., June 2018, at 46, 47.
209.
Id.
210.
42 U.S.C. § 3602 (2017).
211.
Maine & Bateman, supra note 208, at 48.
212.
Singh, supra note 206.
213.
Id.
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handicap, addicts in recovery are also considered a protected class under the
ADA.214
As a result of these protections, sober living facilities are also
protected under these regulations.215 Therefore, laws and regulations
imposed on sober homes may not have a discriminatory impact on its
residents to interfere with their equal opportunity to live in a dwelling.216
Because of these protections, state and local governments feel limited in how
they can regulate individuals with substance use disorders that reside in sober
homes.217 However, in a joint statement by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (XHUDU) and the U.S. Department of Justice
(XDOJU):
Operators of group homes for persons with disabilities are subject
to applicable state and local regulations addressing health and
safety concerns unless those regulations are inconsistent with the
Fair Housing Act or other federal law. Licensing and other
regulatory requirements that may apply to some group homes must
also be consistent with the Fair Housing Act. Such regulations
must not be based on stereotypes about persons with disabilities or
specific types of disabilities. State or local zoning and land use
ordinances may not, consistent with the Fair Housing Act, require
individuals with disabilities to receive medical, support, or other
services or supervision that they do not need or want as a condition
for allowing a group home to operate.
State and local
governments’ enforcement of neutral requirements regarding
safety, licensing, and other regulatory requirements governing
group homes do not violate the Fair Housing Act so long as the
ordinances are enforced in a neutral manner, they do not
specifically target group homes, and they do not have an
unjustified discriminatory effect on persons with disabilities who
218
wish to reside in group homes.

Furthermore, Xcourts have held that laws may treat a protected class
differently if the restriction is intended to benefit the protected group or
responds to legitimate safety concerns raised by affected individuals.U219

214.
Maine & Bateman, supra note 208, at 4748.
215.
See Singh, supra note 206.
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
218.
U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, JOINT STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: STATE AND LOCAL LAND USE
LAWS AND PRACTICES AND THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 13 (2016).
219.
Singh, supra note 206.
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In the recently proposed bill to mandate certification of all sober
homes in Florida, that bill stated that,
The Legislature finds that a person suffering from addiction has a
higher success rate of achieving long-lasting sobriety when given
the opportunity to build a stronger foundation by living in a
recovery residence after completing treatment. The Legislature
further finds that this state and its subdivisions have a legitimate
state interest in protecting these persons, who represent a
vulnerable consumer population in need of adequate housing. It is
the intent of the Legislature to protect persons who reside in a
220
recovery residence.

According to the language in this bill, X[i]t is the intent of the
Legislature to protect persons who reside in a recovery residences,U not to
discriminate against them.221 Thousands of out-of-state addicts flock to
Florida looking for a safe environment to receive treatment and recover from
addiction.222 However, with the fraud and corruption that has flourished in
the recovery community, families send their loved ones into the State only to
return in body bags.223 Addicts and families alike have spoken out about the
issues that arise from lack of regulation over sober homes in Florida;
however, critics of regulation continue to use federal roadblocks such as the
FHA and ADA to fight strong government oversight in the billion-dollar
industry.224
VI.

HOW BIG BUSINESS CONTROLS SOBER HOME REGULATION

With the Florida market for addiction treatment reaching one billion
dollars, more people have entered the business than ever before.225 As the
Florida Model advocates for outpatient rehabilitation to continue in the form
of sober home living, those involved in the business often own both
treatment facilities and sober homes.226 XTreatment costs about $9,000 [per]
monthU; however, once the addicts in recovery complete the standard
inpatient rehabilitation, they then move on to sober home living where the
cost lowers to roughly $400 per month.227 As treatment centers and sober
220.
Fla. H.R. 103.
221.
Id.
222.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 724.
223.
Id.
224.
See Seville et al., supra note 7.
225.
Seville et al., supra note 7; David Segal, City of Addict Entrepreneurs,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2017, at F8.
226.
See Segal, supra note 225; Seville et al., supra note 7.
227.
Segal, supra note 225.
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homes have proliferated due to the opioid epidemic sweeping the nation,
easy money has become an end in itself for those involved in the billiondollar-business.228 In an interview conducted for the New York Times in
2017, sober home owner Daniel Sullivan discussed his experience with those
in the business of addiction, claiming that, X[t]here was a time last year when
a lot of the guys who owned clinics and sober living homes were driving a
Cadillac Escalade, or a Mercedes-Benz.U229 Sullivan also claims he Xheard a
few of them talking about how they were just $50,000 away from joining the
high-roller program at the MGM in Vegas.U230
Dual owners of treatment centers and sober homes can still make
large profits without engaging in mass insurance fraud schemes.231 While
many unscrupulous actors have taken advantage of common practices such
as urinalysis, it is still a key component to drug treatment.232 According to
the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, Xurine testing is the best
developed and most commonly used monitoring technique in substance
abuse treatment programs.U233 Additionally, the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration claims that urine analysis Xshould
occur not less than once a week or more frequently than every [three] days in
the first weeks of treatment.U234 With the use of more sophisticated urine
analysis testing, an addict tested three times a week can amount to charges of
$36,000 a month.235 As a result, a sober home with six residents on the same
testing regimen could bring in roughly $2.5 million a year.236
With the combination of less frequent testing and moderately priced
urine analysis, operators of treatment centers and sober homes can fly under
the radar and still yield a significant profit without violating any state or
federal laws.237 Without some form of complete regulation, it is almost
impossible to detect if these under-the-radar scams are occurring within these
larger business operations.238 With such profits to be made in the South
Florida market, it can be assumed that those involved in the more
sophisticated money-making operations would be opposed to stricter
228.
See id.
229.
Id.
230.
Id.
231.
See Pat Beall & Christine Stapleton, Behind the Bonanza: How Urine
Tests Make Millions, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 2, 2015 at 1A.
232.
See id.; ROBERT F. FORMAN & PAUL D. NAGY, SUBSTANCE ABUSE:
CLINICAL ISSUES IN INTENSIVE OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 237 (2006).
233.
FORMAN & NAGY, supra note 232, at 237.
234.
Id.
235.
Beall & Stapleton, supra note 231.
236.
Id.
237.
See id.
238.
Vogel, supra note 80, at 83.
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regulation and government oversight.239 If stringent regulations were to be
enacted in Florida, it can be assumed that stricter policies would be
implemented to oversee testing such as urinalysis.240 As urine testing is only
one example of the under-the-radar money-making devices implemented by
large business operators in the recovery industry, it can be presumed that
those involved in the billion-dollar-market lobby against stronger
regulation.241
Indirect lobbying tactics occur when opposers to regulation claim
that doing so would violate federal regulations such as the ADA and FHA.242
While these federal laws have been perceived as roadblocks to regulation in
the recovery industry, joint statements made by the DOJ and HUD have
implied that discriminatory impact is justified when health concerns
involving the disabled occur.243 By using well-intended federal law to lobby
against state run regulation, large business operators in the recovery industry
continue to take advantage of the addicted in an under-the-radar fashion.244
VII.

CONCLUSION

As the United States finds itself in the middle of the worst opioid
mortality rate in our nation’s history, Florida needs to realize that it is the
State that needs to take the most significant action.245 Thousands of addicts
from across the nation flock to Florida in seek of recovery. 246 While some
find it, others fall victim to the hands of unscrupulous actors whose only
wish is to make a profit off of their vulnerability.247 While the Legislature
has taken steps in the right direction with the implementation of new
regulatory measures, it is not enough.248 Drug overdose deaths in Florida are
over twice the national average, and as unethical practices in sober homes
create a direct pipeline to relapse, there is an evident nexus between the
two.249
239.
See Seville et al., supra note 7; Singh, supra note 206.
240.
See Beall & Stapleton, supra note 231; Seville et al., supra note 7; Vogel,
supra note 80, at 83.
241.
See Beall & Stapleton, supra note 231; Singh, supra note 206; Vogel,
supra note 80, at 83.
242.
See Seville et al., supra note 7; Singh, supra note 206.
243.
See Singh, supra note 206; U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 9.
244.
See Vogel, supra note 80, at 82.
245.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 745.
246.
Seville et al., supra note 7.
247.
Id.; Liberman, supra note 1, at 734.
248.
See Liberman, supra note 1, at 738.
249.
Lizette Alvarez, Haven for Recovering Addicts Now Profit from Their
Relapses, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/delray-beach-
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The voluntary certification process is merely a band-aid on the sober
home issues that can be seen in Florida’s recovery industry.250 Whether the
answer lies in the form of mandatory certification or not, stronger
government oversight is needed in the recovery community to combat the
ongoing crisis.251 As opposers to regulation fight their battle by using well
intended federal regulations as roadblocks, supporters of statewide
regulations and those affected by a lack thereof must fight back by showing
the Florida Legislature that these roadblocks can be overcome by the health
and safety needs of those in substance abuse treatment and recovery.252 This
analysis serves as a narrow introductory talking point into the various
alternative possibilities as to why real change has not occurred in Florida’s
recovery industry.253 As those in the throes of recovery continue to suffer as
a result of lax regulation, we can only hope that real change will occur
soon.254

addiction.html; Drug Abuse Treatment in Florida: Statistics, Success, and More, COMFORT
RECOVERY, http://www.comfortrecovery.com/florida/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
250.
Liberman, supra note 1, at 740.
251.
See Kashinsky, supra note 197.
252.
See Singh, supra note 206.
253.
See Taylor, supra note 167; Liberman, supra note 1, at 736.
254.
See Alvarez, supra note 249.
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INTRODUCTION

In the closing pages of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s introspective novel, This
Side of Paradise, a self-reflective Amory Blaine preaches the importance of
high-quality broadly accessible public education:
Every child . . . should have an equal start. If his father can endow
him with a good physique and his mother with some common
sense in his early education, that should be his heritage . . . . He
shouldn’t be artificially bolstered up with money, sent to these
horrible tutoring schools, dragged through college . . . Every boy
ought to have an equal start.1

Amory’s musings over education mirror the plight of today’s
inequality over educational opportunities.2 Because of America’s regressive
education funding policy, which derives a large part of school funding from
property values, low-income, and minority students continue to find
themselves in woefully underfunded schools.3 Not only are low-income
students subject to worse education, but the student population, as a whole, is
becoming further stratified both racially and educationally.4 It is because of
1.
F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THIS SIDE OF PARADISE 252 (James L.W. West III
ed. 1995).
2.
Rachel R. Ostrander, School Funding: Inequality in District Funding and
the Disparate Impact on Urban and Migrant School Children, 2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 271,
271 (2015).
3.
See id. at 272–73, 283. Local sources, such as property taxes, account for
approximately forty-five percent of school district funding. Nikhil Goyal, Save Our Schools:
Bernie’s Education Platform Deserves an A+, NATION, June 17, 2019, at 4, 4. This results in
affluent, often white students, being educated in far superior schools than low-income, often
minority students, attending woefully underfunded schools. Id.
4.
Ostrander, supra note 2, at 272.
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this stratification that schools today are more segregated than at any time
since segregation was formally abolished.5
Though the plight of low-income students is palpable, dissatisfaction
with public education throughout the rest of the population has been the true
harbinger of contemporary education reform in the United States.6 When
President Reagan’s administration published its damning report on the state
of American public schools titled A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for
Education Reform in 1983, the public became primed for meaningful and
radical proposals for education reform.7
Instead of tailoring a bottom-up system which increased the floor of
education quality for the most vulnerable students at the bottom of the
socioeconomic ladder, contemporary education reform has manifested from
American market economics—namely, competition.8 This competitionbased approach to education reform increases the range of outcomes for lowincome students, including further increasing negative outcomes.9
This Comment will consider how competition-based education
reform has lowered the quality floor for low-income families and students.10
First, this Comment will explain the development of competition-based
education reform as it has evolved through the judiciary, federal legislation,
and through the states.11 Second, this Comment will define the two main
types of competition-based school choice reform most stringently supported
by President Trump’s administration: Charter schools and school choice
vouchers.12 Third, this Comment will consider how charter schools and
vouchers create new negative outcomes for low-income students.13 Fourth,
this Comment will analyze how these school choice programs have
manifested as a statewide initiative in Florida.14 Lastly, this Comment will

5.
6.

Id.
DAVID P. GARDNER ET AL., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATION REFORM, 1 (1983).
7.
See Zachary Jason, The Battle Over Charter Schools, HARV. EDUC. MAG.,
Summer 2017, at 22, 26.
8.
Chris Gilbert, Creating Educational Destruction: A Critical Exploration
of Central Neoliberal Concepts and Their Transformative Effects on Public Education, 83
EDUC. F. 60, 61 (2019).
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at 63; see also discussion infra Part IV.
11.
Ostander, supra note 2, at 289–90; see also discussion infra Part II.
12.
Gilbert, supra note 8, at 61; see also discussion infra Part III.
13.
Patrick J. Wolf et al., Taking Stock of Private-School Choice, EDUC.
NEXT, Spring 2018, at 46, 47; see also discussion infra Part IV.
14.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 47; see also discussion infra Part V.
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consider alternatives to raising the floor of outcomes in education quality for
low-income students.15
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITIVE EDUCATION POLICY

The development of American education policy is a cocktail of
federal, state, and community legislation intermingled with aspects of
taxation, economics, and the judiciary.16 Unlike freedom of speech, gun
rights, and other fundamental rights afforded strict Constitutional protection,
the right to public education exists beyond the nucleus or penumbra of the
text.17 Instead, the right to public education and the need for its existence
comes from public sentiment declaring its necessity.18 As such, the battle for
access and equality in public education has been historically rooted in civil
rights.19
A.
From Brown to Rodriguez: The Court’s Migration from Progressive
to Competition-Based Education Policy
Like all contests for equality, educational equality has been a hardfought and hard-won issue.20 The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in
Brown v. Board of Education21 signals the role of education in modern
American society.22 In Brown, the Court overruled its previous ruling in
Plessy v. Ferguson23 and effectively struck Jim Crow era school segregation
laws, determining even if segregated schools were in all other respects equal,
segregation had too much of a deleterious impact on children for it to be
just.24
Central to the Court’s determination in Brown was its outlining of
the essential nature and importance of education in modern society.25 Chief
Justice Warren, delivering the opinion of the Court, cited compulsory school
15.
Goyal, supra note 3, at 4; see also discussion infra Part VI.
16.
See Ostrander, supra note 2, at 289–90.
17.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973);
Ostrander, supra note 2, at 283–84.
18.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
19.
See Ostrander, supra note 2, at 290.
20.
See id. at 295.
21.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22.
See Ostrander, supra note 2, at 273.
23.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95.
25.
Id. at 493.
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attendance laws and society’s investment in public education as a
“recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.”26
Further, the Court added education as being “required in the performance of
our basic public responsibilities,” and “perhaps the most important function
of the state and local governments.”27 With respect to the state’s
responsibilities in education, the Court provided where the state has
undertaken the burden of providing public education to its citizens, it is
obligated to do so on equal terms.28
Since Brown, the Court has backed away from a collectivist ideal in
public education.29
In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,30 the Court expressly excluded education as a fundamental right,
despite agreeing with the opinion in Brown about its importance to society.31
Rodriguez involved a Texas state funding system which resulted in
extremely disparate funding between high-income and low-income school
districts.32 As a result of the unequal funding system—predominantly a
product of property taxes factoring heavily into school funding—the state’s
lowest-income school district populated by largely minority students saw
significantly less funding than the state’s most affluent district.33 The Court
ultimately found that state-funded educational quality is not Constitutionally
insured as long as students have access to basic education.34
The Court’s rationale in Rodriguez was a precursor to market-theorybased school initiatives of today.35 The Court in Rodriguez provided that
Texas’ school financing scheme promotion of pluralism, or the local sharing
of the responsibility, encouraged “experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for education excellence.”36 Thus, the Court in Rodriguez
placed virtues of local control, participation, decentralization, and
competition in education policy ahead of the virtues of equality enshrined in
Brown.37

26.
27.
28.
29.
30
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
note 2, at 283.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Ostrander, supra note 2, at 283.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 30, 35.
Id. at 4–5.
See id. at 46–47.
Id. at 2.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35; Gilbert, supra note 8, at 64; Ostrander, supra
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50.
See id. at 2; Ostrander, supra note 2, at 284–85.
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Neoliberalization of American Education Policy

Since Rodriguez, policy-making and political support involving
competition in education has reached a fever pitch.38 And, the expansion of
neoliberal ideals in American policy-making has played a strong part in the
advancement of competition-based education policy virtues found in
Rodriguez.39 Neoliberalism, plainly, is the idea that societal advancement is
best achieved not through progressive cooperation, but through freedom,
individualism, and competition.40
With respect to education, neoliberalism has manifested into federal
legislation over the past three presidential administrations.41 Prompted by a
nationwide dissatisfaction with the performance of American schools, the
administration of George W. Bush proposed the No Child Left Behind Act in
2001, which was federal legislation to “close the achievement gap with
accountability, flexibility, and choice.”42 Although No Child Left Behind is
more readily known for the increase in standardized testing, Title V of The
Bill explicitly promoted parental choice and the funding of innovated
programs, such as charter schools.43
Similarly, the Obama administration’s Race to the Top grant, which
provided over $4 billion for school funding, asked states and school districts
to compete by submitting robust plans to reform their education systems and,
in effect, further endorsed and enabled the proliferation of school choice.44
Former chief of staff to Obama era Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan,
credited the grant for accelerating competition-based education reforms such
as public school choice.45 Among the policies pursued by the winning states
were school choice initiatives such as charter schools, which saw quicker
growth in states receiving grant money than in those which did not.46
38.
Gilbert, supra note 8, at 61.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 62.
41.
Id. at 63.
42.
Id.; No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, § 1, 115
Stat. 1425, 1425 (2002) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301).
43.
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 101; see also Jason, supra note 7, at
28.
44.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, §
5, 123 Stat. 115, 181 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.); see also Gilbert, supra note 8, at 63; Race to the Top, WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT
BARACK OBAMA, http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/education/k-12/race-to-the-top
(last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
45.
Joanne Weiss & Frederick M. Hess, What Did Race to the Top
Accomplish?, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2015, at 50, 51.
46.
Id. at 52.
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Most recently, President Donald Trump’s 2019 budget proposal
allots $1 billion to spur school choice policies.47 At the same time, the
budget looks to cut over ten billion in funding for programs for low-income
parents, Native Americans, arts programs, and other progressive education
policies.48 President Trump’s affinity for school choice initiatives is
headlined by his administration’s appointing of pro-school choice activist
Betsy DeVos as Secretary of Education.49
Prior to being appointed as Secretary of Education, DeVos had
championed school choice initiatives in her home state of Michigan and
nationwide.50 Unlike past efforts of universally raising the floor of education
quality across the board, DeVos establishes the party line that a parent’s
ability to choose where his or her child goes to school, above all, should be
prioritized.51 During her confirmation, DeVos spoke for what she believed
was the will of parents, arguing “parents no longer believe that a one-sizefits-all model of learning meets the need of every child.”52
Public sentiment is also behind school choice policy despite little
data showing definitive positive outcomes for students.53 Neoliberal policymaking, though, finds value not necessarily in outcomes, but achievement of
its ideals.54 Neoliberalism assumes humans are selfish actors and given the
opportunity will strive for their own individual benefit.55 In education,
neoliberal policy eschews the collectivist benchmark that all stakeholders—
students, families, teachers, administrators, and society at large—can work
for a common goal of uniform high-quality education.56
Instead,
neoliberalism advocates for an individualist ideal that if the stakeholders
compete against each other—students against students, teachers against

47.
Philissa Cramer, Report: Trump Education Budget Would Create a Race
to
the
Top
for
School
Choice,
CHALKBEAT
(May
17,
2017),
http://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/us/2017/05/17/report-trump-education-budget-would-create-arace-to-the-top-for-school-choice/.
48.
Id.
49.
See Jason, supra note 7, at 27.
50.
Joel R. Malin et al., Educational Neoliberalization: The Mediatization of
Ethical Assertions in the Voucher Debate, 40 DISCOURSE: STUD. CULTURAL POL. EDUC. 217,
223 (2019); see also Jason, supra note 7, at 27–28.
51.
Malin et al., supra note 50, at 225.
52.
Id.
53.
See Tamara Wilder Linkow, Disconnected Reform: The Proliferation of
School Choice Options in U.S. School Districts, 5 J. SCH. CHOICE 414, 420, 426 (2011).
54.
See Gilbert, supra note 8, at 62; Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 47, 54.
55.
Gilbert, supra note 8, at 63.
56.
See id.
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teachers, district against district, and state against state—the entire system
will benefit.57
III.

DEFINING PRIVATIZED SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS

School choice, broadly, represents several competition-based public
and private school initiatives where parents are given a degree of autonomy
in selecting where their child attends.58 In conjunction, school choice
initiatives are theoretically meant to improve a myriad of systematic issues,
such as racial integration, as well as improve the test scores of those who do
and don’t participate by fostering competitive values.59 The focus of this
Comment is on the school choice policies which divert funds from traditional
public schools, namely: Charter schools and voucher programs.60
A.

Charter Schools

Charter schools are public schools, often run by corporations,
receiving public funds but are otherwise divorced from school district rules
and regulations where they reside.61 Instead, charter schools are said to
benefit students and parents through their institutional autonomy and their
direct accountability to families, as opposed to districts.62 Today, charter
schools are represented in forty-three states, educating approximately three
million students.63
Because students are not assigned to any particular charter school,
their public funding and operational authorization is directly correlated to
fulfilling their charter—a contract usually consisting of upholding academic,
financial, and organizational competence—and maintaining enrollment
numbers.64 Thus, charters face an increased risk of closure as they are not
ensured funding or authorization.65 Since the 2010 school year, the charter
school closure rate has hovered between just over six percent to as high as
57.
See id. at 64.
58.
Linkow, supra note 53, at 417.
59.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 50–51.
60.
Id. at 52; see also discussion infra Part III.A–B.
61.
Ed Grabianowski, How Charter Schools Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS:
CULTURE, http://people.howstuffworks.com/charter-school.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2019);
Linkow, supra note 53, at 417.
62.
Linkow, supra note 53, at 417.
63.
Jason, supra note 7, at 24.
64.
Id.; Grabianowski, supra note 61.
65.
ALISON CONSOLETTI, THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: WHAT WE KNOW
— AND WHAT WE DO NOT — ABOUT PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2011).
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nearly thirteen percent.66 Reasons for closures largely correlate with
financial and management issues.67
Unlike private schools, which receive their funding primarily from
tuition and other non-public means, charters siphon money, both directly and
indirectly, from public schools.68 In charter systems where the money
follows the child, traditional public schools are directly affected when a child
transfers into a charter school.69 In other systems, charter funds are set aside
in the state’s budget funds which could have presumably been allotted to
traditional public schools in a non-parallel school system.70
B.

School Choice Vouchers

School choice vouchers are state supplemental grants for families
wishing to enroll their children in private schools, or high performing public
schools.71 The competitive logic of vouchers is they allow parents increased
autonomy to pull their children from underperforming public schools by
opening more doors to private school education.72 Voucher programs are
often targeted and acute in their implantation and are typically limited, at
least initially, to low-income students and students with disabilities.73
Because private schools are not mandated to accept voucherreceiving students, the effectiveness of voucher programs often turns on the
regulatory nature of a state’s laws.74 Top-performing private schools often
do not participate in voucher programs because of fear of reputation
dilution.75 Instead, voucher-participating private schools are often occupied
by religious institutions.76
Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and Ohio are the only states offering
statewide voucher programs, and twenty-five states and the District of

66.
Inside Charter School Closings: Inside Charter School Growth, NAT’L
ASS’N CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, http://www.qualitycharters.org/policy-research/insidecharter-school-growth/closings/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
67.
CONSOLETTI, supra note 65, at 8.
68.
See Grabianowski, supra note 61.
69.
Jason, supra note 7, at 26.
70.
See Grabianowski, supra note 61.
71.
Linkow, supra note 53, at 418.
72.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 51. “Stringent regulations appear to dissuade
some schools from opting in” to voucher programs. Id. at 48.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 53.
75.
Id. at 52.
76.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 52.
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Columbia offer a more abridged type of voucher program.77 Partly due to the
relative newness of these statewide programs, the differences in their
implementation, and the ever-moving target of what determines a program’s
success, there are no tangible conclusions on the effectiveness of broadly
applied voucher programs.78 But, because school choice programs are rooted
in the neoliberal ideal of freedom, the mere fact parents are given more
choice is success for choice advocates, regardless of outcomes.79
IV.

SCHOOL CHOICE AND EFFECTS OF LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES

Because school choice is rooted in neoliberalism and competitionbased reform, the system necessarily creates disparities between winners and
losers.80 Thus, a top-down system is created in which the winners compel
the losers to improve, or else the losers cease to exist.81 This system proves
ideal in the spectrum of market economics, where producers compete to
make the best or most desirable products at competitive costs.82 Consumers
are tasked in making value propositions—weighing costs and benefits—and
typically are not faced with the prospect of life-long consequences for his or
her choices.83 However, those on the losing end of education are often
further set back when their local traditional public school loses funding, their
charter school closes, or they are enrolled in a charter or private school with
high teacher turnover or overall lowered academic performance.84
A.

Consequences of Charter School Choice

Charter schools around the country are especially targeted toward
low-income, urban, and minority students.85 Because these communities
often receive the lowest funding per student, traditional public schools in
these communities face similar difficulties to their neighboring charters, but

77.
Id. at 47. Florida’s voucher program is more accurately described as a
“tax-credit-funded scholarship initiative.” Id.
78.
Id. at 50.
79.
Malin et al., supra note 50, at 217–18.
80.
Gilbert, supra note 8, at 62–63.
81.
See id. at 63.
82.
See id. at 62.
83.
Malin et al., supra note 50, at 228.
84.
Jason, supra note 7, at 27; Peter Greene, The Promises Charter Schools
Don’t
Make,
FORBES
(Sept.
28,
2019,
11:37
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/petergreene/2018/09/28/the-promises-charter-schools-dont-make.
85.
Jason, supra note 7, at 27.
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charters increasingly expose students to more institutional instability.86 The
prospect of closures, higher teacher turnover, and the nefarious nature in low
performance of charter schools run by for-profit organizations subject
students to lower outcomes than traditional public schools.87
1.

Charter School Closures

Instead of diverting public funds to improving low-performing
public schools in low-income communities, charters often subject students to
an increased range of negative outcomes.88 Unlike their traditional publicschool counterparts, charter schools are mandated to fulfill their charter and
enrollment numbers or else face closure—in some cases occurring after two
consecutive years of non-compliance with their charter.89 But charter
schools more often fail because of their mismanagement.90 According to a
2011 report, 65.7% of all charter schools closed either because of either
financial problems stemming from low student enrollment or
mismanagement issues.91 And 18.6% of closures were the product of failing
to meet academic standards.92 Mismanagement issues typically were ethical
failings, such as dishonest audits and school administration appropriating
school funds for personal use.93
Unexpected closure of charter schools, unsurprisingly, have a
negative effect on students—particularly when schools close in the middle of
the year and, in rare cases, in the middle of a school day.94 The mid-year
closure rate has decreased between 2010–2016, from as high as 3.2% to
2.1%, but mid-year school closures are not an issue students might
experience while at traditional public schools.95 Additionally, because midyear school closures have such a negative effect on students, a school district

86.
See Greene, supra note 84.
87.
Jason, supra note 7, at 27.
88.
See id. at 26–27.
89.
CONSOLETTI, supra note 65, at 14; Lloyd Dunkelberger, Florida Charter
School Closures Average 20 Per Year, Report Shows, SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 18, 2018, 9:55
AM),
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/education/fl-ne-charter-schools-report-20180918story.html.
90.
CONSOLETTI, supra note 65, at 8.
91.
See id.
92.
See id.
93.
Id. at 10.
94.
Jason, supra note 7, at 24.
95.
See Inside Charter Closings: Inside Charter School Growth, supra note
66.
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may take it upon itself to take control of the failed charter and finish out the
year before formally closing the facility.96
Charter advocates argue the mercurial nature of charters allow them
to be more accountable to parents and traditional public schools should also
face the prospect of closure.97 But, as stated, charter closures are more often
related to financial mismanagement than a failure to meet academic
standards.98 Further, if public schools faced a similar burden, students—
particularly those in the lower socioeconomic rungs—would face even more
educational uncertainty on top of attending a poorly funded school.99
2.

High Teacher Turnover Rate

Traditional public schools currently face challenges of high teacher
turnover, and that problem is exacerbated among charter schools.100
Turnover at charter schools tends to be a product of two factors.101 First,
charters can subject teachers to longer hours and less pay than traditional
public schools due to their aversion to teachers’ unions and flexibility in
school policies governing work limits.102 Second, successful charters which
franchise will often transfer teachers between facilities.103
Students are ultimately at the short end of the stick when it comes to
the inability of charters to stifle teacher turnover rate.104 Among the most
important factors determining academic success is both teacher and student
engagement.105 Students having to face constant unfamiliarity in the
classroom and hallways will be less engaged.106 Similarly, teachers who
have to work longer hours for sub-par pay will also be less engaged.107
Although not all charter schools pay teachers a lower rate for more work, the

96.
CONSOLETTI, supra note 65, at 10.
97.
Id. at 5.
98.
Id. at 8.
99.
Greene, supra note 84.
100.
Jason, supra note 7, at 27.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Bruce Beairsto, Teacher Engagement Is the Key to Student Engagement,
EDCAN NETWORK (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.edcan.ca/articles/teacher-engagement-is-thekey-to-student-engagement/.
106.
See id.
107.
Id.
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charter school system provides a lower floor for teacher work quality, which
gets passed along to students.108
3.

For-Profit Charters

Both high closure rates and teacher turnover are often products of
low-performing charter schools.109 And, the vast majority of low performing
charter schools are run by for-profit corporations—such as the one formerly
run by the current Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos.110 While
advocating charters in Michigan, DeVos helped fund a system which
performed no better, and more often worse, than Michigan’s already
teetering public school system.111 Further, Michigan’s charter system is run
predominantly by for-profit companies, which are known for placing
profiteering over improving education outcomes.112 Under the performance
standard of the No Child Left Behind Act, for-profit charters performed
fifteen percentage points lower than their traditional public school
counterparts.113 And, the role of for-profit charters in the charter school
system is not insignificant, considering for-profit charters represent fourteen
percent of all charter schools nationwide.114
4.

The Argument for Charters

Notwithstanding the harrowing bottom end of the charter school
barrel, charters have received much-publicized success.115 Despite only
educating six percent of the nation’s student population, charters occupy
approximately a fourth of U.S. News and World Report’s top 100 high
schools.116 In states with stringent charter school laws, ample oversight, and
active non-profit charter organizations, charters not only thrive, but work in

108.
See Christopher Redding, Teacher Turnover Is a Problem — Here’s How
to Fix It, CONVERSATION: EDUC. (Sept. 7, 2018, 6:43 AM), http://theconversation.com/teacherturnover-is-a-problem-heres-how-to-fix-it-101584.
109.
See Jason, supra note 7, at 27.
110.
Id. at 27–28.
111.
Id.
112.
Id. at 28.
113.
Id.
114.
Jason, supra note 7, at 28.
115.
See id. at 24.
116.
Id.; see also Best U.S. High Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-high-schools/search?ranked=true (last visited Dec. 21,
2019).
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harmony with traditional public schools.117 Successful charters, like any
successful school, do not necessarily thrive because of competition, but
because they are well -funded, and implement known policies and features
facilitating student engagement.118
Thus, the argument for charters is less an argument that competitivebased school choice initiatives work, but that well-funded and well-run
schools work—regardless of whether the school is a charter, or traditional
public school.119 In 2018, one of the top players in the National Basketball
Association and Akron, Ohio, native, Lebron James, opened the I Promise
School which operates within a troubled school district in his hometown of
Akron.120 The school serves a largely minority population, including a
sizeable non-native English speaking and special needs population.121 Along
with the school’s two million district funded budget, Lebron James’
foundation supplies an additional $600,000 to support the teaching staff.122
Further, James’ foundation supports parents by supplying adult education
programs, along with health and legal services.123
Early results have been promising for James’ investment.124 The I
Promise School’s results, as measured by the nationally recognized Measure
of Academic Progress assessment, saw exponential growth in academic
achievement for the school’s third and fourth grade student body.125 “Ninety
percent met or exceeded individual growth goals in reading and math,
outpacing their peers across the district.”126 A significant distinction James’
school has with other celebrity endeavors in education is the school operates
within Ohio’s public school district as a traditional public school, and not
under the state’s charter program.127

117.
See Jason, supra note 7, at 27–28.
118.
See id. at 28.
119.
See Alana Semuels, Good School, Rich School; Bad School, Poor School,
ATLANTIC:
BUS.
(Aug.
25,
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/property-taxes-and-unequalschools/497333/.
120.
Erica L. Green, Reigniting Dreams: An N.B.A. Star’s School Is Gaining
Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2019, at A1.
121.
See id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
See id.
125.
Green, supra note 120.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
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Consequences of School Choice Vouchers

Unlike charter school policies, school choice vouchers give parents
the option of pulling their children from low-performing public schools and
enrolling them into competing private schools.128 Charters, in theory, are an
expansion of public education, while vouchers are an indirect repudiation of
it.129 Also, unlike charter schools, school choice vouchers supply public
funds to schools which are not subject to public oversight.130
1.

Vouchers Further Stratify Educational Opportunities

Traditionally, the prospect of attending private schools is reserved
for middle and upper-class families.131 The combination of high tuition, and
academic and disciplinary requirements, is regularly a bar on low-income
and minority students whose families would like to open the door to highperforming private institutions.132 Further, “research shows that white or
affluent parents often avoid schools that have high concentrations of
minority and low-income students.”133
Although voucher programs often prohibit participating schools from
instituting practices which exclude low-income students with less-than-ideal
academic and behavioral records, oversight over such prohibitions is
unsatisfactory.134 Thus, access to the very schools that students seek to
leverage vouchers, which voucher laws purport to want to help, are not
compelled to help these students.135 Instead, voucher laws are more
concerned with upholding exclusivity and serving their primary stakeholders,
which typically are not low-income and minority families.136
Within low-income communities, likely only those families who
have both the education and means to leverage vouchers will use them at
participating schools.137 Parents of children who are more educated are
better equipped to leverage market-based initiatives, like charters and
vouchers.138 Additionally, parents who can’t physically transport their
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 47.
Jason, supra note 7, at 26.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 48, 52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
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children to their chosen private school are inherently excluded from the
program.139 Thus, vouchers are at least partially incompatible with the
community which they are intended to help.140
2.

Research Does Not Support the Effectiveness of Vouchers

Earlier this Comment discussed that although low outcomes exist
with respect to charter schools, they still did provide a sizeable upside where
charter schools were well run and well-funded.141 Conversely, no such
upside exists where school choice vouchers are involved.142 Rigorous
academic studies have found that voucher systems have a negligible-tonegative effect on student achievement in the short and long term.143 In the
District of Colombia and Louisiana, year-to-year results in math showed a
precipitous decline—there was as much as a sixteen-percentile rank drop in
math for elementary students in Louisiana for students who had switched to a
private school under the voucher program.144 In Ohio, researchers similarly
found a sharp decline in math performance.145
Voucher proponents will point to other factors besides achievement,
such as educational attainment, as a worthwhile component to voucher
policy.146 Educational attainment speaks to a student’s future prospect in
furthering his or her education.147 Attainment is often directly correlated
with quality of life, such as health and earnings.148 Studies have found that
students participating in voucher programs showed a higher rate of
attainment when compared to those not participating.149 But, as stated in the
section above, parents of children participating in voucher programs are also
more likely to be more educated, which is inextricably linked to student
attainment.150

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
2014, at 3.

Id.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 48, 52.
Jason, supra note 7, at 24; see also discussion supra Part IV.
See id., at 29; Malin et al., supra note 50, at 217.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 53.
Malin et al., supra note 50, at 219.
Id.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 49–50.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Ronald Brownstein, Are College Degrees Inherited?, NAT’L J., Apr. 12,
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The Argument for Vouchers

Along with arguments for student attainment, voucher proponents
preach that they improve the performance of neighboring public schools
through competition.151 But, it is more likely that public schools—including
charter schools—have simply improved independently of vouchers on their
own.152 Significantly, when voucher participants are compared to charter
participants, the latter still shows improvement over the former—signifying
that vouchers, simply, are a net negative for their participants.153
Apart from any results-based legitimacy, voucher proponents simply
argue for the neoliberal values explained earlier in this Comment—that
parental choice is both the ends and means of any school choice program.154
It is undisputed that parents leveraging school choice initiatives like charters
and vouchers are more satisfied than those not participating in those
programs, but their—particularly low-income parents’—satisfaction is more
often correlated with perceived convenience and safety than whether their
student is achieving academically.155 Additionally, as stated, vouchers are
more readily available to parents with the skills, time, and transportation
means to use them.156
V.

THE EFFECTS OF STATEWIDE SCHOOL CHOICE IN FLORIDA

The Florida education system hosts five of the nation’s top ten
largest school districts.157 It educates approximately 2.8 million students
across its sixty-seven counties.158 Like many other large education systems,
Florida has fully bought into the school choice trend by implanting one of
four statewide voucher programs and has instituted one of the nation’s most
151.
Gilbert, supra note 8, at 61.
152.
See Bill Honig, Why Conventional School Reforms Have Failed: Charter
Schools Are Not the Key to Improving Public Education, BUILDING BETTER SCHOOLS (April
26,
2016),
http://www.buildingbetterschools.com/charter-schools-are-not-the-key-toimproving-public-education/.
153.
Id.
154.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 54.
155.
Jason, supra note 7, at 27.
156.
Id.
157.
Top 10 Largest School Districts by Enrollment and Per Pupil Current
Spending,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(May
21,
2019),
http://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2019/comm/largest-school-districts.html.
158.
Dunkelberger, supra note 89; Emily L. Mahoney, House Bill to Expand
Schools of Hope Program, Adds to Charter School Debate, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 20, 2019,
9:25 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/education/article228166494.html.
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robust charter school systems.159 But Florida’s school choice initiatives have
been wrought with many of the tell-tale issues discussed in this Comment.160
A.
Florida Constitution and Challenges Against School Choice
Vouchers
Unlike the Federal Constitution and judiciary, many states, including
Florida, have adopted state constitutional mandates enacting many of the
tenets discussed by the Court in Brown.161 In section I of article IX of the
Florida Constitution, education is protected on a level congruent with its
place in the social fabric: “Adequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public
schools that allows students to obtain a high quality of education . . . .”162
1.

Bush v. Holmes I & II

Florida’s courts have had a storied history in protecting the State’s
public schools from competition-based reforms.163 In 2004’s Bush v.
Holmes,164 the Florida Supreme Court overturned a statewide voucher
program providing state funds to sectarian, or religious, private schools
pursuant to the state constitution’s no-aid provision—prohibiting the use of
state funds benefitting, directly or indirectly, any sectarian institution. 165 In
2006’s Bush v. Holmes,166 the court again struck down another voucher
program, but this time under the aforementioned article IX, section I of the
Florida Constitution.167 Justice Pariente, writing for the majority, wrote that
the state constitution barred the transfer of funds “earmarked for public
education to private schools.”168 Significantly, Justice Pariente found that
voucher programs inherently undermine the mandate of high quality
education provided by the constitution:
159.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 47.
160.
See Dunkelberger, supra note 89.
161.
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. at 483,
493 (1954).
162.
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
163.
See John Kennedy, School Choice Expands in Florida with 5th Voucher
Program,
GOVERNING:
EDUC.
(May
13,
2019,
8:15
AM),
http://www.governing.com/topics/education/tns-school-choice-expands-in-florida.html.
164.
886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (en banc).
165.
Id. at 366.
166.
919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
167.
Id. at 412–13.
168.
Id. at 408.
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The [voucher program] by its very nature undermines the system
of high quality free public schools that are the sole authorized
means of fulfilling the constitutional mandate to provide the
education of all children residing in Florida. The systematic
diversion of public funds to private schools on either a small or
large scale is incompatible with article IX, section 1(a).169

Despite challenges in the judiciary, Florida is one of the biggest
players in statewide school choice initiatives.170 Florida and other states
which have constitutional bars on choice voucher programs have found a
work-around by diverting funds directly to parents through tax credits or
education savings accounts.171 Today Florida, along with three other states,
Indiana, Louisiana, and Ohio, have spearheaded sweeping statewide school
choice programs.172
2.

Florida’s Neo-Voucher Program

Florida’s Tax Credit scholarship program (“FTC”) was established
in 2001 with the intended goal of helping low-income families gain access to
private schools.173 As it stands, political forces have decidedly turned the
FTC from a low-income targeted initiative to targeting decidedly middleclass families.174 As of the 2016–2017 school year, the FTC allows families
not exceeding 260% of the federal poverty level, $25,750 for a household of
four, to qualify for the program.175 For further context, a family of four
grossing six thousand per month qualifies for a program purported to help
low-income families gain access to better education and would be squarely
considered middle class according to the U.S. Census Bureau.176
Despite none of the statewide voucher programs showing any
meaningful academic achievement results, the FTC has shown a supposed

169.
Id. at 409.
170.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 47.
171.
Malin et al., supra note 50, at 218.
172.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 47.
173.
Florida Tax Credit Scholarship FAQs, FLA. DEP’T EDUC.,
http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school-choice/k-12-scholarship-programs/ftc/ftc-faqs.stml (last
visited Dec. 21, 2019).
174.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 51–52.
175.
Florida Tax Credit Scholarship FAQs, supra note 173; Kimberly
Amadeo, What Is Considered Middle Class Income?, BALANCE (June 18, 2019),
http://www.thebalance.com/definition-of-middle-class-income-4126870.
176.
Amadeo, supra note 175; Florida Tax Credit Scholarship FAQs, supra
note 173.
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glimmer of hope for school choice advocates.177 In a non-rigorous study,
researchers found that the FTC “had a statistically significant positive effect
on reading . . . for students close to the program’s . . . eligibility cutoff.178
However, even without considering the veracity of the research, those
students near the cutoff are decidedly not within any definition of lowincome.179
Further, studies showing the success of the FTC aren’t able to
compare the pre and post transfer test scores of participants because the
program’s design eludes such evaluation.180 Lastly, studies that do suggest
the FTC’s success in increasing student attainment are further watered down
by their lack of scientific rigor.181
3.

Governor DeSantis’ Doubling-Down on Vouchers

Florida Governor Ron DeSantis recently signed bold new voucher
legislation, the Family Empowerment Scholarship, which diverts $136
million of public funds to private schools.182 The bill harkens back to the
failed push of former governor Jeb Bush, who was present on the floor as it
passed the state senate, and allows state tax dollars to be funneled directly to
private schools as opposed to the current tax-credit scheme in place.183 The
legislation is expected to face constitutional challenges, but since Holmes,
three of the majority opinion’s justices have retired, and Governor DeSantis
has appointed three conservative justices, himself.184
The new scholarship predictably threatens the sustainability of
existing Florida public schools.185 Despite proponents conservatively
suggesting the scholarship will pull a relatively low $136 million from the
state’s $22.2 billion public education budget, long-term effects of the
scholarship range up to $1 billion in total diverted funds.186 As a result, the
state’s public schools will face increased overcrowding, decreased
177.
See Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 53.
178.
Id. at 48.
179.
Amadeo, supra note 175.
180.
Wolf et al., supra note 13, at 53.
181.
Id.
182.
Kennedy, supra note 163.
183.
Bill Cotterell, Jeb Bush’s Education Plan Comes Full Circle, PENSACOLA
NEWS J., May 5, 2019, at F8.
184.
Kennedy, supra note 163.
185.
Kevin Robinson, Union Says School Choice Law Will Hurt Districts:
Escambia and Santa Rosa Could Take Combine Hit of $20 Million, PENSACOLA NEWS J., May
21, 2019, at A5.
186.
Kennedy, supra note 163; Robinson, supra note 185.
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investment in the arts, and crumbling infrastructure and transportation
services.187 Further, the scholarship is even further divorced from assisting
low-income families as families of four earning as much as $77,250, or not
exceeding three-hundred percent of the poverty line, are eligible for voucher
assistance.188
B.

Florida’s Charter Schools

Along with a robust voucher program, Florida has also instituted a
vast network of charter schools.189 Of Florida’s 2.8 million pre-kindergarten
through high school students, 284,000 are enrolled in the state’s 654 charter
schools.190 Currently, charters are prohibited from opening near a traditional
public school in Florida unless the school had received a “D” or “F” grade by
the school board for three consecutive years.191 But a proposed bill
expanding Florida’s charter school program, named Schools of Hope, seeks
to liberalize charter schools’ access to opportunity zones—or economically
poor areas.192
1.

Negative Results of Charters Schools in Florida

Despite the Florida legislature’s enthusiastic attitude in expanding
charter schools, Florida has seen less-than-stellar results in their
implementation.193 Between 2012 and 2017, 160 charter schools failed
because of typical reasons related to financial and organizational
mismanagement.194 Further, forty-five percent of Florida’s charter schools
are run by for-profit organizations despite evidence showing for-profit
charters earn the worst results for student achievement.195 The combination
of lax regulation of charters and profiteering from education has caused a
failure rate of almost twenty percent a year, costing Florida taxpayers $70
million.196
Charter school proponents in Florida argue—as is the national
refrain for charter advocates—that charter schools outperform traditional
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
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public schools in the high-end range.197 The latest grade report found that
charter schools outperformed traditional public schools sixty-five percent to
fifty-five percent where it came to earning an “A” or “B” grade from the
school board.198 Conversely, charter schools outpaced traditional public
schools in the low end, where they beat out traditional public schools three
percent to one percent where it came to earning “F” grades.199 Additionally,
a general nation-wide study found that where students, instead of schools, are
compared, traditional public schools actually outperformed charters.200
2.

Constitutional Challenges against Schools of Hope

Schools of Hope, like Florida’s newly signed voucher law, is set to
be reviewed by Florida’s courts based on state constitutional challenges.201
Florida’s school boards have launched an offensive against Schools of Hope,
and argue, in part, that the law violates the Florida Constitution’s provision
governing local control of schools.202 But legal challenges against the law
will likely face an uphill battle as the state’s courts have ruled on similar
issues of state and local control in previous rulings.203
For example, the Florida appellate division has already ruled on a
similar operational control matter in School Board of Palm Beach County v.
Florida Charter Education Foundation, Inc.204 In Florida Charter, the Palm
Beach County School Board appealed the constitutionality of Florida’s
charter school law, allowing the state board to reverse its denial of a charter
school opening in the district.205 The county school board argued that the
charter law’s appeals process allowed the state board to overrule the county’s
constitutional power to “operate, control and supervise all free public schools
within the school district.”206 The court found that the Florida Constitution
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gave the state board superior power than the school district to supervise the
system of free public education in the state.207
The current case challenging Schools of Hope came under review at
the First District Court of Appeal.208 During oral arguments, the panel
appeared to question the school board’s argument, particularly whether
standing existed to challenge the law.209 Ultimately, the latest constitutional
challenge of Florida’s charter program will likely be for naught.210
VI.

ALTERNATIVES TO COMPETITION-BASED EDUCATION REFORM

Repeat presidential candidate Bernie Sanders has been among the
loudest voices against competition-based education policies and has
advocated for a more bottom-up and progressive system of reform.211 Paying
homage to former Supreme Court Justice and the petitioner’s counsel in
Brown, Sanders’ proposal is aptly named “A Thurgood Marshall Plan for
Public Education.”212 The plan calls for an adoption of education as a public
good rather than a private commodity as it has evolved into under school
choice.213
In effect, the plan seeks to raise the floor of public education by
raising teacher salaries, investing in adult education after school and summer
programs, making school meals free, and perhaps most significant of all,
providing federal investment to reverse the inequalities of funding between
low and high-income communities.214 In effect, Sanders’ plan is not
dissimilar to what Lebron James’ I Promise School in Akron, Ohio sought
and in the short-term succeeded in achieving.215
Significantly, Sanders’ plan specifically provides for a per-pupil
spending floor.216 There exists some symmetry between a spending floor per
student and voucher and charter school programs allowing funding to follow
the student.217 But, unlike charters and vouchers, Sanders’ plan increases the
level of the funding to ensure positive results for the pupil instead of
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allowing the funding to move from school to school in hopes the pupil is
benefitted.218
Despite the mercurial nature of charters and vouchers, the former has
unquestionably offered positive results for many low-income and minority
students and even school choice opponents are hesitant to call for an outright
ban on charter schools.219 In states with sma conservative implementation of
charters to ensure proper oversight, accountable authorizers of charters, and
charters run by non-profit organizations, charter schools can thrive and
benefit students alongside traditional public schools.220 But, like the I
Promise School, effective public schools serving low-income and minority
students are not exclusive to the charter system and instead are a result of
proper funding and implementation.221 While the Department of Education
has funneled over $4 billion into charter schools—hundreds of millions of
that money into failed charters—the formula for effectively serving lowincome and minority students has already been proven.222 Schools funded
according to the needs of its community rather than property values or
student achievement are better fit to ensure the Court’s mandate in Brown—
that every student have a quality and equal education.223
VII.

CONCLUSION

The start of reversing the lowering floor of public education is not
through competition, but through the acceptance that every child has the
right to a quality education.224 It has been established that low-income
students face more problems with respect to teacher turnover, segregation,
safety, and other detractors that take away from their engagement.225 While
competition has provided a wider range of outcomes for low-income
students, it does not provide them with the security of a quality education.226
Both charter schools and school choice vouchers offer net negative effects to
low-income student populations, despite the former offering a handful of
high performing schools.227
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Instead, public policy should favor a view on education closer to
Chief Justice Warren’s view in Brown and acknowledge that schools are too
interwoven into the fabric of modern society to allow the range of negative
outcomes to be so perilous as they’ve become.228 Considering the staggering
popularity of school choice initiatives among parents and political
proponents spanning both sides of the isle, competition-based reform will be
a hard habit for the United States to kick.229 But, as school choice initiatives
mature and research studies continue to show the negligible and negative
effects of school choice programs on low-income students, public support for
plans like Bernie Sanders’ “A Thurgood Marshall Plan for Public Education”
will likely gain more traction in the public sphere.230
As a despondent Amory Blaine exclaimed in the closing pages of
This Side of Paradise, “[r]eform won’t catch up to the needs of civilization
unless it’s made to. A laissez-faire policy is like spoiling a child by saying
he’ll turn out all right in the end.”231 Leaving education to the devices of
neoliberal policy is too much a price to pay for those toiling at the bottom.232
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